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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This paper is concerned with the future of the minimum wage in Australia.  While the minimum wage, 
from the time of the 1907 Harvester decision, has been a core element of the Australian wages 
system, its nature and role has varied.  Established as a ‘family’ wage it has moved to be a wage for 
a single person, with the role of family support being taken up by government and by changing 
patterns of workforce participation.  Despite the minimum wage remaining relatively stable in real 
terms over recent decades, this transition has seen rising living standards for low waged families.  
This has occurred without strongly exacerbating inequality and without the potential adverse 
consequences of a growing minimum wage outstripping the productivity of many low paid workers.  
Notwithstanding the central role of government policies and programs in this, there is little to suggest 
that this is the consequence of a deliberate and coherent policy strategy implemented by different 
governments over time. 
It is however a transition which is coming to an end.   
After an introduction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 looks at the history of the federal minimum wage in 
Australia. While the paper notes that for much of the period State minimum wages, and award 
minimums, may have played much more direct roles, the focus on the federal minimum wage reflects 
both the current role of the wage and the influence it has had over time.  Over this period the well-
being of workers on the minimum wage has also been impacted on by other changes, including in 
relation to working hours and superannuation.  In weekly terms the minimum wage has increased by 
almost 120 per cent since the Harvester decision, but taking account of these other factors suggests 
a real hourly increase of some 220 per cent.  The minimum wage has though declined relative to 
other earnings. In part a consequence of the family wage structure of the Harvester decision and its 
underlying male breadwinner model, it was not until 1975 that the minimum wage was extended to 
women. 
The current role of the minimum wage is discussed in Chapter 3. In the absence of direct data on the 
payment of the minimum wage the paper draws estimates from a range of different surveys.  These 
suggest that between 4 and 10 per cent of adults are currently paid at or around the minimum wage.  
Minimum wage employment is higher among small firms and in occupations such as food 
preparation, process workers, sales, hospitality and in agriculture and related occupations. Part-time 
workers are more likely to be employed on the minimum wage as are those employed on a casual 
basis.  Although there is contradictory data, on balance it appears women are more likely to be 
employed on the minimum wage than men.  Minimum wage employment is more frequent amongst 
younger workers, but picks up again for older age groups. It is also much more common amongst 
those with low levels of education.   
In stark contrast to the original conception of the Harvester minimum wage as a family wage, the 
archetype of a single breadwinner supporting a partner and children while working on the minimum 
wage has virtually disappeared. Indeed it is estimated that just 1.1 per cent of couple families with 
dependent children currently fit the Harvester model. Rather the income of minimum wage 
employees tends to supplement that of higher earners in households.  Amongst couples receipt of 
the minimum wage is most frequently by one member of a couple, working either full or part-time for 
the minimum wage, while their partner works full-time at a higher earnings rate.  In many other 
households the minimum wage employee is an adult child still living at home.  A consequence of this 
is that while minimum wage workers are more likely to be in lower income households, they are 
represented in households across the income distribution.  While 30 per cent of minimum wage 
workers are in the ‘poorest’ 20 per cent of working households, almost a quarter are in the ‘richest’ 
40 per cent.  Using relative income measures minimum wage employees were only marginally more 
likely to be in a household ‘in poverty’ than other employees, with this result holding also for 
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measures of financial stress and ‘consistent poverty’.  Where these measures identified 
disadvantage, this was associated with either a lack of employment, or part-time employment. A 
consequence of this is that today the minimum wage is a relatively inefficient and ineffective means 
of boosting the incomes of low income households. 
Internationally Australia has a high minimum wage, and along with France, which also has a high 
minimum wage and New Zealand, it has a relatively high incidence of minimum wage employment.  
In contrast the UK and Netherlands, while also having a relative high minimum wage, have a much 
lower rate of minimum wage employment. Canada and the United States have comparatively lower 
minimum wages and rates of incidence somewhat between these other two groupings. 
Chapter 4 looks at more recent trends in the minimum wage, relative to other earnings and its 
interaction with the tax and transfer system.  Compared to other earnings, the value of the minimum 
wage in Australia has declined over recent decades. This reflects higher rates of growth in these 
earnings rather than a fall in the minimum wage.  The most significant trends however are those 
arising from the interaction of wages with the tax and transfer systems. Between January 1986 and 
January 2012 the paper estimates that, while the real value of minimum wage increased by just 1.3 
per cent, the disposable income of a single person earning this wage increased by $53 per week 
mainly due to lower taxation.  For a couple with a single wage earner on the minimum wage with two 
young children, as a consequence of policies directed at providing support to low income families 
with children, disposable incomes are estimated to have increased by $410 per week – a 70 per cent 
increase.   
There are many theories about the economic role of the minimum wage.  These and the evidence 
from empirical research about the impact of changes in minimum wages are discussed in Chapter 5. 
The paper argues that, while these theories are most frequently portrayed as conflicting – and the 
results of analysis interpreted as proving or refuting a generalised case about the impact of minimum 
wage policies – much of this debate is misplaced.  Rather it needs to be recognised that the labour 
market is complex, has many distortions and that labour supply is not homogeneous.  A 
consequence of this is that the impact of minimum wage changes, especially at the margin, is very 
sensitive to specific circumstances and may be quite different depending upon these.  In the longer 
run however, sustained increases in real wages require higher productivity. 
The final chapter addresses future policy options.  It recognises that Australia has adopted national 
policies of boosting participation and productivity and it places the question of the minimum wage in 
this context.  Three options are considered.  The first is maintaining the minimum wage at around its 
current real value, as has been done over recent decades.  While minimising pressure on 
employment this comes at the cost of greater wages inequality and potential poor outcomes for 
single people depending on this income.  The second is to allow the minimum wage to increase in 
line with overall productivity growth and other wages.  This strategy, unless accompanied by 
increased productivity of minimum wage employees is likely to have adverse employment outcomes 
– with this being borne by those with the lowest skills.  The third is to hold the minimum wage 
steady, as with the first option, but with the government intervening in a targeted way to boost the 
incomes of the low paid through policies such as an earned income tax credit. 
In identifying these options the paper emphasises that while this relatively benign transition in the 
role of the minimum wage is coming to an end, what is required is not a short term fix, but rather a 
clear strategy. Future policy requires the development of a clear articulation of the role of the 
minimum wage, and the building of appropriate institutional supports for this. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The natural and proper measure of wages is such a sum as is a fair and immediate 
recompense for the labour for which they are paid, having regard to its characteristic and 
duration; but it can never be taken at a less sum than such as is sufficient to maintain the 
labourer and his family in a state of health and reasonable comfort.   
Sir Samuel Griffith, The Elementary Property Bill 1890 (Cited in Mendelsohn 1979 p145) 
 
This paper is concerned with the current and future role of the minimum wage in Australia. Looking 
backwards it shows that the minimum wage, despite some increases in recent years, is at levels 
similar to those which it reached in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Its role over this period has 
however changed. It has shifted from being a wage set to meet the needs of a family to that of a 
wage for a single person. The role of family support has been taken up by both the increasing 
incidence of dual income households, and through increases in government support for families.  
This latter has meant that, even the reducing share of single income families which are reliant upon 
the minimum wage, have experienced strong increases in their disposable incomes1. 
The substantive question this paper is concerned with is the implications of this for the minimum 
wage into the future. Notwithstanding considerable debate around the impact of changes to 
minimum wages on employment, long term sustained growth in the real value of the minimum wage 
without productivity growth by workers in receipt of the minimum wage is likely to have detrimental 
impacts on employment. For many marginal workers the demands of such productivity growth may 
be unrealistic or otherwise need to be offset. At the same time policy objectives of social inclusion 
and long term economic sustainability and growth have focused on a ‘high participation’ agenda for 
Australia. Reconciling this may require a further change in the role of the minimum wage. It may also 
require the introduction of measures such as an earned income tax credit to ensure that those who 
do work can achieve an adequate standard of living relative to the rest of the community, without 
putting inappropriate demands on the ability of the market to generate adequate employment 
opportunities. 
In looking at this subject, especially from a historical perspective, it is to be noted that the nature of 
the ‘minimum wage’ in Australia has varied considerably over time and there has rarely been a single 
comprehensive minimum wage across the population. This will be explored further in Chapter 2 and 
reflects many factors including the separate Commonwealth and State industrial relations 
jurisdictions and changes in the industrial relations system, as well as the specific circumstances 
that gave rise to the original federal minimum wage decision. In addition to the adult minimum wage, 
the Australian wages system has had a tradition of the payment of junior rates, usually to people 
aged under 21 years. This paper is primarily concerned with the adult minimum wage. Appendix B 
presents some findings with regard to junior rates. 
                                                          
1 The characterisation of the Australian minimum wage, and the significance of the Harvester decision and the range of 
economic and social structures it embodied, and the evolution this over time, has been considered by a number of authors. 
These include Watson et al (2003) and their concept of ‘Harvester Man’, and Castles (1985) and his characterisation of the 
“wage earners welfare state”. This latter suggests that Australia developed a specific form of a ‘welfare state’ focused on 
achieving high levels of well-being by generating well paid employment with low unemployment. This was underpinned by a 
set of specific institutional arrangements namely: the use of tariffs as a means of protecting industry and ensuring high wages; 
the role of the arbitration system as a means of ensuring the distribution of the rents generated through this mechanism; and 
the regulation of labour supply through migration policy. 
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In Australian industrial relations parlance confusion also exists around the use of the term ‘minimum 
wage’. This has arisen because the system comprised a series of industry and job classification 
based minimum wages – the minimum wage that could be paid by an employer who was covered by 
the award to an employee of that classification in a particular industry, rather than a floor under all 
wages. Frequently documentation will refer to these as ‘minimum award rates’.  
Indeed it was only in 1997 that the Federal Minimum Wage was established as a formal floor to the 
award wages system and in 2006 that this role was effectively expanded to encompass non-federal 
award employees with subsequent changes leading to close to universal coverage. 
This though does not mean that the minimum wage did not play an important role in underpinning 
the wage system prior to this. Indeed for much of the period of its existence it has played a dual role, 
both as a minimum floor wage and as the fundamental building block from which other award wages 
were derived. This was as a result of these wages being formally constructed in terms of the 
minimum wage plus additional amounts reflecting skills and other factors. In this structure increases 
in the minimum wage have generally directly flowed on to a much wider group of employees.  
Again this aspect of the minimum wage is not the focus of this analysis2. 
The balance of the paper is structured as follows: 
• Chapter 2 looks at the development of the Australian minimum wage over the 20th century 
• Chapter 3 is primarily concerned with the current role of the minimum wage. It considers the 
types of jobs which are paid at this rate, and the relationship between income from the 
minimum wage and household income. It also reviews the nature and level of minimum 
wages in a number of countries and compares these with Australia’s 
• Chapter 4 is concerned in more detail with the changes in the minimum wage over the past 
25 years and the relationship between the minimum wage and the tax transfer system 
• Chapter 5 considers the economics of the minimum wage. The first part is theoretical and 
examines the various approaches to understanding the economic role and consequences of 
a minimum wage. The second part provides an extensive overview of some of the more 
recent Australian and international research in this field 
• Chapter 6 drawing on the previous chapters, and some of the central policy priorities 
enunciated by Australian governments, identifies some of the challenges for minimum wage 
policy over the next 25 years, and strategies which may be used to address these. 
  
                                                          
2 While this paper is not concerned with this formal mechanism some of the market driven spillover effects of minimum wage 
setting are considered.  
 3 
 
2 HISTORY OF THE AUSTRALIAN MINIMUM 
WAGE 
Along with contemporary developments in New Zealand the minimum wages established by Wages 
Boards under the Victorian Factories and Shops Act 1896, were amongst the first independently 
established minimum wages in Australia and the world. (Webb 1912, Pember Reeves 1969, Leonard 
2000). These Boards, comprised of equal numbers of employers and employees with an 
independent chair, had the power to determine minimum wages (and piece rates) within industries. 
While the scope of these Boards was limited (Price 2009) and focused in particular on industries with 
‘sweated labour’, at the time, their impact on earnings was seen as significant.  As an example of 
this the Victorian Government Statist (1904) reported: “For instance, the average weekly wages of all 
employés (including boys) in the bread-making trade was £1 12s. 6d. in 1896, prior to the Wages 
Board being in operation, and £2 2s. 10d. in 1902 when its determination was in full force”. (p 91) 
Although the States’ industrial relations systems played a more significant role than the Federal 
system for much of the 20th century3, for the purposes of this analysis, which is concerned with the 
broad picture of the development of the minimum wage and its contemporary role, the focus is on 
the federal jurisdiction. For similar reasons it does not address the different rates of the federal 
minimum wage struck for different locations.4 The question of the minimum wage for women is 
discussed in Section 2.9.5  
2.1 Harvester Judgement 
The foundation of the Australian Federal Minimum Wage was the 1907 Harvester decision (2 CAR 1).  
This case concerned an application by HV McKay, proprietor of the Sunshine Harvester Works, for 
an exemption from the imposition of a tariff on the manufacture of agricultural harvesting machines6. 
The case arose because a condition of the Excise Tariff Act 1906 was that an exemption could only 
be granted if ‘fair and reasonable’ wages were to be paid to employees.  Trade Unions opposed the 
application as they considered that the rates paid did not reach this standard. The case was, as a 
consequence, directed at the question of what a ‘fair and reasonable’ wage was for the employees 
of this company. 
The case was heard by Justice Higgins, President of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and 
Arbitration. While concerned with the wages paid to all employees, his central focus was initially on 
the question of identifying a wage for an unskilled worker. He approached the question of what 
constituted a fair and reasonable wage by considering a wage which was appropriate to “the normal 
needs of the average employee regarded as a human being living in a civilised community”. He 
                                                          
3 Indeed even in 1968 it was estimated that 40.1 per cent of employees were affected by Commonwealth Awards, 46.3 per 
cent by State Awards with the remaining 12.7 per cent outside of the award system (CBCS 1970 p 136).  
4 For example, in February 1923, the value of the minimum wage ranged from the equivalent of $8.25 in Sydney to $7.35 in 
Brisbane, reflecting changes in the cost of living in different locations. (CBCS 1970 p 335.)  
5 A further issue, not discussed in this paper is the treatment of wages for Indigenous Australians. While this was not so much 
an issue with general industry wages, up until the 1970s, two specific factors often meant that these wages were lower than 
other Australians. The first, up until 1967, was the extent to which Indigenous Australians could be treated as wards of the 
state which frequently resulted in state employment at sub-award rates (this also extended to NT where wages were regulated 
through ordinance). The second was the exclusion of Aboriginal employees from many pastoral awards leaving their rates of 
pay being set by employers as they wished. 
6 The Sunshine Harvester Works was one of a substantial number of companies making application under the Act.  It was 
selected by Higgins as the focus as it was amongst the largest of the companies making application and had a wide range of 
employees.  This latter enabled the question of wages for different occupations to also be considered in the case. 
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further articulated this as being a wage sufficient for “himself and his family” and as “a wage 
sufficient to insure the workman food, shelter, clothing, frugal comfort, provision for evil days, &c”. In 
making his judgement Higgins drew upon a range of evidence which was presented in hearings – 
including by “working men’s wives and others” – on what might be the “necessary average weekly 
expenditure for a labourer’s home of about five persons”. (ibid pp5-6). He concluded that the 
minimum wage should be set at 7 shillings a day for an unskilled labourer7 – on the basis of a 8 hour 
day six days a week – a weekly ‘living’ wage of £2 2s – approximately $279 per week in $2012 terms. 
Although this decision was subsequently overturned by the High Court, as being constitutionally 
invalid (Frazer 2002), the rate of 7 shillings a day was rapidly adopted as a minimum wage in other 
decisions of the Australian Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (Higgins 1915). The historical 
development of the minimum wage from this beginning is illustrated in Figure 1 and discussed in 
Sections 2.2 to 2.5. While, as shown in the chart, the minimum wage had various identities over time, 
with the exception of the period between 1978 and 1995, it can be considered as a single series. 
Figure 1. Estimated real value in $2012 of the basic/minimum wage 1907-2012 
 
Source: See Appendix A  
2.2 The minimum wage until 1953 
From 1913 the Court began a process of updating the living wage, which became generally known 
as the ‘basic wage’, for changes in prices8. This, initially an ad hoc process, was formalised in 1921 
with the introduction of indexation, an arrangement which remained in place until September 1953. 
Some other changes were also made to the underlying rate over the period. These included: a 
                                                          
7 This occupational grouping included furnacemen’s labourers, lorry drivers and carters. 
8 When introduced indexation was based on the change in prices in specific locations. In 1923 the Statistician was providing 
individual price indexes for 200 towns (CBCS 1929 pp 40-42). 
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loading of 3 shillings a week between 1922 and 19349; a reduction of 10 per cent in the rate between 
February 1931 and 1934 as a response to the depression10; and the reintroduction of prosperity 
loadings of 3 shillings a week in 1937. 
As shown in Figure 1, in real $2012 terms, the Basic Wage in November 1952 was around $372, 
compared with $296 in February 1923, and $279 at the time of the Harvester decision11. 
Over this period there were also a number of reviews of the basic wage: 
• The 1920 Royal Commission on the Basic Wage: The terms of reference for the Commission 
asked it to assess “the actual cost of living at the present time, according to reasonable 
standards of comfort, including all matters comprised in the ordinary expenditure of a household, 
for a man with a wife and three children under fourteen years of age” (Piddington 1920 p 4). The 
finding (with dissent) was that the cost varied from £5 6s. 2d. to £5. 17s. These levels were 
however considered to be impractically high (see FWA 2011 pp 85-86) and the uprated 
Harvester Basic Wage was retained with a 3 shilling loading which brought its current value to 
£4 5s.12, and much more formalised indexation arrangements. To enable this indexation a new 
ABS price index was introduced. The terms of this decision also introduced a second principle 
into the setting of the minimum wage – that of the capacity of industry to pay13. 
• Basic Wage Inquiry 1934: This resulted in the ‘Restoration Basic Wage’ (CBCS 1939 p 77) which 
introduced a new Basic Wage of £3 5s – in effect reversing the 10 per cent cut implemented in 
1931 but stripping off the earlier 3s. loading, as well as again ushering in a new price index. 
• Basic Wage Inquiry 1937: This viewed the 1934 decision as reflecting a ‘needs based’ basic 
wage, and added geographic and industry based loadings (CBCS 1939 p 78) – later known as 
prosperity loadings. 
• Basic Wage Inquiry 1940: While this Inquiry rejected an increase in the value of the Basic Wage, 
the judgement by the Chief Judge of the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration: “I regard the 
present basic wage as adequate for a family unit of three persons, but think it offers only a 
meagre existence for a family unit of four. When that unit gets beyond four, hardship is often 
experienced.” (cited in Plowman 1995 p 264)14 was one of the pressures which led to the 
introduction of child endowment, at a rate of 5s. a week for the second or above child in a family, 
in 1941. 
• Basic Wage inquiries in 1946, and again in 1949-50: The first of these involved the granting of an 
interim increase of 7s. while the second resulted in the setting of the Basic Wage, in November 
1950, at £8 2s. comprising a £6 17s. needs component, a now uniform 5s. prosperity loading 
and £1 additional loading. (CBCS 1955 Chpt III) 
                                                          
9 This loading was introduced as protection against the time lag in making indexation adjustments. (Hancock 2004 p 420) 
10 Gregory, Ho and McDermott (1988) report that notwithstanding the formal cutting of the basic wage by 10 per cent, this was 
neither reflected in the average wages paid to factory workers nor in the average award wages paid across industries. 
11 It is to be noted that the actual rates cited in specific decisions do not necessarily match the rates used in Appendix 1 and 
elsewhere in this paper. In general this results from the table being based on an average across capital cities, with decisions 
relating to a single specific location. 
12 FWA(2011) notes this “was done through a confusing series of decisions and conferences” (p192). 
13 In the Harvester decision the issue of capacity to pay was briefly considered, but Higgins noted that this was neither the 
focus of the Customs Tariff Act, nor was it a substantive issue in the case. Rather he indicated: “There is far more ground for 
the view that, under this section, the fair, and reasonable remuneration has to be paid before profits are ascertained-that it 
stands on the same level as the cost of the raw material of the manufacture.” (2 CAR 1 p5) In addition it was not seen as a 
substantive issue as McKay had indicated that he could afford to pay higher rates. 
14 The adoption of a family unit of four as the new reference point appears to have occurred in 1934 (“Best citizens suffer – 
Basic Wage Method” The Argus 1940 p 5) 
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• Basic Wage and Standard Hours Inquiry 1952-53. This decided not to grant an increase in the 
basic wage and abolished indexation, but rejected an employer submission for an increase in 
standard hours.  
The period between 1926 and 1941 was also notable for a series of reductions in working hours. 
These comprised changes in the number of hours worked per week and in the number of weeks 
worked per year. The changes in weekly working hours initially involved a reduction in the standard 
hours of work to 44 per week, and subsequently, as a result of the Standard Hours Inquiry of 1947, 
the introduction of the 40 hour week in January 1948. Annual leave of 1 week per year was initially 
introduced in some Federal Awards in 1936 and became standard in 1941. It was then extended to 
two weeks from 1945. 
2.3 Post indexation and the introduction of the minimum 
wage 1953-78 
After the cessation of indexation the Basic wage was initially adjusted, between 1953 and 1966, at 
intervals of one to three years, by a series of decisions of the Commonwealth Conciliation and 
Arbitration Commission. In 1966 as a consequence of the ‘Basic Wage, Margins and Total Wage 
Case’, the basic wage was replaced by a ‘minimum wage’ for adult males. This established a wage 
floor for employees under federal awards which was set at $3.75 per week above the former rate of 
the basic wage (ABS 1974)15. This continued to be adjusted through Commission decisions, roughly 
on an annual basis, until 1975 when quarterly indexation was reintroduced.  
In the National Wage Case of 1974 the Commission decided to extend the minimum wage to adult 
females through a phased process with parity to be achieved by 30 June 1975. (See section 2.9 for 
further details on the treatment of women under the basic and minimum wage.) 
In 1975 the Commission again established a linkage between wage adjustments and the CPI. These 
adjustments however did not involve automatic indexation. Rather there were a mix of decisions, 
some granting full indexation, some partial indexation and others plateau adjustments at a flat rate 
across awards. (Dabscheck & Niland 1984)  
This period saw the Basic/Minimum wage increase in nominal terms from $23.10 in November 1952 
to $115.50 in June 1978 – a real increase, in $2012 terms, from $372 to $534 per week – an increase 
of 43.6 per cent. 
There were also further increases in annual leave over this period. Three weeks annual leave became 
standard in the early 1960s, and four weeks by 1974. 
2.4 Divergence 1978-1995 
From 1978 to 1987 it is more difficult to track the movement in the ‘minimum wage’. This was a 
consequence of the decision of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission to 
abandon plateau indexation and the emergence of decentralised wage bargaining. 
                                                          
15 A differentiation between this decision and the usual decisions with regard to the Basic Wage was that this increase did not 
flow on through the wages system. Rather there continued to effectively be a Basic Wage – but this was a notional concept – 
with the Minimum Wage forming the wage floor. Plowman (1991) describes this as the end of the ‘foundational’ basic wage. 
This decision is also discussed in Hawke (1969) who described it as an attempt by the Commission to “with the lowest 
possible cost impact to do something for those people who because of their lower bargaining power had not been able 
through over-award payments to make up for the inadequacy of the basic wage to provide a reasonable standard of living.”   
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In 1978 the Commission considered an application by employers that the concept of a minimum 
wage should be abolished ‘because it had no basis or concept behind it’ (Plowman 1995 p 280). 
While the Commission ultimately decided to retain the concept it declared that in future the minimum 
wage “would be subject to the same adjustment as award wages generally” (ibid) rather than there 
being any specific focus on the adequacy of the minimum wage itself.  
The second factor was that of some decentralisation of wage fixation, initially in the form of flow-ons 
from the work value case brought by waterside workers. The focus here is on decisions relating to 
the Metal Industries Award and the minimum rates of pay this contained.  
The role of the Metal Industry Award in this period was important for three reasons. The first because 
of the extent to which decisions taken under this award tended to establish a community 
benchmark. Secondly because it covered a substantial component of manufacturing industry where 
the minimum wage represented the wage of a process worker. The third is the role of this award in 
the later restoration of a formal minimum wage. 
As a consequence over the period it is possible to contemplate two versions of the Minimum Wage. 
The first a ‘National Wage Case only’ minimum wage which simply reflects the impact of the National 
Wage Case decisions over the period. The second is one which includes the gains which were 
incorporated into the Metal Industry Award. Over the period the first of these became less and less 
relevant in terms of its role in establishing the rates of pay of low paid workers, and the second more 
so.   
As discussed in Section 2.5 this convergence towards the Metal Industry based minimum wage 
ultimately resulted in it forming the basis for the current Federal Minimum Wage. In contrast the 
‘National Wage Case only’ version of the minimum wage had become so irrelevant that in their 
submission to the 1997 Safety Net Review one of the major employer organisations wrote in terms of 
“reviving the minimum wage” and placing its value as being “about $260 a week”. (The Australian 
Chamber of Commerce and Industry cited in AIRC Dec 335/97 1997.) 
Over the period there were a number of substantial increases in the Metal Industry Award including: 
a supplementary payment in September 1978, a Work Value decision in November 1979; major 
increases awarded in 1981 (which involved at the trades level an increase of $25 per week and $14 
per week) as well as the introduction of a 38 hour week. There were also a series of increases in 
1990 and 1991 associated with Award restructuring. These increases, along with those from National 
Wage Cases, resulted in the nominal value of the ‘metal industry’ minimum wage rising from $115.50 
in June 1978 to $349.40 in September 1995. However, in real terms, the value at the end of this 
period was a scant half a per cent above the $534 ($2012) it was at the beginning. As seen in Figure 
1 this change in value comprised a steep increase to December 1981 followed by an equally marked 
decline. Taking account of National Wage Case and Safety Net Award decisions over the same 
period, the notional reference Minimum Wage increased in nominal terms from $115.50 to $260.30 – 
in real terms a fall from $534 to $399 ($2012). 
Little data exists to identify the relative reliance on these two series of the minimum wage, although 
the evidence from the ABS Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership (EEBTUM) 
survey, as discussed later, suggests that large numbers of low paid workers, in particular women, 
did not immediately benefit from types of gains achieved in the Metal Industry Award, although an 
increasing proportion did in later years. The final impetus to convergence was the August 1989 
National Wage Case which endorsed the minimum rates for a metal and building industry 
tradesperson to “reflect the final effect of the structural efficiency adjustment determined by this 
decision.” (AIRC Dec 530/89 1989 p12) 
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A simple focus however on the rate of the minimum wage over this period does not though tell the 
full story of the changes in well-being of low paid workers. Between September 1983 and July 1995 
under a series of seven ‘Prices and Incomes Accords’ between the ACTU and the federal Labor 
Government there were a series of negotiated trade-offs of wage increases in favour of social wage 
benefits. These included: personal income tax cuts; child care subsidies; increased family payments; 
health care through Medicare; and the development of employer funded superannuation.   
While most of these policies involved government expenditure (or reduced revenue as a result of tax 
cuts) as a trade-off for wage restraint, this was not the case with superannuation. The first stage of 
this was implemented in the 1986 National Wage Case which, in lieu of granting a wage increase for 
productivity gains, agreed a proposal for an employer contribution to superannuation of an amount 
equal to 3 per cent of wages for those workers employed under awards16. Following the rejection by 
the Commission of a bid to increase this in 1991 the Government introduced the Superannuation 
Guarantee. This resulted in, not just the extension of the 3 per cent contribution to most 
employees,17 but also a staged increase in the rate of contribution to 9 per cent of earnings with this 
level being reached in 2002-0318. Bateman and Piggot (cited in Treasury 2001) reported that between 
1987 and 1991 superannuation coverage grew from around 40 per cent of employees to 79 per cent, 
and in the private sector from 32 per cent to 68 per cent. The ATO (2011) reported that, by 1999, the 
coverage had increased to 91 per cent of employees.  
As a deliberate wage trade-off the design of the Australian superannuation system and its interaction 
with the publicly funded, flat rate, Age Pension is currently structured so that these superannuation 
savings largely complement, rather than substitute for, entitlement to the Age Pension19.  
2.5 Restoration of a Minimum Wage, 1997 to date 
The April 1997 Safety Net Review conducted by the Australian Industrial Relations Commission 
(AIRC) saw the introduction of a new Federal Minimum Wage. The decision stated 
“We have decided to determine a minimum wage (to be called "the federal minimum 
wage") for full-time adult employees of $359.40 per week …  The federal minimum wage 
of $359.40 per week is established as the wage below which no full-time adult employee 
working under a federal award is to be paid.”  (AIRC Dec 335/97 1997)20 
With regard to the grounds on which they set this rate the Commission stated: “we have decided not 
to link the level of the federal minimum wage with any defined benchmark of needs. We think that the 
most appropriate course to follow now is to equate the federal minimum wage with the minimum 
classification rate in most federal awards; that is, the rate of the C14 classification in the Metal 
                                                          
16 These contributions were paid into individual accounts, most frequently in ‘Industry’ Superannuation Funds (these are 
independent mutual type funds overseen by employer and union representatives) as part of a defined contribution retirement 
income system. 
17 Exemptions apply for those employees aged under 18 years and over 69 years, and those with an income below $450 per 
month. 
18 As at 1 July 2013 the rate of the Superannuation Guarantee is increasing to 9.25 per cent as part of a phased increase in the 
rate to 12 per cent.  This goal is to be reached in 2019. (ATO 2013) 
19  The Australian Treasury estimates that the net earnings replacement rate of retirement income comprising of 
superannuation savings and the Age Pension for a single male who works for 37 years would be almost 110 per cent for a 
person earning half average weekly earnings; around 90 per cent for one earning three-quarters; and around 75 per cent for a 
person on average weekly earnings (Henry 2009 p 110). 
20 The decision also made provision for an hourly rate for part-time employees, with this being set at 1/38th of the weekly rate, 
and for the proportionate payment of a the minimum wage to junior employees. 
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Industry Award.”(ibid) At the time of the decision the C14 rate was $349.40, which with the $10 per 
week awarded in the decision, generated the rate of $359.40.  
This rate was subsequently increased in eight Annual Safety Net Reviews up to June 2005.  In 2006 
responsibility for the setting of the minimum wage was transferred to the Australian Fair Pay 
Commission (AFPC) which provided increases in 2006, 2007 and 2008, but decided against any 
increase in 2009.  In 2010 the role of setting the minimum wage moved to Fair Work Australia (FWA) 
which awarded increases in 2010, 2011 and 2012. In its June 2010 decision it also decided that 
minimum standard casual loadings21 should be increased, in a series of steps of one percentage 
point each year, from the default 20 per cent to 25 per cent. (FWA C2010/1 para 403) 
Both the AFPC and FWA have had specific legislative criteria for setting the minimum wage. In the 
case of the AFPC this was stated in terms of: “The objective of the AFPC in performing its wage-
setting function is to promote the economic prosperity of the people of Australia having regard to the 
following: (a) the capacity for the unemployed and low paid to obtain and remain in employment; (b) 
employment and competitiveness across the economy; (c) providing a safety net for the low 
paid”.(Workplace Relations Act 1996) The legislation for FWA specifies that in setting the minimum 
wage FWA is required to consider: “(a) the performance and competitiveness of the national 
economy, including productivity, business competitiveness and viability, inflation and employment 
growth; (b) promoting social inclusion through increased workforce participation; and (c) relative living 
standards and the needs of the low paid” (Fair Work Act 2009 Section 284) 
The shifting industrial relations framework also saw the role of the Federal Minimum Wage move 
from being a minimum wage for employees on Federal Awards, as noted in the AIRC decision above, 
to a broader coverage to encompass all ‘constitutional corporations’ under the Work Choices 
legislation of 2005 and then expanded coverage to sole traders, partnerships, other unincorporated 
entities, except those in Western Australia, progressively to 2010.  
In the 14 years since its re-introduction the nominal rate of the Federal Minimum Wage has increased 
to $606.40 (as at 1 July 2012) – a real increase (including the initial $10 increase awarded with the 
introduction of the wage) of just over $70 and real growth of 13.1 per cent.22 
The flow-on of changes to the minimum wage 
While the emphasis here in discussion has been on the rate of the ‘minimum wage’, in large part 
most of the decisions discussed have had implications for the wage rates paid for a much wider 
group of employees, and in fact affect the wider group ‘minimum wages’ as established through 
Awards and Collective and Individual Agreements. As discussed previously within most agreements 
there are a series of minimum rates of pay for each occupational level or grouping. The decisions on 
the setting of the ‘minimum wage’ have in general also contained decisions relating to the setting of 
these minimum rates.  
                                                          
21 The casual loading is a payment made to employees who are employed without an entitlement to paid leave. While there is 
some contention as to what the loading actually compensates for, in general terms it is seen as encompassing the non-
payment of recreation, sickness and family leave, as well as non-accrual of long-service leave and termination entitlements. 
While termed ‘casual’ in many cases such employees are employed on an on-going, and often full-time, basis. Existing 
loadings tend to be in the range from 15 to 30 per cent. 
22 The FMW applies to adult employees. Provision is made in decisions for separate rates for junior employees, for 
apprentices and for some groups of persons with a disability. (Employees with disability who are unable to perform the range 
of duties to the competence level required because of the effects of disability on their productive capacity). As at 1 July 2011 
the hourly junior rates of the minimum wage were: under 16 years of age $5.87; 16 years of age $7.55; 17 years of age $9.22; 
18 years of age $10.90; 19 years of age $13.17; and 20 years of age $15.59. These compare with the adult rate of $15.96. The 
minimum rate for apprentices varies from $10.22, in the first year of an apprenticeship to $17.65 in the fourth year – a rate the 
FMW. (Fair Work Ombudsman 2012) Whether or not young people are paid at junior or adult rates varies between individual 
awards and agreements and from workplace to workplace. It was estimated in 2004 that of employees aged 15-20 years: 18.4 
per cent were apprentices or trainees being paid at rates appropriate to these positions; 43.2 per cent were paid junior rates; 
and 38.4 per cent were paid adult rates. (Australian Government 2006 p 157) 
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Hence in the 1977 decision of the AIRC, the $10 increase referred to above not only applied to the 
newly established Federal Minimum Wage, but also to all minimum and paid rates awards. In the first 
two decisions of the AFPC they made what they called ‘differential decisions’ awarding different 
increases to different groups of employees. In 2006 this involved an increase in the minimum wage 
and all wages up to $700 per week, of $27.36, and a lesser increase of $22.04 to pay scales above 
this rate. By contrast the 2008 decision was a flat $21.66 across all pay scales. A similar flat increase 
– this time of $26 per week was made by Fair Work Australia in their 2009-10 Annual Wage Review, 
although in their 2010-11 Review they decided to award a 3.4 per cent increase to all modern 
award23 minimum wages – with this rate of increase applying also to the federal minimum wage.  A 
proportional increase was also awarded in the 2011-12 determination, in this case 2.9 per cent. 
Given the varying ways in which changes in the minimum wage may be applied to others, the nature 
of wage setting decisions is most probably best characterised as the minimum wage and other wage 
rates being ‘co-determined’ rather than the change to the minimum wage ‘flowing-on’ to other 
employees. 
2.6 Accounting for hours and superannuation 
Since the Harvester decision the weekly value of the minimum wage has grown in real terms by 
117.3 per cent. This comparison does however not take full account of changes in employment 
arrangements and working conditions experienced by minimum wage workers over time. These, as 
discussed, include reductions in hours of work (both weekly and through the increases in paid leave) 
and the value of payments made on behalf of employees under the superannuation guarantee.  If 
these changes are included the effective real value of the minimum wage has increased much more 
substantially. In terms of remuneration (including superannuation) per hour worked the real value has 
increased by 224.2 per cent – an annualised growth of 1.1 per cent. 
Figure 2 illustrates this. It shows an index (Nov. 1907 = 100) of real value of the minimum wage (as a 
weekly wage), and the index of this wage adjusted for effective hours worked, taking account of 
changes in the working week and leave, and the value of superannuation. A third line plots the value 
of the latter as a percentage of the former.  
For the purposes of this and subsequent analysis of the minimum wage24 over time the ‘metal 
workers’ series has been used as the indicative value of the minimum wage between 1978 and 1997.  
While this may initially overstate the value of the wages paid to people on the minimum wage, as is 
seen later in Figure 14 by 1983 the ‘NWC only’ minimum wage had fallen to just some 60 to 65 per 
cent of the value of the 10th percentile of the earnings distribution, suggesting it had by that time 
become largely irrelevant as a floor of the wages system.  
As shown, since the Harvester decision, changes in conditions – related to hours worked and 
superannuation, have increased the effective hourly benefit from the minimum wage by almost 50 
per cent over the change in the weekly rate of pay. These changes were most marked in the 1920s 
to 1940s as a consequence of the reduction in weekly working hours and the introduction of annual 
leave, in the 1960s and 1970s with increases in annual leave, and then again from the 1980s to early 
2000s, initially with the introduction of the 38 hour week, and then superannuation. In addition to 
these changes many other improvements in working arrangements and conditions have also 
                                                          
23 Modern Awards were introduced in 2010 and replaced a large number of federal and state industrial awards. They identify 
industry or occupational based minimum employment standards and earnings. They do not apply to an employer with an 
enterprise award or to employees with earnings over $120,000 per annum, however the rates of pay in the awards over-ride 
lesser entitlements which may be in contracts or other agreements. 
24 The language of the minimum wage and the Federal Minimum Wage is used interchangeably to refer to this series over 
time. 
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occurred. These include long service leave, sick pay, and family leave, and other support for 
employment such as child care subsidies. 
 
Figure 2. Effective value of minimum wage for a constant labour input 1907-2012 
 
Source: Derived from Figure 1 and author’s calculations 
 
Conversely, from an employer perspective, most of these additional benefits have increased the 
effective cost of labour. In most cases these increases would have been proportionate across all 
employees, and hence have not impacted directly on the relative cost of employing minimum wage 
employees. 
2.7 Measuring prices 
In deriving the above estimates a linked price index has been used. This draws upon early retail price 
indexes – the ‘A Series’ retail price index – a measure which was largely restricted to groceries, dairy 
products, meat and house rents for the period up to 1914; the ‘C Series’ price index which covered a 
much wider set of items, adding clothing, energy and urban transport amongst other items to the ‘A 
Series’, and which was maintained up until the late 1940s; and, since 1948-49, the ABS Consumer 
Price Index25. This latter in turn is comprised of 15 linked series. In most cases the differences 
between these series largely relate to revisions of weighting patterns to allow for changes in the 
composition of consumption. In other cases, however, they have involved considerable 
methodological changes. 
The validity of the estimates of the change in the ‘real’ value of the minimum wage, cited above, is 
dependent upon the quality of this index. That is how accurately and meaningfully do these 
measures identify changes in the cost of living. This is a particularly challenging assumption over the 
extended time period under consideration and the variety of different indexes which have been 
                                                          
25 For the period up to June 1949 the long run annual Price Index as published by ABS in the 1988 Australian Year Book (ABS 
1988 pp 678-680) has been used. This publication has a more detailed explanation of the derivation of this index. This series 
which was published as annual averages, has been interpolated to a quarterly index using the annual Price Index for the June 
estimate. The two series have been combined using the 1948-49 average price level in each index. 
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combined. If the rate of price increases has been under-estimated then the increase in the real value 
of the minimum wage has been over-estimated. On the other hand if price change is over-estimated 
then the increase in the minimum wage has been underestimated. It is very difficult to be conclusive 
about this question. 
Typically price indexes can be subject to many different biases which can result in over, or under 
estimating the level of price change. Even today with regard to current price indexes there is little 
information available to judge the impact of these, or even the direction in which the biases may 
operate. Historically there is even less.  
The main types of bias that can affect price indexes include: product substitution bias – where 
consumption patterns change but this is not accounted for within the price index; new product bias – 
where the index does not adequately reflect the entry of new products; outlet bias – where prices 
vary between stores (and types of stores) and there are changes in the places where people 
purchase various products – without these being taken into account in the prices used in the index; 
and quality change in products. In this latter case the bias can occur when improvements in the 
quality of products are neglected with this leading to an over-estimate of the rate of change in prices 
– since the improved product has higher value than the one it replaced.  Conversely approaches that 
adjust for quality change in a mechanical way, without regard to the extent the improvement actually 
provides additional utility to consumers, can lead to an underestimate of effective costs.26   
In addition, to the extent the CPI seeks to measure price changes across the community as a whole, 
it can be dominated by the impact of higher income and higher consumption households and may 
not give an appropriate measure of changes for sub-groups within the community. Although this may 
not affect the use of the CPI in some contexts, it may for particular purposes such as this study 
where the interest is in how price changes impact on the cost of living for low income households, 
rather than households overall. 
The potential for some of these biases, especially substitution and new product bias, is likely to be 
large in the case of earlier indexes. The basket of goods used in these was very limited, and while a 
wider range of items were included in the ‘C Series’, this latter used a largely unchanged weighting 
pattern over the full period for which the index operated. 
As noted above, even today, we know little about how the Australian CPI may be distorted by these 
types of bias. Only two estimates of aspects of bias have been produced by the ABS. The first 
concerns the impact of changing consumption patterns on the CPI. In this ABS report, between June 
2000 and 2005, that the estimated change in prices of 17.6 per cent may have been upwardly biased 
by 1.2 percentage points due to product substitution (ABS 2010 p 56). The second concerns the 
extent to which the CPI represents the change in prices experienced by subsets of households. 
Some insight into this can be gained from the ‘Analytical living cost indexes for selected Australian 
household types’ that ABS publishes. These show that between June 1998 and June 2012, while the 
CPI had increased by 49.1 per cent, the costs of employee households had increased by 53.0 per 
cent and for non-Age Pension income support recipients27 by 56.1 per cent (ABS 2012). Over the 
extended period of this analysis even these levels of bias can have a substantial effect.  In these two 
cases the biases have operated in opposite directions – with the substitution bias overestimating 
price change, and the ‘plutocratic weighting’ of the CPI underestimating the potential impact on 
                                                          
26 This issue has been discussed in more detail in Bray 2010. 
27 ABS published, up to 2012, specific indexes for four household types: Employee households; Age Pensioner households; 
Other government transfer recipient households; and self-funded retirees (ABS 2012 Cat No 6463.0). As of September 2012, a 
new set of Selected Living Cost Indices have been produced (ABS 2012 Cat No 6467.0). 
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lower income households. This may or may not be the case with other biases on which no data are 
available.28 
Further to these issues, it can be argued that understanding changes in living standards over such 
long periods may require more than simply taking account of price change. Societal expectations 
and technology have moved dramatically over the past century – and what comprises ‘the normal 
needs of the average employee regarded as a human being living in a civilised community’ are 
substantially different today than they were in the past and cannot be simply measured in terms of 
changes in prices.  
2.8 The coverage of the minimum wage 
The dual role of the minimum wage in the Australian wages system has been noted above. The first, 
as described, is setting a binding floor for wages – that is a wage rate below which people are not 
paid. The second, more particular to the Australian wages system, has been as a base component of 
the wages paid to a much wider set of employees. Traditionally this was seen in the structure of 
wage rates comprising the basic wage and various margins, for example, for skill, and loadings, with 
these latter being awarded for matters such as work conditions and profitability. A consequence of 
this is that increases in the minimum wage rate have tended to flow on to other groups of, in 
particular, lower paid employees.29 Taking this into account the concept of coverage has two 
interpretations: those actually paid the minimum wage; and those whose wages may be affected by 
changes in the minimum wage.  This paper is primarily concerned with the first of these. 
Unfortunately very limited data are available on either the current or historical size of the minimum 
wage workforce. In Section 3 some contemporary estimates are provided. For the longer time period 
the most effective means of gauging coverage is to consider the value of the minimum wage relative 
to the average earnings of employees. Changes in the relativity of these can be interpreted as 
potentially providing an estimate of the proportion of those who are in receipt of the minimum wage, 
or paid rates relatively close to the minimum. Although such changes can also be driven by 
increases in the value of wages of those with very high incomes, this can partially be controlled for 
by using earnings measures that exclude higher earners. 
This type of approach is illustrated in Figure 3 which plots the real value of the minimum wage and 
the average earnings of full-time adult male non-managerial employees30. As shown, the relative 
value of the minimum wage to these measures of average earnings has dramatically decreased over 
the past century. While in 1914 the value of the minimum wage was around 80 per cent of such 
average earnings, this fell to 70 per cent in 1950, to 53 per cent in 1970, and then 43 per cent in 
2010. It is not entirely clear whether the stabilisation in the minimum wage as a ratio of earnings 
between 1970 and 1990 is an artefact of the use of the ‘metal workers’ minimum wage, or is 
associated with the fall in real earnings which was recorded between the mid-1970s and early 1990s. 
                                                          
28 While recognising the potential existence of bias in Australian price indexes, as discussed here these are likely to operate in 
both directions, that is some will have biased the series upwards and others downwards. It would appear unlikely however 
that the CPI is subject to the type of bias identified by the Boskin Commission in the US which reported an upward bias of 1.1 
percentage points per year. (Boskin 1996) 
29 Under the current Annual Wages Review the scope of consideration is somewhat wider including all employees covered by 
the national workplace relations system and applies not just to employees covered by the national minimum wage, but also 
those under modern awards and various transition arrangements. 
30 Strictly speaking the series uses a number of different estimates as detailed in the table footnotes. 
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Figure 3. The minimum wage relative to ‘average’ employee earnings, selected years 
1914 to 2010 
 
Source: Minimum wage – as per Figure 1, Earnings: 1914 & 1929: Derived from Weekly Wage Rates Adult 
Males 'All Groups' adjusted by average ratio of this series to Average Weekly Earnings per Male Employee for 
1948-53, as per following series: (ABS Cat No 6101.0 1957 p 40); 1950: Average Weekly Earnings per Employed 
Male Unit using 1950/51 annual figure (ABS 1968 Cat No 6101.0 p 305). 1970, 1990: Average Weekly Earnings 
Private Sector Full-time Employees, Adult Male, Non Managerial (Foster 1996 Table 4.19); 2010: Employee 
Earnings and Hours, May 2010 Average Weekly Cash Earnings Male Full-time Non Managerial Adult Employees 
(ABS 2011 Cat No 6306.0). 
 
Although not conclusive, this is highly suggestive of a consistent decline, over time, in the proportion 
of employees who are paid at, or near, the minimum wage. 
2.9 Women and the minimum wage 
The Harvester decision only established wage rates for men. As the Australian wages system 
developed, the adoption of the concept of the minimum wage in the decision as a ‘family wage’, 
rather than with reference to the needs of an individual to support themselves, or alternatively the 
value of work undertaken, resulted in a quandary as to whom such a wage should be paid to. That is, 
should all employees qualify for receipt of a wage appropriate for the needs of a family, or would it 
be more appropriate to pay some on the basis of their individual needs, especially when they were 
not involved in supporting a family. 
This was not an immediate issue in the Harvester decision but ultimately, reflecting family structures 
of the time, when this issue was considered decisions on the application of the Basic Wage were 
primarily based on gender. While in taking this decision it was recognised that not all men were 
married with a family to support, a significant proportion were, and that “marriage [is seen] as the 
usual fate of adult men”. A further rationale for this blanket approach was that “the employer need 
not concern himself with his employee’s domestic affairs”. (Higgins 1915 p 7)31  
                                                          
31 One exception to the payment of the family wage to all males was in Commonwealth Government employment. Here 
separate rates were struck for married and unmarried men, with the latter being below the Harvester rate. In part this structure 
was a reflection of how this employment was seen as an ongoing career, and that there were a series of annual salary 
increments which raised wages from a lower to an upper rate within occupational classifications. Powers J as deputy 
President of the Court explained it in his 1916 decision as “the principle is clearly not applicable to employers and employees 
generally outside the Public Service where the same living wage is payable ... in such a case a lower living wage for a single 
man would prevent him preparing for marriage  - or it would be a punishment for not marrying – and it would encourage 
employers to employ unmarried men in preference to married men ... in the Public Service it is different – all employees go on 
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In this context setting a different minimum wage for women was not seen as being discriminatory, 
but rather as applying the same principle – that of adequacy, and using a broad brush categorical 
approach. “The principle of the living wage has been applied to women, but with a difference, as 
women are not usually legally responsible for the maintenance of a family. A woman's minimum is 
based on the average cost of her own living to one who supports herself by her own exertions”32 (ibid 
p20). 
In contrast to the setting of a standardised minimum wage for men across all Federal Awards, the 
minimum for women operated at the individual award level and hence was defined at both an 
industry and occupational level. At the same time however some women were paid at the ‘male rate’. 
This was largely done to minimise the risk that male employment could be undercut by women 
working at a lower rate. This led to a complex set of arrangements where if some women undertook 
work which was traditionally undertaken by men, such as in traditional male trades, they were paid 
the male wage. This was also the case in some decisions on occupations such as fruit-picking which 
were undertaken by both men and women. On the other hand in those occupations seen as being 
primarily undertaken by women, the lower female minimum wage was paid to women33.   
In 1934 the Conciliation and Arbitration Court re-examined this approach and considered the 
alternative of the establishment of a female minimum wage. It rejected this option, concluding: “The 
court does not think it necessary or desirable, at any rate at the present time, to declare any wage as 
a basic wage for female employees. Generally speaking they carry no family responsibilities. The 
minimum wage should, of course, never be too low for the reasonable needs of an employee, but 
those needs may vary in different industries.” (Cited in CBCS 1948 p83) The ABS summarised the 
situation as “The previous practice of the Court was therefore continued whereby each Judge 
granted such proportion of the male rate as he deemed suited ...Generally speaking, this proportion 
was in the vicinity of 54 per cent of the male rate” (loc cit) 
This position substantively34 held until the Conciliation and Arbitration Act was amended in 1949 to 
allow the Court to determine a “basic wage for adult females” being “a wage which is just and 
reasonable for an adult female, without regard to any circumstances pertaining to the work upon 
which, or the industry in which, she is employed”. (CBCS 1953 p86) As a consequence the 1949-50 
Basic Wage Inquiry established “a new basic weekly wage for adult females at 75 per cent, of the 
corresponding male rate operative from the beginning of the first pay period commencing in 
December, 1950.” (loc cit) The determination of the 75 per cent rate was essentially arbitrary and 
pragmatic. Foster J noted in the decision “I do not claim that the ... 75 per cent is scientifically, 
statistically or intellectually verifiable.  It is a round figure; the 75 per cent has the justification of an 
existing and past fixation as well as Government decision by Statutory Regulation” (68 CAR 698 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
to the maximum whether single or married by automatic increases so that it can only affect, generally speaking, the salary of a 
young man between the age of 21 to 25, and if he wants to marry he can at once get the £150 as a married officer.” (10 CAR 
314 p394) 
32 Again even in identifying a minimum wage for women the issue of the relative needs for income to maintain an adequate 
standard of living for those living under different circumstances, with different needs, raised issues. In a continuation of this 
quote Higgins notes the differences in the needs of a woman who lived independently, as opposed to one who dwelt at home 
with her parents. While this might have been grounds for a different level of wage this argument was subordinated to the 
question of how the market would respond. Here he concludes “A woman or girl with a comfortable home cannot be left to 
underbid in wages other women or girls who are less fortunate” (Higgins 1915 p20). 
33 It is difficult to identify the extent to which this principle was effectively implemented although, for clearly identifiable female 
dominated occupations, it most certainly did. This in itself raises a further question of the extent to which it also led to gender 
segmentation of employment by occupation, a feature which has continued to persist in the Australian labour market. 
34 While not affecting the basic wage per se, a range of court and other decisions during the war period resulted in increases 
in the relative earnings of women. This included court decisions in the clothing and rubber industries which awarded women 
75 per cent of male rates (CBCS 1950 p 87), the role of the ‘Women’s’ Employment Board’ which was empowered to set 
women’s’ rates at between 60 per cent and 100 per cent of the male rate – with a reported average of 90 per cent being 
adopted (ibid p84), and Ministerial powers which resulted in wages being set not “less than 75 per cent of the corresponding 
minimum male rate” in ‘vital industries’ (ibid p83). 
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p819) he previously had noted that if the lower figure of 54 per cent was adopted that to “award such 
a rate would not be to settle the dispute but to aggravate it” (ibid p817)35   
The underlying concept of the family component of the male basic wage continued into the 1970s, 
notwithstanding strengthening campaigns for the introduction of equal pay. In 1950 FJ McKenna 
acting Secretary of the Prime Minister’s Department, in response to correspondence about equal 
pay, replied that the pay was conceptually equal but: “In the Commonwealth Public Service, as in 
outside industry, the salaries for adult males comprise a basic wage plus a margin for skill.  The basic 
wage is intended to cover the needs of a family unit. Females are paid the same margin for skills as 
an adult male performing the same work but receive a total remuneration lower than the male 
because of the difference in needs.” (McKenna 1950) 
While the 197236 equal pay decision of the Commonwealth Conciliation and Arbitration Commission 
recognised the principle of ‘equal pay for work of equal value’, this was applied to all awards, with 
the exception of the minimum wage.  Although an extension to the minimum wage had been 
proposed by unions the Commission concluded: “all we can say is that ever since the minimum wage 
has been the subject of debate it has been presented by the unions and considered by the 
Commission as including a family component. The material used by the unions in their various claims 
over the years for special increases to the minimum wage has principally been directed to family 
problems and the oral evidence, both expert and of employees themselves, has been similarly 
directed. …Because of the essential characteristic of the male minimum wage we decline to apply it 
to females and we dismiss that part of the unions' claims.” (147 CAR 172 p176) 
It was not until 1974 that the Commission decided on a common rate of the minimum wage for men 
and women with this being implemented in three steps37 reaching parity in June 1975 (ABS 1976). In 
this decision the Commission moved substantially away from the concept of a family wage declaring 
that they were “an industrial arbitration tribunal not a social welfare agency” and that “the care of 
family needs is principally a task for governments” (cited in Nieuwenhuysen 1974). 
  
                                                          
35 Chief Judge of the Commonwealth Court of Conciliation and Arbitration WR Kelly dissented from the decision on the 
establishment of the female minimum wage rate.  “I have concluded that the present basic wage for males provides at least for 
some family group) the basic wage for women cannot, as a matter of social justice, even allowing for the additional expenditure 
necessarily incurred by a woman who has to go to work, above that of one who remains at home, occupied by her domestic 
duties, be assessed at very much more than half of that basic wage (the adult male’s) which is fixed as an amount adequate for 
the fulfilment of the needs of a family group” (68 CAR 698 p785). These two positions highlight the perennial tension in wage 
setting decisions – whether the decisions have intrinsic merit, or simply reflect a judicial solution to a dispute. 
36 The previous 1969 equal pay case had granted equal pay to women doing the same jobs as men – the principle of ‘equal 
pay for equal work’. 
37 It was initially increased to 85 per cent of the male rate, increasing to 90 per cent by September 1974 and then to 100 per 
cent by end June 1975. 
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3 CURRENT ROLE OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 
The previous section has noted the limited amount of information about the number of people in the 
workforce who are in receipt of the minimum wage. Although there are several sources of 
information on the earnings of Australians each of these have some limitations for exploring this 
question. Broadly two types of data are available. The first being from surveys of employers, the 
second are household surveys.   
There is only one regular Australian employer based survey which provides information on the 
individual earnings of employees. This is the ABS Survey of Employee Earnings and Hours (EEH). 
This survey is currently conducted every two years and is a mail out survey to some 9,000 public and 
private sector employers who report on the earnings, and other related information, of a sample of 
their employees. It excludes enterprises engaged in agriculture, forestry and fishing, and 
employment by private households. To the extent the survey responses are usually prepared by 
employers on the basis of their payroll records, it is considered that the reported level of earnings it 
produces are accurate, as are the details on the number of hours for which people are paid.38 
Limitations of the survey on the other hand include the restricted scope of the industries it covers 
and the likelihood it omits informal ‘cash in hand’ employment. In addition the survey does not 
contain information on the hours worked by ‘managerial employees’. For this reason this group is 
excluded from analysis. The survey also provides very little information on the characteristics of 
employees. 
In contrast there are many different household surveys which contain data on individual reported 
earnings. These include the ABS Employee Earnings, Benefits and Trade Union Membership 
(EEBTUM); the ABS Survey of Income and Housing (SIH); the ABS Survey of Employment 
Arrangements, Retirement and Superannuation (SEARS); and the Household Income and Labour 
Dynamics Australia (HILDA) Survey. While these surveys do not have the problem of scope which 
potentially limits the EEH, the quality of data on earnings and of hours of employment is likely to be 
less reliable. This is because it is self-reported by individuals on a recall basis, frequently without 
reference to actual records39. In addition, these surveys do not usually collect sufficient information 
to identify whether or not a person is being paid a casual loading, nor the rate at which such a 
loading is paid.  
A number of Australian studies have attempted to derive estimates of minimum wage employment 
from these surveys. In a major study for the then Australian Fair Pay Commission (AFPC) 
McGuinness, Freebairn and Mavromaras (2007) estimated, using the HILDA Survey, that in 2004 
around 7.2 per cent of adult employees are paid at around or below the minimum wage rate. They 
also derived an estimate of 4.1 to 4.9 per cent from the EEH40. Earlier work for the AFPC by Healy 
and Richardson (2006) used the 2004 HILDA Survey and estimated that 9.5 per cent of adult 
employees were paid around the minimum wage rate with a further 9.1 per cent within an additional 
$2 an hour of the rate, with similar results, 10.3 per cent and 9.0 per cent being derived from the SIH 
for 2003-04. Dockery, Seymour and Ong (2010) again using HILDA data, but this time from 2006, 
estimated that 11.2 per cent of employees aged 21-64 years were paid an hourly wage rate “no more 
than 10 per cent above the minimum rate set by the Commission”. Nelms, Nicholson and Wheatley 
(2011) using data for 2007 estimated from the HILDA survey, that there were 6.8 per cent of adult 
                                                          
38 At the same time however hours paid for may not reflect hours worked since some employees may work additional unpaid 
periods. This would appear to be part of the rationale for non-collection of data on hours of work for managerial employees. 
39 The surveys also vary in whether or not they collect information on actual most recent, or ‘usual’, pay and hours of work. 
40 In this study the authors classified all persons earning less than 110 per cent of the minimum wage as minimum wage 
employees. 
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employees paid at rates up to the minimum wage and a further 11.0 per cent paid no more than 20 
per cent above the minimum wage. From the SEARS survey they estimated these proportions at 9.2 
per cent and 10.7 per cent, and from the SIH at 7.4 per cent and 10.5 per cent. 
3.1 Minimum wage employment 
For the purposes of examining the level and nature of minimum wage employment in Australia the 
initial focus in this paper is on data from the 2010 EEH Survey. In subsequent analysis data from 
HILDA is used to analyse the household characteristics of such employees, and to look at the 
incidence of minimum wage employment amongst those aged under 21 years. While, as noted 
above, the scope of the EEH data is somewhat limited, it is used here because it is based on payroll 
records and hence is less susceptible, in comparison to household based surveys, to reporting error.  
In addition, in comparison to the ABS household surveys, it contains an indicator for those paid at 
casual rates. This permits more accurate estimation of the coverage of the minimum wage by 
allowing for an estimate of the value of the casual loading. 
In the following analysis a full-time employee is classified as being paid the minimum wage if they 
are paid, other than at junior rates, and their ordinary time earnings are within five per cent of the 
minimum wage, and part-time employees if their hourly rate is within this range. Where a person is 
reported as being a casual employee a 20 per cent loading has been applied to the minimum wage 
rate. The EEH survey covers an estimated 8,968,054 employees excluding managers, persons paid 
at junior rates, self-employed workers and, as noted above, those employed in agriculture, forestry 
and fishing, and employment by private households.   
Using this approach an estimated 2.2 per cent of employees, excluding those paid junior rates, and 
managers, are paid at the minimum wage and a further 2.0 per cent are paid at rates below this, a 
total of 334,532 employees or 4.1 per cent of the workforce41. Figure 4 shows the composition of 
these employees by full and part-time employment status and whether they are paid at casual rates.  
Just over half, 54.4 per cent are part-time employees and 40.4 per cent are paid at casual rates.  
While 13.6 per cent of full-time minimum wage workers are employed as casuals 63.0 per cent of 
part-time ones are. 
The finding of a group of employees receiving rates of pay below the minimum wage is consistent 
with other research. While some of these may be employees who are being paid training or disability 
rates,42 this does not seem to provide a full explanation for all such employment. A detailed analysis 
of the phenomena of below minimum wage employment has recently been undertaken by Nelms, 
Nicholson and Wheatley (2011). After a review of a series of different Australian datasets they 
concluded that this group of employees largely shared common characteristics with those earning 
just above the FMW, but were more likely to be working part-time, in small business or reporting 
having worked more than 60 hours per week. While there was insufficient evidence to suggest that 
this was simply a matter of poor data, the need to be aware of such issues was seen as important. 
Otherwise the research suggests: “Employees being specifically excluded from the FMW, employees 
working long hours, and employees with salary sacrifice arrangements all appear to be partial 
explanations” (ibid p44). 
                                                          
41 If the margin is increased to include those earning up to 110 per cent of the FMW, as is frequently done in other studies, 
and as is done later in this paper using HILDA, the proportions earning at or below the FMW increases from 4.1 per cent to 6.0 
per cent. 
42 Under the Supported Wage System employers can seek a special wage for those with low productivity. This is limited to 
those who are on, or eligible for, the Disability Support Pension. 
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Figure 4. Composition of employees paid at or below the minimum wage, EEH May 
2010 
 
Notes:   
at =  being paid +/- 5 per cent of the FMW with an adjustment of 20% for employees paid a casual loading. 
below =  being paid less than 95 per cent of the FMW with an adjustment of 20% for employees paid a casual 
loading 
Source: Derived from the ABS 2010 Employee Earnings and Hours, Expanded CURF 
 
In the balance of discussion in this section, unless otherwise noted, the terms ‘minimum wage 
worker’ and ‘paid around the minimum wage’ will be used to encompass all those paid under 
105 per cent of the minimum wage. 
In the EEH survey a higher proportion of men (4.3 per cent) than women (3.9 per cent) are employed 
on wage rates around the minimum wage43. Male minimum wage employees are more likely to be 
employed full–time and on a non-casual basis than women. Overall employment around the 
minimum wage is more likely amongst part-time employees (6.4 per cent) than those in full-time 
employment (2.9 per cent) and 9.0 per cent of casual employees are paid around the minimum wage 
compared with 3.0 per cent of non-casual employees. 
Minimum wage employment is much more prevalent in small businesses. In the EEH while just 2.6 
per cent of employees in businesses with 20 or more employees are paid around the minimum wage, 
this increases to 9.1 per cent in those with under 20 employees.  
 
                                                          
43 This differential almost entirely disappears if the higher margin of 10 per cent is used as the cut off. At this point the 
respective male and female rates of minimum wage employment are 5.97 per cent and 5.95 per cent. Section 3.3.2 considers 
gender and the incidence of the minimum wage in more detail. 
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Table 1 Composition of employees paid at or below the minimum 
wage, by gender, EEH, May 2010 
 
Number  
   
Proportion 
   Male Female Persons 
 
Male Female Persons 
  
-persons- 
   
-%- 
 Full-time non-Casual 
below 48,918 34,338 83,256 
 
1.2 0.8 1.0 
Full-time non-Casual at 29,985 18,601 48,586 
 
0.8 0.5 0.6 
Full-time non-Casual 
above 2,905,818 1,948,034 4,853,852 
 
73.2 47.4 60.1 
Full-time Casual below 4,806 2,621 7,427 
 
0.1 0.1 0.1 
Full-time Casual at 9,088 4,192 13,280 
 
0.2 0.1 0.2 
Full-time Casual above 152,329 70,577 222,906 
 
3.8 1.7 2.8 
        Part-time non-Casual 
below 14,269 17,356 31,625 
 
0.4 0.4 0.4 
Part-time non-Casual 
at 14,649 21,118 35,767 
 
0.4 0.5 0.4 
Part-time non-Casual 
above 308,693 1,220,248 1,528,941 
 
7.8 29.7 18.9 
Part-time Casual below 19,917 16,732 36,649 
 
0.5 0.4 0.5 
Part-time Casual at 30,567 47,375 77,942 
 
0.8 1.2 1.0 
Part-time Casual above 428,347 709,509 1,137,856 
 
10.8 17.3 14.1 
Total (excl Junior and 
Managers) 3,967,386 4,110,701 8,078,087 
 
100.0 100.0 100.0 
        Subtotals 
       Full-time at or below 92,797 59,752 152,549 
 
2.3 1.5 1.9 
Part-time at or below 79,402 102,581 181,983 
 
2.0 2.5 2.3 
Casual at or below 64,378 70,920 135,298 
 
1.6 1.7 1.7 
Non-casual at or below 107,821 91,413 199,234 
 
2.7 2.2 2.5 
All at or below 172,199 162,333 334,532 
 
4.3 3.9 4.1 
        Managers (a) 270,371 116,136 386,507 
    Junior rate (b) 253,826 249,634 503,460 
    
        Total (c) 4,491,583 4,476,471 8,968,054 
    at =  being paid up to 105 per cent of the FMW ($543.78 pw, $14.31ph) with an adjustment of 20% for 
employees paid a casual loading. 
below =  being paid less than 50 per cent of the FMW with an adjustment of 20% for employees paid a casual 
loading 
(a) Managerial staff are excluded because data on their hours of work are not collected in the survey. 
(b)  Those paid at junior rates are excluded as the survey does not collect the age of these employees and 
hence it is not possible to derive appropriate age specific levels of the minimum wage for this group. 
(c) While the ABS caution that the EEH is not well designed to generate estimates of employees, the 
4,491,583 male employees compare with an estimate of 5,107,500 male employees in sectors other than 
Agriculture in the May 2010 Labour Force Survey, while the 4,476,471 females compares with the Labour 
Force Survey estimate of 4,567,600.  There is no clear explanation for this discrepancy. 
Source: Derived from the ABS 2010 Employee Earnings and Hours, Expanded CURF 
 
More detailed information on firm size is available in the HILDA survey as shown in Table 2. While 
these data are not directly comparable with the estimates from the EEH as they estimate that 9.1 per 
cent of all adult employees are paid the minimum wage, they show an even more marked pattern by 
firm size. 
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Table 2 Adult Minimum wage employment by workplace size,     
HILDA 2011 
 
Employees 
in 
workplace 
Employment Distribution 
of FMW(a)  
Distribution 
of other(a)  
Prop'n 
on FMW  FMW Other Total 
 - Persons - - % - 
2 to 4 95,312 489,342 584,654 12.2 6.3 16.3 
5 to 9 169,643 786,484 956,127 21.7 10.1 17.7 
10 to 19 123,105 923,933 1,047,038 15.8 11.9 11.8 
20 to 49 121,175 1,431,488 1,552,663 15.5 18.4 7.8 
50 to 99 73,766 1,056,275 1,130,041 9.5 13.6 6.5 
100 to 199 65,799 867,547 933,346 8.4 11.2 7.0 
200 to 499 26,814 812,616 839,430 3.4 10.5 3.2 
500 or 
more 
44,690 1,260,258 1,304,948 5.7 16.2 3.4 
 
      
Total (b) 780,075 7,760,809 8,540,884 100.0 100.0 9.1 
(a) Excludes those for whom workplace size is not known 
(b) Total includes persons reporting they were a sole employee and records where data on 
workplace size was not reported. 
Source: HILDA – derived from Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ release 
 
In very small workplaces, that is those with 2 to 4 staff, 16.3 per cent of employees are in receipt of 
the minimum wage, with this rising to 17.7 per cent for those with 5 to 9 staff in the workplace and 
declining to 11.8 per cent for those with 10 to 19 staff. While workplaces with 2 to 19 staff employ 
30.3 per cent of all employees, they account for 49.7 per cent of minimum wage employees. Less 
detailed data is available on actual firm size, as opposed to workplace size. Excluding people 
working in a workplace by themselves and who are not part of a multi-workplace firm, 19.4 per cent 
of people working for a firm with fewer than 20 employees are estimated to be minimum wage 
workers, with this declining to 9.8 per cent for firms with 20 to 99 employees, 5.7 per cent for those 
with 100 to 499, and 5.2 per cent for those with 500 or more. Those working for firms with less than 
20 employees account for 39.8 per cent of those minimum wage employees for whom a firm size is 
known 
The EEH also includes information on the wage setting arrangements under which people are 
employed.  This shows that minimum wage employment is most frequent where people work under 
‘Award Only’ employment arrangements where 11.5 per cent of employees work at these rates, and 
where people work under ‘Unregistered Individual Agreements’, 4.2 per cent. At 1.8 per cent it is 
relatively rare in where people are employed under ‘Registered Collective Agreements’.  
Data from HILDA, which as noted above estimates a much higher incidence of minimum wage 
employment (9.1 per cent of employees) provides some details by the nature of the employer. Using 
this source indicates a substantially above average rate of minimum wage employment, 12.3 per 
cent, in the not for profit sector and a lesser, but still above average rate of 10.7 per cent in the 
private for profit sector. Below average rates of minimum wage employment (6.4 per cent) were 
reported by people employed in Government business enterprises and the rate was 3.8 per cent in 
other Government organisations. 
3.1.1 Estimates derived from household surveys 
The ABS Survey of Income and Housing and the HILDA survey are both frequently used for the 
analysis of income and earnings, and both are used here. The estimated proportion of employees 
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working for the minimum wage as derived from each of these surveys is shown in Table 3, along with 
estimates derived from the EEH. 
Table 3  Estimated number of adults in receipt of the minimum wage, SIH, HILDA 
and EEH 
Full-time (FT)/ Part-
time (PT) status 
and wage rate 
SIH 2009/10  HILDA 2011  EEH 2010  
Excluding 
Loading 
Including 
loading for 
all PT (a) 
 Up to 
105% of 
FMW 
Up to 
110% of 
FMW 
 Up to 
105% of 
FMW 
Up to 
110% of 
FMW 
 
Number of Adult employees  
FT less than 
FMW(b) 53,245 53,245 
 
29,758 29,758 
 
90,683 90,683 
PT less than FMW 46,975 60,733  72,260 72,260  68,274 68,274 
Total less than 
FMW 100,220 113,978 
 
102,018 102,018 
 
158,957 158,957 
FT FMW (c) 286,621 286,621  294,220 366,776  61,866 119,318 
PT FMW 352,858 780,219  383,837 518,006  113,709 202,935 
Total at FMW 639,479 1,066,840  678,057 884,782  175,575 322,253 
Total paid at or 
below 739,699 1,180,818 
 
780,075 986,800 
 
334,532 481,210 
FT paid above 2,010,925 1,569,806  5,866,307 5,793,751  2,666,797 2,577,571 
PT paid above 5,988,419 5,988,419  1,894,502 1,760,333  5,076,758 5,019,306 
Total (d) 8,739,043 8,739,043  8,540,884 8,540,884  8,078,087 8,078,087 
 
Proportion of adult employees (- % -) 
FT less than 
FMW(b) 0.6 0.6 
 
0.3 0.3 
 
1.1 1.1 
PT less than FMW 0.5 0.7  0.8 0.8  0.8 0.8 
Total less than 
FMW 1.1 1.3 
 
1.2 1.2 
 
2.0 2.0 
FT FMW (c) 3.3 3.3  3.4 4.3  0.8 1.5 
PT FMW 4.0 8.9  4.5 6.1  1.4 2.5 
Total at FMW 7.3 12.2  7.9 10.4  2.2 4.0 
Total paid at or 
below 8.5 13.5 
 
9.1 11.6 
 
4.1 6.0 
FT paid above 23.0 18.0  68.7 67.8  33.0 31.9 
PT paid above 68.5 68.5  22.2 20.6  62.8 62.1 
Total (d) 100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0  100.0 100.0 
(a) Includes a 20 per cent casual loading on the FMW for all part-time employees  
(b)  For the SIH and HILDA employees earning less than 50 per cent of the FMW has been used, 
for the EEH employees earning less than 95 per cent of the FMW has been used. This differential 
approach to the margin takes account of the less accurate reporting of hours and earnings in household 
surveys. 
(c)  For the SIH employees earning up to 110 per cent of the FMW, for HILDA and the EEH, 
persons earning up to 105 and 110 per cent of the FMW to address potential errors in reporting. 
(d)  SIH and HILDA Adult (aged over 21) wage and salary earners excluding those with zero 
reported income, and for HILDA those employed in their own incorporated businesses, for EEH all 
persons excluding those paid junior rates and managers, excludes employees in Agriculture, self-
employed and household employees. 
Source: EEH - Derived from the ABS 2010 Employee Earnings and Hours, Expanded CURF; SIH - 
Derived from ABS 2009-10 Survey of Income and Housing, HILDA – derived from Wave 11 In 
confidence release 
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In the table two estimates are given for each of the surveys. For the EEH and for HILDA44 these relate 
to different margins for the cut-off used to define who is classified as working at the minimum wage. 
(Whether to include those reporting earnings 5 per cent above the minimum wage as minimum wage 
employees, or to use a greater margin of 10 per cent.) In the case of the SIH both estimates use a 10 
per cent margin, but differ in the treatment of the 20 per cent casual loading. The reason for this is 
that in the available data from this survey, in contrast to the EEH and HILDA, there is no indicator of 
whether or not a person is employed on a casual basis. As such it is not clear where provision needs 
to made for the casual loading. The table shows the sensitivity of the estimates to assumptions 
around this. Where the loading is included for all part-time employees45 the number estimated to be 
paid at the FMW more than doubles.  
Given the sensitivity of the SIH to the assumption made in this respect, while the HILDA survey is 
less suited to some aspects of household analysis46 of the role of the minimum wage, it has been 
used in the following analysis. It has also been decided to use the range of up to 105 per cent of the 
minimum wage to define minimum wage employees, rather than the 110 per cent which has been 
used in some studies. The reason for this is that the higher margin draws in a considerable number 
of jobs which, while ‘low paid’, are more highly classified and recognise additional skills or 
responsibilities. This can be seen in Appendix 3 which contains some extracts from awards and 
enterprise agreements47. 
In this analysis a further advantage of HILDA is that it permits some analysis of the role of the 
minimum wage for people aged under 21 years, something which is not possible with the EEH and is 
even more problematic with the SIH because of the role of part-time employment for this age group. 
This is presented in Attachment B. While this analysis does provide some insight caution needs to be 
exercised because of the role of specific agreements giving access to rates of pay at particular ages. 
In summary the analysis shows that 30.5 per cent of these young employees are paid at, or below, 
their estimated, age specific, minimum wage. When added to adult minimum wage employees, the 
total number of minimum wage workers increases to almost 1.1 million with these young minimum 
wage workers accounting for 28.9 per cent of all persons employed at the minimum wage. The total 
rate of minimum wage employment increases to 11.5 per cent. Over 90 per cent of these young 
minimum wage workers live at home with their parents. This group comprises students living with 
                                                          
44 This paper uses unit record data from the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) Survey. The HILDA 
Project was initiated and is funded by the Australian Government Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and 
Indigenous Affairs (FaHCSIA) and is managed by the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research 
(Melbourne Institute). The findings and views reported in this paper, however, are those of the author and should not be 
attributed to either FaHCSIA or the Melbourne Institute. 
45 As seen earlier in the detailed data from the EEH, some 37.4 per cent of minimum wage employees are employed on a 
casual basis. This group comprises 68.5 of part-time minimum wage employees and 13.5 per cent of those who work full-
time. In effect the assumption assumes that all of the part-time, but none of the full-time, employees are employed on a casual 
basis. 
46Whereas the SIH provides contemporary estimates of household disposable income and current earnings, HILDA generates 
current earnings at the time of the survey (typically the last quarter of the calendar year), but only has previous financial year 
estimates of household disposable income. 
47 One reason for using a higher tolerance is the potential problem of ‘heaping’ in survey responses. This typically involves 
people reporting income in terms of the nearest $100, or hours worked per week on multiples of five hours, or multiples of 8 
hours.  Analysis of the HILDA data indicates the presence of this phenomenon. The question considered here is whether this 
type of mis-reporting introduces any bias into estimates of minimum wage employment. This testing has been restricted to 
those working under 38 hours per week and reporting incomes under $699 per week. Statistical testing at a 95 per cent 
confidence level does not suggest any bias in estimates of the incidence of minimum wage employment in terms of reported 
hours of work, for those reporting in multiples of 8 and 10 hours relative to those reporting other values. While there is not a 
significant difference in terms of multiples of $25 or other values (except for multiples of $100), those reporting incomes in 
multiples of $100 per week had a statistically significant higher likelihood of being identified as being on the minimum wage 
(45.2 per cent) than those reporting continuous values (34.2 per cent). Those reporting earnings in multiples of $25 have a 
lower, 28.0 per cent, probability of being identified as being minimum wage workers. Although this suggests there is some 
mis-estimation of the incidence of minimum wage employment as a consequence of heaping, it can be suggested that it is 
unlikely to seriously bias the overall population results. 
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their parents and working part-time, and a smaller group of other, non-dependent, children who may 
or may not be studying. Most of this latter group, 69.5 per cent, work full-time.  
Returning to the adult population the estimated number of employed persons paid wages at or 
below the minimum wage generated by HILDA is 133.2 per cent larger than the population identified 
in the EEH, while the proportion of employed persons identified as being on the minimum wage of 
9.1 per cent is more than double the estimate of 4.1 per cent in the EEH. When the higher level of 
tolerance (that is up to 110 per cent of the minimum wage) is applied to both surveys HILDA 
generates an estimated rate of minimum wage employment of 11.6 per cent, some 105 per cent 
higher than the 6.0 per cent derived from the EEH. While the higher HILDA estimate may in part be a 
consequence of the wider population included in HILDA especially industry sectors such as 
agriculture, and potentially the inclusion of informal employment, such explanations do not appear to 
account for the whole of the difference. A substantial probability is that a further contribution is made 
through reporting errors, either about the wages received, or for part-time employees, about the 
hours they work.48   
While this lack of consistency in estimates of the number of minimum wage employees is 
unfortunate, there are few other options available than to utilise these disparate sources, and to treat 
all estimates with caution. Section 3.4 considers the distribution of ‘near minimum wage’ 
employment in more detail. 
One distinct difference in the results from these two sources is that while the EEH reports that a 
higher proportion of males (4.3 per cent) relative to women (3.9 per cent) are employed at or below 
the minimum wage, this position is reversed in the HILDA data which indicates that 7.0 per cent of 
men and 11.6 per cent of women are employed on these rates. 
3.2 Which jobs pay the minimum wage 
By industry there is a strong concentration of minimum wage employment in the ‘accommodation 
and food services sector’ where, using data from the EEH, 11.8 per cent of employees are paid 
around the minimum wage. Other concentrations include: ‘administrative and support services’, 8.2 
per cent; ‘other services’, 7.6 per cent; and ‘construction’, 7.2 per cent. There were also higher than 
average rates in: ‘retail trade’, 5.9 per cent; ‘rental hiring and real estate’, 5.3 per cent; and 
‘manufacturing’, 5.1 per cent. 
The occupational classifications in which employees were most frequently paid the minimum wage, 
see Table 4, are: ‘farm, forestry and garden workers’ where 20.6 per cent are identified as being 
minimum wage employees; ‘food preparation assistants’, 17.5 per cent; ‘factory process workers’, 
15.5 per cent; ‘food trades workers’, 13.0 per cent; ‘hospitality workers’, 10.4 per cent; and 
‘construction trades workers’, 10.0 per cent. The occupations accounting the largest proportion of 
such workers are: ‘factory process workers’ with 12.0 per cent of all minimum wage employees in 
this occupation; ‘sales assistants and salespersons’, 8.2 per cent; ‘hospitality workers’, 7.3 per cent; 
‘food preparation assistants’, 5.6 per cent; and ‘cleaners and laundry workers’, 5.3 per cent. 
Some of these occupational groups can be broken down into more detailed occupations. Amongst 
the ‘construction trades’, 11.2 per cent of ‘bricklayers’ are minimum wage employees as are 10.6 per 
cent of ‘glaziers’. These results would suggest that while the occupational classifications refer to 
‘trades workers’ they include a substantial number of non-trades employees. A similar range of 
                                                          
48 In making these estimates the wage rate is calculated on an hourly basis for part-time employees and hence is affected by 
both reported earnings and hours. For full-time workers the comparison is based on earnings alone, without reference to the 
number of hours people have reported working. 
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Table 4  Incidence and Composition of employees (excluding part-time managers 
and those on junior rates) paid at or below the minimum wage, by Occupation, 
EEH 2010 
Occupation (a) Number 
receiving FMW 
(b) 
% of 
employees 
on FMW 
% of FMW 
employees 
Chief Executives, General Managers and Legislators 319 0.5 0.1 
Farmers and Farm Managers 0 0.0 0.0 
Specialist Managers 1,250 0.3 0.4 
Hospitality, Retail and Service Managers 2,245 1.4 0.7 
Arts and Media Professionals 1,226 3.9 0.4 
Business, Human Resource and Marketing 
 
2,697 0.6 0.8 
Design, Engineering, Science and Transport 
 
1,358 0.7 0.4 
Education Professionals 876 0.2 0.3 
Health Professionals 1,411 0.4 0.4 
ICT Professionals 1,256 1.0 0.4 
Legal, Social and Welfare Professionals 5,099 4.7 1.5 
Engineering, ICT and Science Technicians 807 0.4 0.2 
Automotive and Engineering Trades Workers 6,458 2.9 1.9 
Construction Trades Workers 9,416 10.0 2.8 
Electrotechnology and Telecommunications Trades 
 
9,972 8.3 3.0 
Food Trades Workers 13,011 13.0 3.9 
Skilled Animal and Horticultural Workers 3,253 5.1 1.0 
Other Technicians and Trades Workers 8,082 8.0 2.4 
Health and Welfare Support Workers 1,794 1.1 0.5 
Carers and Aides 15,564 3.8 4.7 
Hospitality Workers 24,409 10.4 7.3 
Protective Service Workers 1,050 0.8 0.3 
Sports and Personal Service Workers 6,850 6.0 2.0 
Office Managers and Program Administrators 4,162 1.4 1.2 
Personal Assistants and Secretaries 2,238 2.3 0.7 
General Clerical Workers 13,608 4.5 4.1 
Inquiry Clerks and Receptionists 12,319 4.2 3.7 
Numerical Clerks 4,158 1.5 1.2 
Clerical and Office Support Workers 3,109 4.5 0.9 
Other Clerical and Administrative Workers 3,784 1.8 1.1 
Sales Representatives and Agents 5,863 4.0 1.8 
Sales Assistants and Salespersons 27,479 7.7 8.2 
Sales Support Workers 15,417 7.0 4.6 
Machine and Stationary Plant Operators 4,826 2.7 1.4 
Mobile Plant Operators 2,617 3.0 0.8 
Road and Rail Drivers 9,347 4.6 2.8 
Storepersons 3,142 3.1 0.9 
Cleaners and Laundry Workers 17,627 7.7 5.3 
Construction and Mining Labourers 3,692 3.9 1.1 
Factory Process Workers 40,094 15.5 12.0 
Farm, Forestry and Garden Workers 10,949 20.6 3.3 
Food Preparation Assistants 18,712 17.5 5.6 
Other Labourers 12,986 6.3 3.9 
    
All Occupations 334,532 4.1 100.0 
(a) Occupation sub-major groups (2 digit ANZSCO 1st edition) 
(b) Persons being paid at or under the FMW (plus 5%) adjusted for casual employment 
Source: Derived from the ABS 2010 Employee Earnings and Hours, Expanded CURF 
 
 
 
 
 
 
outcomes can be seen for the 3.8 per cent of ‘carers and aides’ who are paid the minimum wage. 
Within this broad classification 11.3 per cent of those employed as a ‘carer or aide’ in the child care 
industry are identified as being on the minimum wage. In contrast, for those classified as 
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‘educational aides’ or ‘personal aides’ the incidence is just 1.9 per cent and 1.4 per cent 
respectively. Surprisingly, given the reputation of the sector, only 3.2 per cent of ‘call or contact 
centre information clerks’ are reported as earning at or below the minimum wage. 
3.3 Characteristics of minimum wage workers 
As the data from the EEH is derived from employers’ payrolls this survey does not provide much 
information on the characteristics of minimum wage workers. Rather this information needs to be 
drawn from household surveys. As discussed previously the main source which will be used is Wave 
11 of the HILDA survey which provides information on employment characteristics at end 2011, and 
minimum wage employment is defined as employment at or below 105 per cent of the minimum 
wage, taking into account a casual loading of 20 per cent for those employed on a casual basis.  
Unless otherwise indicated, the data relates to minimum wage workers aged 21 years and over. 
3.3.1 Age  
Minimum wage employment is distributed across the age spectrum. Indeed, as shown in Figure 5, 
broadly similar numbers of people are employed in the age group from 21 to 24 years, and in the 10 
year groupings up to and including age 54 years.  
Figure 5. Adult minimum wage employees by age, HILDA 2011 
(a) Employed minimum wage employees (persons) (b) Proportion of employed persons working on 
minimum wage 
  
Source: HILDA – derived from Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ release 
 
The rate of minimum wage employment shows a U shaped distribution, being highest amongst the 
young and amongst older workers. For those aged 21 to 24 years 27.9 per cent of part-time and 16.8 
per cent of full-time jobs were paid at the minimum wage. The lowest rate of minimum wage 
employment for full-time employees was 2.9 per cent for those aged 35-44 years, and the lowest 
rate of part-time employees was in the 55-64 year age group at 11.3 per cent. While the rate of 
minimum wage employment was high for the 65 year and over age group, as can be seen in the first 
panel, this group only accounts for a small proportion of minimum wage employment – 7.1 per cent 
of the part-time employment and 2.6 per cent of the full-time employment 
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3.3.2 Gender 
The differences in the estimated levels of minimum wage employment by gender derived from the 
different data sources have been noted earlier. Table 5 examines this further using the same 
categories as used in Table 3. 
Table 5  Minimum wage employees by gender, comparative estimates SIH, HILDA 
and EEH 
 Male  Female  Prop’n 
 FMW Total Prop’n 
FMW 
 FMW Total Prop’n 
FMW 
 FMW 
female 
 - Persons - - % -  - Persons- - % -  - % - 
 SIH 2009/10 
Excluding Loading 313,442 4,670,146 6.7  426,257 4,068,897 10.5  57.6 
Including Loading 416,940 4,670,146 8.9  763,878 4,068,897 18.8  64.7 
 HILDA 2011 
Up to 105% of FMW 314,686 4,520,593 7.0  465,389 4,020,291 11.6  59.7 
Up to 110% of FMW 397,123 4,520,593 8.8  589,677 4,020,291 14.7  59.8 
 EEH 2010 
Up to 105% of FMW 172,199 3,967,386 4.3  162,333 4,110,701 3.9  48.5 
Up to 110% of FMW 230,913 3,967,386 5.8  240,258 4,110,701 5.8  51.0 
Notes:  As per Table 3 on p22 
 
This table clearly shows the higher rate of minimum wage employment recorded in household based 
surveys, in particular for women. While both the SIH and the EEH show a higher proportion of 
women being identified as minimum wage workers, when the ‘wider’ measure is used this is not the 
case with HILDA. 
The estimated share of minimum wage employment undertaken by women also varies across age 
groups. Using HILDA data women account for 41.6 per cent of minimum wage employees aged 21-
24 years. This share increases to reach a peak of 79.6 per cent for those aged 45-49 year. In this age 
group 12.3 per cent of employed women are identified as earning the minimum wage, compared 
with just 3.2 per cent of the men. After this peak the share of minimum wage work undertaken by 
women declines until equal numbers of men and women are recorded as working for the minimum 
wage in the 65 year and over group. 
By major occupational groups, while the broad pattern of the relative incidence of the minimum 
wage is similar for men and women in that there were higher rates of minimum wage employment by 
people employed as labourers, sales workers and as community and personal service workers, there 
were also some differences. This can be seen Figure 6, and can be considered by looking at the ratio 
of incidence. Whereas employed women across all occupations were 1.7 times more likely to be 
minimum wage employees than men, this rose to 2.7 times for those employed as a manager. 
Women employed as machinery operators and drivers were 2.5 times more likely than males in this 
grouping to be paid the minimum wage, with a similar rate, 2.4 times, for clerical and administrative 
staff. The lowest ratio was in sales workers – where 24.0 per cent of women were working for the 
minimum wage compared with 16.7 per cent of men – giving a ratio of 1.4. 
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Figure 6. Broad industry sector, proportion of adult employees on minimum wage by 
gender, HILDA 2011 
 
Source: HILDA – derived from Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ release 
 
Male minimum wage employees were more likely to be employed in agriculture (5.3 per cent of male 
minimum wage workers compared with 2.4 per cent of women), manufacturing (11.6 per cent 
compared to 3.2 per cent), construction (8.2 per cent compared with 0.9 per cent) and transport and 
storage (5.9 per cent compared to 1.5 per cent). In contrast while 21.5 per cent of women on the 
minimum wage were employed in health care and social assistance, only 6.2 per cent of male 
minimum wage workers were. This was also the case in retail trade (17.8 per cent compared with 
12.0 per cent), education and training (9.0 per cent compared with 4.6 per cent) and to a much lesser 
degree accommodation and food services (15.8 per cent compared with 12.8 per cent). 
3.3.3 Education 
There is a strong relationship between levels of educational attainment and minimum wage 
employment. Across all adult employees aged 25 years and over49 14.0 per cent of those with Year 
11 or lower as their highest level of education received the minimum wage. This fell to 8.7 per cent 
for those with Year 12 as their highest level of education and to 4.5 per cent for those with a degree.  
The rate for those with a certificate or diploma was 8.0 per cent. 
These rates show marked differences by age, see Figure 7. For most education levels the U shaped 
relationship with age is again present although it is much shallower. For example for people with 
Year 11 or lower as their highest level of education, it only falls from a peak of around 27 per cent to 
a low of 17 per cent. For those with a university degree it is at or below 5 per cent for most age 
groups before rising to some 8 per cent around age 60 years – potentially reflecting some low wage 
post retirement employment. 
                                                          
49 The population has been restricted to those aged 25 years and over to minimise the distorting effect of including current 
students. 
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Figure 7. Persons by age and highest level of educational attainment, proportion of 
employed persons in receipt of the minimum wage, HILDA 2011 
 
Note:  Series smoothed by a local polynomial using a bandwidth of 5 years. 
Source: HILDA – derived from Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ release 
 
The pattern for those with Year 12 as their highest level of education is the most distinctive.  This is 
likely to reflect a number of disparate factors. The initial high levels of minimum wage employment 
may reflect people who are still in education, as well as those in the process of establishing 
themselves in the workforce. The lesser increase with age in the second part of the distribution may 
be a result of a cohort effect and the differences in levels of educational achievement across the age 
distribution. That is people in these older cohorts were less likely to have obtained tertiary education, 
but still progressed in careers without this.  
3.3.4 Family composition 
Most (51.8 per cent) adult minimum wage workers identified in HILDA are members of couples, 
although as illustrated in Table 6, the highest rates of incidence of receipt are amongst: adult 
dependent students, 22.2 per cent of whom receive pay rates around the minimum wage; other adult 
children living at home with their parents, 19.3 per cent of whom are minimum wage employees; and 
employed lone parents, 13.3 per cent of whom are paid at or below the minimum wage. 
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Table 6  Family composition of adult minimum wage workers, HILDA 2011 
 Position in household: Total 
Member of a couple Lone 
parent 
Dependent 
student 
aged 21 
years and 
over 
Other 
child 
aged 
21 
years 
and 
over 
Other 
person 
aged 21 
years and 
over (a) 
With 
dependents 
No 
dependents 
 - persons - 
FT less than FMW(b) 4,654 7,191 3,520 0 5,757 8,636 29,758 
PT less than FMW 8,229 7,924 6,095 2,833 24,632 22,547 72,260 
FT FMW 71,786 72,002 18,612 0 87,426 44,394 294,220 
PT FMW 116,683 115,935 35,497 28,062 34,536 53,124 383,837 
Total Paid at or 
below 
201,352 203,052 63,724 30,895 152,351 128,701 780,075 
PT Paid above 735,312 518,176 154,905 108,478 108,508 269,123 1,894,502 
FT Paid above 2,173,136 1,813,477 259,931 0 526,497 1,093,266 5,866,307 
Total (c) 3,109,800 2,534,705 478,560 139,373 787,356 1,491,090 8,540,884 
 - % - 
Proportion of 
employed at or 
below the FMW 
6.5 8.0 13.3 22.2 19.3 8.6 9.1 
Distribution of 
minimum wage 
employees  
25.8 26.0 8.2 4.0 19.5 16.5 100.0 
(a) Includes single person households 
(b) Paid less than 50% FMW 
(c) Adult (aged over 21) wage and salary earners excluding those with zero reported income and employed in 
their own incorporated businesses 
Source: HILDA – derived from Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ release 
 
The circumstances of minimum wage earner couples are presented in Table 7. In this there are 
371,190 households where at least one member of the couple is on the minimum wage. However, 
only a little more than a quarter of these, 27.6 per cent, is reliant upon minimum wage employment 
only. Furthermore in around half of these cases the couple comprises one member working part-time 
on the minimum wage and the other is not employed.   
Across all of these couples with at least one person in receipt of the minimum wage the most 
common situation is one member of the couple working full-time at a wage above the minimum 
wage, while their partner works part-time in a minimum wage job (32.5 per cent). This is followed by 
both partners working full-time, one on the minimum wage and one at a higher rate (17.2 per cent). 
Only 10.0 per cent of couples with at least one person employed at the minimum wage have a single 
full-time breadwinner, and these couples represent just 0.9 per cent of all couple households with 
employment. Of these there are only around 19,600 couple families with dependent children aged 
under 15 years with a single full-time minimum wage breadwinner – the archetypical ‘Harvester’ 
family. These account for just 1.1 per cent of couple families with dependent children under 15 
years.  As was previously seen in Table 6 there is an equal number (18,600) of lone parent 
households with dependent children with a full-time minimum wage worker. 
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Table 7  Couples with at least one member employed incidence and type of 
minimum wage employment, HILDA 2011 
Employment status of  
Person 1: Person 2 (a) 
(FT: Full-time, PT: Part-time, 
FMW: Earning at or below the 
FMW, 
Above: Earns more than FMW) 
(b) 
Family type of couple (b) Total Composition 
of couples 
with at least 
one 
minimum 
wage 
employee  
With 
dependent 
child 
under 15 
With 
dependent 
student 
With non- 
dependent 
children 
Couple 
only 
 - persons - - % - 
FT FMW : FT FMW 0 0 0 1,703 1,703 0.5 
FT FMW : PT FMW 2,455 979 0 3,260 6,694 1.8 
PT FMW : PT FMW 0 1,905 0 368 2,273 0.6 
FT FMW : FT above 18,572 8,354 6,153 30,676 63,755 17.2 
FT FMW : PT above 3,165 1,244 1,238 5,426 11,073 3.0 
PT FMW : FT above 52,533 21,019 8,546 38,378 120,476 32.5 
PT FMW : PT above 3,878 0 881 20,336 25,095 6.8 
FT FMW : Other employed(c) 8,564 5,831 2,460 5,930 22,785 6.1 
PT FMW : Other employed 11,989 6,304 1,648 5,778 25,719 6.9 
FT FMW : Not employed 19,600 4,319 1,054 12,087 37,060 10.0 
PT FMW : Not employed 16,006 1,169 12,234 25,148 54,557 14.7 
Total with at least one FMW 136,762 51,124 34,214 149,090 371,190 100.0 
Other with employed person 1,620,033 410,784 274,007 1,257,487 3,562,311  
 - % -  
Proportion with at least one 
FMW  8.4 12.4 12.5 11.9 10.4 
 
Distribution of those with at 
least one FMW  36.8 13.8 9.2 40.2 100.0 
 
(a)  Person 1/Person 2 simply describes the two members of the couple in terms of the combination of income 
types. They have been designated as being Person 1 or Person 2 on the basis of being the first member of the 
couple to be coded in the following sequence: Full-time employment on the minimum wage, part-time employed 
paid the minimum wage, full-time paid above the minimum wage, part-time paid above the minimum wage, 
other employed and not employed. Because a small number of households include more than one couple and 
only the lowest two ranked under this hierarchy are used for the classification of earner type. This may tend to 
overestimate the degree of minimum wage employment. 
(b)  In this table persons on the minimum wage include persons aged under 21 years who are a member of a 
couple. The minimum wage status for these people is based on the age specific minimum wage applicable to 
them. However as some awards and agreements provide for the full-adult wage to be paid at earlier ages this 
approach may underestimate the number of people on the appropriate minimum wage.  
(c)  Hierarchical coding, couples with a dependent child under 15, couples with no dependent child under 15 but 
with at least one dependent student, couples with neither a dependent child under 15, or a dependent student, 
but with other children living at home; and those with no children living at home. 
(d)  Individuals identified in HILDA as being employed, but in receipt of junior wages, business income etc. 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
Given these results a broad picture emerges of minimum wage employment being largely a 
secondary income for couple households and little evidence of the existence of the model upon 
which the family based minimum wage was established. 
3.3.5 The minimum wage and household income 
Since the primary interest in the minimum wage is on its role in providing adequate income to low 
income households, this has been a focus of research in Australia (Richardson 1998, Healey and 
Richardson 2006, McGuiness, Freebairn and Mavromaras 2007) and overseas (Gramlich 1976, Card 
and Krueger 1995 – chapter 9 and Neumark and Wascher 2010 – chapter 5.) Underlying this is the 
question of the role of the minimum wage as an ‘anti-poverty’ strategy. A common finding from these 
studies is that minimum wage employees are widely spread across households of differing income 
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levels, although different authors draw different conclusions about the relevance of this to the case 
for a minimum wage. This section provides an analysis of the household distribution of adult 
minimum wage workers in the 2011 HILDA survey. 
Table 8 Distribution of minimum wage earners by income quintile, 
HILDA 2011 
Minimum wage 
status (b) 
Equivalised annual household disposable income - all 
Households (a) 
Total 
1 
Bottom 
2 3 4 5 
Top 
 - % - 
 Distribution of adult employees 
FT FMW 18.3 24.0 25.7 21.1 11.0 100.0 
PT FMW 23.2 27.5 22.2 16.1 11.1 100.0 
All FMW 21.1 26.0 23.6 18.1 11.1 100.0 
Employed 
persons 
6.2 15.1 21.4 27.2 30.1 100.0 
 Distribution of all employees (including youth)  
FT FMW(b) 17.4 26.0 25.0 20.2 11.4 100.0 
PT FMW 21.2 25.9 21.8 16.6 14.5 100.0 
All FMW 19.7 25.9 23.0 18.0 13.3 100.0 
Employed 
persons 
7.0 15.7 21.6 26.8 28.9 100.0 
(a) Previous financial year household disposable (after tax) income, equivalised using revised OECD scale (1.0 
for first adult, 0.5 for subsequent adults and 0.3 for children aged under 15 years). 
(b)  FMW indicates persons working at or below 105 per cent of the minimum wage. 
Source: Derived from HILDA wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
Table 8 shows the relative distribution of full and part-time employed minimum wage workers, and 
those paid more than the minimum wage, across all households ranked into quintiles (20 per cent 
groupings) of equivalised50 household disposable income over the 2010-11 financial year51. This 
shows that only 18.3 per cent of full-time adult minimum wage earners live in the poorest 20 per cent 
of the Australian population, with the largest concentration being in the third quintile (25.7 per cent) 
and second quintile (24.0 per cent). Some 11.0 per cent of adult full-time minimum wage workers are 
in the highest quintile.  Part-time adult minimum wage earners are more heavily concentrated in the 
lower two quintiles, 23.2 per cent and 27.5 per cent respectively, with again more than 10 per cent in 
the highest. 
Notwithstanding the pattern of distribution of minimum wage employment across the income 
distribution, when this is compared with the distribution of all employment it is clear that the relative 
level of minimum wage employment is disproportionately weighted towards lower income 
households. 
If young people are also included in the analysis a broadly similar situation is seen, with the main 
difference being an increase in the proportion of part-time minimum wage employment in 
households in the fourth and fifth deciles. (As noted attachment A provides some more details on the 
experience of young people on the minimum wage.)  
                                                          
50 Disposable income is total household income, including transfer payments, less taxes. Equivalisation involves dividing this 
net household income by a factor which takes account of the number and characteristics of people living in the household to 
gain an estimate of the relative level of income, taking into account needs. 
51 Previous financial year income is used as household disposable income, that is taking full account of taxes and transfers, is 
only available on this basis in HILDA. 
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Clearly, on the basis of these results, it appears any attempt to improve the outcomes for those 
households with the lowest incomes through the minimum wage is likely to be relatively inefficient 
and not particularly effective.  
This approach to analysis has been criticised for confounding households with earnings, with those 
reliant upon transfers. (That is since the lowest income households are dominated by those without 
employment it is to be expected that an increase in the income of those in employment would have 
little effect.) Table 9 hence simply looks at those households with some income from employment 
and excludes those wholly reliant upon transfers, with the quintiles being reset for this different 
population. Even here just 28.6 per cent of full-time adult minimum wage earners are in the poorest 
20 per cent of these working households52, along with a slightly higher proportion, 32.1 per cent, of 
part-time minimum wage workers. (Because this analysis involves comparing current individual 
earnings with previous financial year household income there is a small residual group which cannot 
be classified since the household they live in did not have any wage and salary income in the 
previous year.) 
Table 9  Distribution of adult minimum wage earners by income quintile, 
households with earned income, HILDA 2011 
Minimum wage status 
(b) 
Households with any earned income, equivalised 
disposable income quintile (a) 
No 
previous 
year 
earnings (c) 
Total 
1 
Bottom 
2 3 4 5 
Top 
 
 - % - 
 Households with earned income from adult employment 
FT FMW 28.6 22.2 21.7 17.6 9.0 0.9 100.0 
PT FMW 32.1 24.1 18.6 13.2 9.1 2.9 100.0 
All FMW 30.7 23.3 19.9 15.0 9.1 2.1 100.0 
Employed persons 11.6 17.2 20.7 23.9 25.9 0.8 100.0 
 Households with earned income from at least one full-time employee  
FT FMW 36.1 25.1 17.6 12.3 7.9 0.9 100.0 
PT FMW 11.8 10.9 7.4 8.7 4.5 56.8 100.0 
All FMW 21.9 16.8 11.6 10.2 5.9 33.5 100.0 
Employed persons 11.8 14.7 17.6 19.8 21.6 14.4 100.0 
(a) Previous financial year household disposable (after tax) income, equivalised using revised OECD scale (1.0 
for first adult, 0.5 for subsequent adults and 0.3 for children aged under 15 years). 
(b)  FMW indicates persons working at or below 105 per cent of the minimum wage. 
(c)  Income quintiles are only constructed for those households with a full-time employee and some income from 
earnings in the previous year. 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
The second panel of Table 9 restricts the classified households to those with a full-time employee.  
Here the proportion of full-time minimum wage earners in the bottom quintile increases to 36.1 per 
cent. Again while the proportion decreases with the increasing income of each quintile, it can be 
seen that both full and part-time minimum wage employment persists into the higher income 
brackets even when households are restricted to those with at least one full-time earner. The high 
concentration of part-time minimum wage employment in the category which had no full-time 
employment income in the previous year highlights the extent to which part-time minimum wage 
employment is concentrated in households with no full-time employment. 
                                                          
52 The split into quintiles in these tables is based upon person weighted households rather than households per se. For 
presentational purposes the term households has been used. 
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Table 10 Couples, Distribution of adult minimum wage employment by 
income quintile, households with earned income, HILDA 2011 
Minimum wage 
status (b) 
Couple households with any earned income, equivalised 
disposable income quintile(a) 
No 
previous 
year 
earnings(c) 
Total 
 
1 
Bottom 
2 3 4 5 
Top 
 - % - 
At least one FMW 32.0 28.8 16.8 13.8 5.8 2.8 100.0 
No FMW 15.6 18.1 19.9 20.8 21.4 4.1 100.0 
(a) Households with a couple only. Previous financial year household disposable (after tax) income, equivalised 
using revised OECD scale (1.0 for first adult, 0.5 for subsequent adults and 0.3 for children aged under 15 
years).   
(b)  FMW indicates persons working at or below 105 per cent of the minimum wage. 
(c)  Income quintiles are only constructed for those households with some income from earnings in the previous 
year. 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
Table 10 considers couples, rather than individuals, and addresses the distribution of those couple 
households where at least one person was receiving the minimum wage either in full or part-time 
employment relative to all couple households with some earned income. Here it can be seen that 
almost a third, 32.0 per cent, of households with at least one person working on the minimum wage 
were in the bottom quintile of all working couple households. Although this is a disproportionate 
representation, the majority of these minimum wage receiving couples were in the second, third and 
fourth quintiles of working couples ranked by household income. Almost one in five of the couples 
with at least one member being a minimum wage employee are in the top two quintiles of these 
households by income.   
Table 11 focuses on the distribution of income from minimum wage employment, rather than the 
distribution of people who are employed on the minimum wage. It shows the proportion of current 
household wage and salary income which is derived from the minimum wage, and the distribution of 
minimum wage income across households. The first panel considers income from adult minimum 
wage earners only, while the second includes those aged under 21 years. In both panels the quintiles 
of households are limited to those with some earnings from wage and salaries in the previous year. 
Households in the lowest quintile receive 29.9 per cent of their total income from adult minimum 
wage workers – and it represents some 12.9 per cent of these households’ income from the wages 
and salaries of adult workers. In contrast, for example, some 15.2 per cent of income from minimum 
wage employment flows to households in the fourth decile. This represents just 1.8 per cent of these 
households’ income. This pattern does not change appreciably when the scope of income is 
extended to include the earnings of those aged under 21 years, as illustrated in the final panel of the 
table. 
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Table 11 Income from minimum wage employment by income quintile, 
households with earned income, HILDA 2011 
 
All households with wage and salary income, 
Equivalised disposable income quintile(a) 
No 
previous 
year 
earnings(b) 
Total 
 
1 
Bottom 
2 3 4 5 
Top 
 - % - 
 
Distribution of earnings of adult minimum wage employees 
Min wage income as share of 
household earned income 
12.9 5.4 3.6 1.8 0.7 0.7 3.0 
Distribution of minimum wage income 29.9 23.1 21.9 15.2 8.4 1.5 100.0 
 
Distribution of earnings of all minimum wage employees 
Min wage income as share of 
household earned income 
14.3 6.3 4.5 2.2 1.0 4.4 3.6 
Distribution of minimum wage income 28.7 22.7 22.2 15.1 10.1 1.2 100.0 
(a)  Previous financial year household disposable (after tax) income, equivalised using revised OECD scale (1.0 
for first adult, 0.5 for subsequent adults and 0.3 for children aged under 15 years).   
(b)  Income quintiles are only constructed for those households with some income from earnings in the previous 
year. 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
In the review of young people receiving minimum wages presented in Appendix B, it is found that the 
distribution of these across households ranked by income varies between those working part-time 
and those working full-time. Young people working part-time and in receipt of the minimum wage are 
relatively evenly distributed across all quintiles of households with some income from earnings. Full-
time junior employment on the minimum wage, in contrast, is more heavily weighted towards the 
bottom of the distribution with 30 per cent being in the lowest quintile, nevertheless some 12 per 
cent of this group are in each of the top two quintiles. This reinforces the picture seen above, that 
those people who earn incomes at or around the minimum wage, while at times over-represented in 
those households with the lowest incomes, are not primarily concentrated in such households. 
Rather they are distributed across a substantial part of the overall income distribution.  To the extent 
there is some concentration in lower income households, for adult minimum wage employees, it is 
most marked amongst part-time workers. This indicates that the association between minimum 
wage employment and household income is as much a matter of their hours of work as of the rate of 
payment. 
3.3.6 Minimum wages well-being and poverty 
A frequent form of measuring well-being is through the use of income poverty lines. Most frequently 
these are ‘relative’ income poverty lines which define poverty in ways such as having an income 
below half of the median income of all households (after adjustment for household size and 
composition). As such these lines do not identify whether or not a household is having adverse 
outcomes, but rather a belief that having such a level of income is likely to make it difficult for the 
household to achieve an adequate standard of living relative to the community standard set by other 
households. Reflecting this, such measures of ‘poverty’ have, for example, been called ‘at risk of 
poverty’ measures by the EU. This language is adopted here. 
An alternative approach to measuring material well-being is to identify whether or not a household or 
a person is experiencing financial stress or material deprivation. That is, rather than assuming, as do 
the poverty lines, that the level of income is inadequate to allow them to undertake particular 
activities, information on this is collected directly. A third approach combines both these 
methodologies to generate a measure of what is frequently termed ‘consistent poverty’, that is where 
a person not only has a low income relative to others, but also experiences some form of 
deprivation. 
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All three approaches are used here. Specifically the measures that have been utilised are: 
• At risk of poverty. Two measures are used. The first is having (equivalised disposable) income 
less than 50 per cent of median (equivalised disposable) income of the community as a whole.  
The second uses a line set at 60 per cent of the median. 
• Multiple financial stress and hardship. In the HILDA survey data are collected on four items 
which can be considered as representing hardship: having to sell or pawn something; being 
unable to heat one’s home; having gone without meals; and having to ask for help from a welfare 
or community organisation. A further three items are collected on aspects more aligned with 
financial and cashflow problems: not being able to pay electricity, gas or telephone bills on time; 
asking for financial help from family or friends; and not being able to pay a mortgage or rent 
payment on time. The measure of multiple hardship used in the table is based on whether or not 
a person reports two or more of the hardship items. The measure of multiple stress is whether 
they report two or more of the seven items – that is either financial problems or hardship. 
• Consistent poverty. This is based upon being both ‘at risk of poverty’ and having some 
experience of financial stress. Four measures are shown – these are a combination of the two 
different ‘at risk of poverty’ measures and whether a person has one or more, or two or more of 
the financial stressors or hardship outcomes. 
In using these measures it has been necessary to assess being at risk of poverty and the incidence 
of deprivation on the basis of the person’s experience in the 2010-11 financial year, while their 
employment and minimum wage status is based on when they were interviewed in late 2011. This, 
along with possible misreporting of income and the treatment of business and investment losses, 
does mean that there is some ‘noise’ in the estimates. This can be a problem in trying to define the 
absolute level of outcomes, but when the measures are used as relative measures between groups 
this does not introduce substantial bias. 
Table 12 provides the incidence of each of these measures for the population aged 15 years and 
over. In deriving this status people are classified as being at risk of poverty on the basis of whether 
or not the household they live in is classified as being at risk of poverty (since this measure is based 
upon the equivalised income of the household and to take account of income pooling) while 
deprivation and stress is based on individual experience. 
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Table 12 At risk of poverty and financial stress, HILDA 2011 
Individual 
employment 
status 
At risk of poverty  Deprivation/Stress  Consistent poverty 
50% 
median 
60% 
median 
 Multiple 
Financial 
stress 
Multiple 
Hardship 
 1+ financial stress  2+ financial stress 
  50% 
median 
60% 
median 
 50% 
median 
60% 
median 
 - % - 
 Junior           
PT FMW 7.4 16.6  3.4 0.6  2.3 3.4  1.5 1.5 
FT FMW 7.6 14.0  3.8 0.0  2.3 3.3  0.0 1.1 
PT above 7.7 10.9  3.0 0.0  1.5 2.7  0.6 1.4 
FT above 4.3 12.1  2.5 0.3  0.5 1.4  0.0 0.9 
 Adult                   
PT FMW 15.1 22.7  11.5 1.4  7.3 10.4  5.8 7.9 
FT FMW 9.0 17.3  9.7 1.5  2.8 7.6  0.4 4.7 
PT above 13.7 20.6  11.3 1.6  6.3 9.6  4.6 7.0 
FT above 7.5 16.4  11.7 1.9  2.4 7.7  0.5 5.2 
Own business 9.6 14.5  4.9 0.7  3.3 4.9  2.2 3.1 
Not employed 27.5 39.1  7.5 2.4  7.9 11.3  4.9 7.2 
Population 15 
years and over 13.1 19.4  5.6 1.1  3.9 5.7  2.4 3.7 
Note: At risk of poverty derived at household level, stress and deprivation at the individual level, data 
reported on basis of individuals and individual employment/earning status 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
Amongst adult employees it is clear that the risk of being ‘at risk of poverty’ is associated with part-
time employment. While 9.0 per cent of full-time minimum wage workers are living in households ‘at 
risk of poverty’ at the 50 per cent of median income level, this is only 1.5 percentage points higher 
than those full-time wage and salary earners who earn above the minimum wage and less than one 
third of the rate of those not in the workforce. However the rate for part-time minimum wage 
employees is considerably higher – at 15.1 per cent, this is though not inconsistent with the 13.7 per 
cent for those part-time workers employed at higher hourly rates of pay. 
In contrast there is little difference in the at risk level for full and part-time junior minimum wage 
earners. They also have an at risk rate a little below that of those on part-time earnings. However 
their at risk of poverty rate is one and three-quarters that of full-time junior employees earning above 
the minimum wage. This latter difference tends to diminish if the higher 60 per cent threshold is used 
to measure risk. 
The two multiple deprivation measures do not identify any major consistent difference between those 
adults on the minimum wage and those earning at higher rates. (The higher rate of financial stress 
amongst wage and salary earners relative to the non-employed reflects the very low rates of financial 
stress reported by the aged who make up a significant share of those without jobs.) 
Using the consistent poverty measure again shows, amongst adults, a strong part-time work effect, 
that is those persons working part-time were in households with much higher incidence of consistent 
poverty, but no substantial minimum wage effect.  
The absence of a marked minimum wage effect in the above data could be a reflection of the extent 
to which minimum wage employees are frequently in households with more highly remunerated 
persons.   
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Table 13 seeks to minimise this impact by considering the incidence of being at risk of poverty by 
the extent to which a household is dependent upon the minimum wage. In contrast to the early data 
these results are reported on a household rather than person basis 53. Households have been 
classified on a hierarchical basis commencing with those whose only earnings are those of a junior 
part-time employee who is in receipt of the minimum wage. This group has a very high at risk of 
poverty rate – 49.1 per cent at the 50 per cent median benchmark and 55.2 per cent at the 60 per 
cent benchmark. They are though a very small group – representing less than one per cent of all 
households at risk of poverty. The second group are households who are again only reliant upon 
part-time minimum wage earnings – but where this may be from a single adult or a combination of 
adults and juniors. Here the at risk of poverty rate, while remaining high, falls considerably to 30.3 
per cent and 43.2 per cent respectively at the two benchmarks. These households also form a more 
considerable block of those households at risk of poverty – just under 4 per cent. 
Table 13 Household incidence and distribution of at risk of poverty by 
minimum wage earning, HILDA 2011  
Household income 
source 
(Hierarchical coding) 
Incidence  Distribution of 
households at risk of 
poverty 
All 
households 
50% 
median 
60% 
median 
 50% 
median 
60% 
median 
 -%- 
Only junior PT FMW 49.1 55.2  0.8 0.6 0.3 
Only PT FMW 30.3 43.2  3.4 3.4 1.9 
Only FMW 16.7 29.7  1.9 2.4 1.9 
Any adult FMW 2.0 6.6  0.2 0.5 1.7 
Any FMW 3.8 9.1  1.1 1.8 4.7 
Any employ (excl 
business) 4.1 7.0  12.5 15.0 51.5 
Any employ other 5.3 9.4  1.9 2.4 6.1 
No employment 41.5 55.6  78.2 74.0 31.9 
All households 16.9 23.9  100.0 100.0 100.0 
Note: Data reported at the household level. The rate of individual poverty is lower. 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
The third group of households are those households who have at least one full-time employed 
person on the minimum wage, and are wholly reliant upon the minimum wage for their earned 
income. Here there is some more marked divergence in the results depending upon whether the 50 
per cent or 60 per cent benchmark is used. Relative to all households and using the 50 per cent of 
median income line, the incidence of at risk of poverty for these minimum wage reliant households of 
16.7 per cent is a rate consistent with the average of all households. The rate of incidence increases 
by almost 80 per cent to 29.7 per cent using the somewhat higher benchmark, suggesting a 
considerable segment of this group sits between these two points. The next two groups represent 
households with some minimum wage and some non-minimum wage employment. These represent 
almost 60 per cent of all households with some minimum wage income and taken together they have 
an incidence of being at risk of poverty of 3.3 per cent using the 50 per cent of median line and 8.4 
per cent using the higher line. When using the 50 per cent benchmark this rate is below that for 
households with earnings only from sources other than the minimum wage of 4.2 per cent. This 
though is reversed if the higher 60 per cent at risk of poverty measure is adopted. In the table this 
                                                          
53 The reporting of this on a household rather than a person basis tends to generate a higher rate of incidence of the risk of 
poverty, as there is a U shaped relationship between household size and being at risk of being in poverty and the household 
level results are disproportionately weighted by the adverse outcomes for single person households. 
 39 
 
latter group is split into those with some income from business and self-employment. This is done as 
it is possible that income is less well recorded for these households. 
Taken together this data suggests that adult full-time minimum wage earners do not carry any 
disproportionate burden of poverty or financial stress and hardship. Where people or households on 
the minimum wage are more frequently at risk of poverty is when this employment is part-time or 
where it is a young person seeking to live independently on incomes at or around the minimum 
wage. 
Figure 8. Satisfaction with financial situation and with life, minimum wage and other 
wage and salary earners, HILDA 2011 
Satisfaction with financial situation Satisfaction with life 
  
Note: Distributions have been smoothed 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
A further approach to measuring well-being is to consider how people perceive their own level of 
well-being. Figure 8 shows two measures; firstly satisfaction with an individual’s financial situation 
and secondly their satisfaction with life. Under the first measure those wage and salary earners on 
the minimum wage are somewhat less satisfied than higher earners. When asked about their level of 
satisfaction with their financial situation, 21.9 per cent of minimum wage earners reported being 
dissatisfied to some degree, 17.5 per cent were neutral and 60.5 per cent were positive. This 
compares with 11.4 per cent, 12.0 per cent and 76.6 per cent for those on higher rates of earnings. 
Part-time minimum wage employees were more likely to nominate that they were not satisfied (23.5 
per cent compared with 19.7 per cent of full-time minimum wage earners). 
The second measure is a broader one of overall life satisfaction. Very clearly responses to this will 
take into account much more than the impact of income. Only 2.7 per cent of minimum wage earners 
and 1.4 per cent of other wage and salary earners indicated that they were dissatisfied. A further 4.6 
per cent and 2.9 per cent respectively said they were neither satisfied nor dissatisfied. At the very 
top of the distribution 13.9 per cent of minimum wage employees reported that they were ‘Totally 
satisfied’, well above the 8.2 per cent of those earning higher rates of pay. 
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3.4 Near minimum wage employment 
To the extent the minimum wage directly operates as a binding floor on wages, and impacts on the 
actual operation of the labour market, it would be expected that there would be a group of persons 
whose wages would equal the minimum wage, and few paid at rates below the minimum wage. As 
previously discussed this latter is not the case. Similarly there is little evidence in the data of the 
minimum wage itself being the actual rate of pay for many employees. 
Figure 9 plots the distribution of earnings, at the lower end of the earnings distribution, in 5 
percentage point multiples of the minimum wage, using data from the 2010 EEH survey54. At best it 
suggests that there is a very weak floor effect. For full-time non-casual employees approximately 0.6 
per cent of employees are paid at between 99.5 per cent and 104.5 per cent of the minimum wage. 
This though, as seen in the chart, appears to be at most a slight step, being above the proportions of 
persons employed in the preceding classifications. In the case of part-time non-casual employees, 
while again there is the suggestion of a step, with 1.1 per cent of employees being in this category, 
this is much more marked in the 104.5-109.5 per cent of the minimum wage category, which had 2.3 
per cent of these employees, with the same proportion in the subsequent category.  
Turning to casual employees, it needs to be recalled that a uniform 20 per cent casual loading has 
been used for analysis – with the actual loadings varying from 15 per cent to 30 per cent. A 
consequence of this is that where people are being paid a higher casual loading they will be 
classified in the chart as earning above the minimum wage, and where a lower loading is paid they 
will be classified as being paid under the minimum wage. The data indicates that amongst part-time 
casual employees 3.3 per cent are within the 99.5 per cent and 104.5 per cent range with again a 
marked indication of a step in the distribution. However a larger proportion, 5.1 per cent, is in the 
104.5-109.5 per cent range. In contrast, amongst full-time casual employees the step appears to be 
in the 94.5 to 99.5 per cent group with 2.8 per cent of this group of employees falling into this 
category, whereas a lesser 2.1 per cent is in the 99.5-104.5 category, and a larger 4.8 per cent in the 
104.5-109.5 range. 
The lack of any marked concentration of employment at the minimum wage may in part be a 
consequence of the structure of classifications within modern awards. In many of these all 
classifications are paid at rates above the minimum wage, whereas in others the minimum wage is 
only paid during a ‘training period’ – varying from 3 months to a year. However given that many of 
the awards that make this type of provision have a base ongoing rate about 3 per cent or so above 
the minimum wage, it could have been expected that these will fall within the 105 per cent of the 
minimum wage boundary as has been used elsewhere in this paper. Appendix C provides some 
more details on the structure of some illustrative awards and agreements. 
                                                          
54 The results from analysis of income data from household surveys was even more indeterminate as would be expected due 
to the potential for reporting error, and is not reported here. 
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Figure 9. Distribution of earnings as percentage multiples of the minimum wage, lower end 
of the earnings distribution, EEH 2010. 
Full-time non casual Full-time casual 
  
Part-time non casual Part-time casual 
  
Note: Categories rounded to nearest 0.5, that is 100-104 is from 99.51 per cent to 104.49 per cent 
Source: Source: Derived from the ABS 2010 Employee Earnings and Hours, Expanded CURF 
 
 
Earlier analysis has looked at the effect of using, from the EEH survey, estimates of the scope of the 
minimum wage using definitions of up to 105 per cent and up to 110 per cent. Figure 9 takes this 
further to examine the impact of higher multiples. Using a boundary of 150 per cent encompasses 
some 34.5 per cent of non-managerial employees. Moving from the 105 to a 120 per cent boundary 
more than triples the scope from 4.1 per cent to 12.5 per cent. 
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Table 14 Proportion of employees cumulatively paid at multiples of the 
minimum wage, EEH 2010 
Up to per cent of 
FMW 
Full-time  Part-time Total 
Non- 
casual 
Casual  Non- 
casual 
Casual 
 - % - 
80 0.8 1.6  1.3 0.8 1.0 
85 1.0 2.0  1.5 1.2 1.2 
90 1.2 2.6  1.8 2.1 1.5 
95 1.7 3.0  2.0 2.9 2.0 
100 2.0 6.0  2.6 4.8 2.7 
105 2.6 8.5  4.2 9.1 4.1 
110 3.6 13.3  6.0 14.0 6.0 
115 5.0 20.4  8.5 20.8 8.6 
120 6.7 29.3  12.2 32.3 12.5 
125 8.7 36.7  16.6 40.2 16.0 
130 11.0 42.1  22.9 48.6 20.1 
135 13.3 48.3  27.5 55.8 23.8 
140 15.8 54.8  33.3 60.8 27.4 
145 18.7 59.6  38.8 64.5 31.0 
150 21.6 63.6  43.1 69.1 34.5 
Source: Derived from the ABS 2010 Employee Earnings and Hours, Expanded CURF 
 
These results, ie the incidence of sub-minimum wage earnings and the lack of any substantial 
concentration of employees being employed at the actual level of the minimum wage, then lead to a 
further question –whether the Federal Minimum Wage in Australia actually operates as a binding floor 
wage? This has two elements. The first is whether given the apparent substantial number of people 
being paid below the minimum wage it can be considered as binding. The second is whether it 
represents in any real sense a minimum floor – set above that which would have been derived from 
an equilibrium of labour supply and demand. 
The first of these, as has been discussed, was considered in research by Nelms, Nicholson and 
Wheatley (2011) which attributed apparent sub-minimum wage employment to a range of specific 
employee circumstances – such as reported hours of work, salary sacrifice, training wages and 
potentially data problems. It was also considered by Healey (2010) who finds that below minimum 
wage employment was associated with being female, limited workforce experience, speaking a 
language other than English at home and having a moderate to severe disability. He concludes that 
this “leaves open the possibility that very low wages are caused by illegal non-compliance with the 
FMW” (p20). At the same time he however finds ”Union membership does not significantly reduce 
the probability of wages below the FMW” (p17). This latter would suggest the explanation of non-
compliance is less robust as it would seem unusual that unions would be unaware of, or have taken 
no action, with regard to the underpayment of their members, especially given the considerable 
margin by which the apparent under minimum wage rates are paid.55 
The second, that is the floor effect, has been considered by Harding and Harding (2004a) who 
conclude that the firm based data they use provides “strong evidence that  ... either the minimum 
wage or efficiency wage is the binding wage floor ... strong evidence against the assumption that 
                                                          
55 The Fair Work Ombudsman is responsible for ensuring compliance. In their 2011-12 Annual Report they indicated that they 
completed 28,412 compliance investigations across the range of aspects of wages and conditions for which they are 
responsible, and had recovered $33.6 million in underpayments for just under 17,000 individuals. Information is not provided 
on the proportion of this which relates to the underpayment of the minimum wage. (Fair Work Ombudsman 2012) 
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employment and wages are determined via the intersection of labour demand and supply as in a neo-
classical model.”(p8) The concepts these authors cite are discussed in more detail later – but 
essentially the finding is that the minimum wage acts as a substantive floor to the wages system, 
and is largely complied with, or it is a wage above what would be generated by the simple demand 
and supply of labour, but is paid by employers as an inducement for employees to apply themselves 
to the job, rather than just turn up.  
3.5 International comparisons 
While most OECD countries have a national statutory minimum wage, not all do. For example, 
Austria, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Norway and Sweden all rely upon industry based 
collectively agreed minimum rates of pay. The coverage of such agreements varies by country. In 
2008-09 it was estimated that the coverage ranged from some 62 per cent of the whole economy in 
Germany, and 74 per cent in Norway, to 99 per cent of employees in Austria. (Eldring and Alsos 2012 
p10) 
Figure 10.  International comparison of Minimum Wage rates, 2010 
 
Source OECD 2012  
 
Relative to average earnings Australia has the third highest minimum wage, below New Zealand and 
France, and equal with Belgium. When taken as a proportion of median earnings, Australia has the 
5th highest, trailing Turkey56, France, New Zealand and Portugal. 
3.5.1 International comparisons of the scope of the minimum wage 
As with Australia only limited data are available for many countries on the relative coverage of the 
minimum wage. From national sources it is though possible to derive a series of estimates. These, as 
well as some background on the characteristics of these nations’ minimum wage systems are 
detailed below for the United Kingdom, New Zealand, France, Ireland, the United States, Canada 
and the Netherlands: 
                                                          
56 The high ratio of the minimum to median wage in Turkey, but relatively low ratio of the minimum wage to average earnings 
reflects the distribution of earnings in that country which has a large number of low paid workers and a small group of more 
highly paid workers. As such the minimum wage worker is less differentiated from the median employee, but average incomes 
are driven by the small group with high incomes. 
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• The UK had a history of wage determination through collective bargaining and the operation of 
Trades Boards and Wages Councils for most of the 20th century. In 1999 the Low Pay 
Commission was established to advise the government on the rate of a National Minimum Wage 
which operates as a floor rate to the wages system. In the UK (Low Pay Commission 2011, pp 
30-33) it was estimated that, in 2010, around 2.5 per cent of adult employees were paid the 
National Minimum Wage (NMW) and a further 0.9 per cent paid below. This latter included 
apprentices, persons paid piece rates and those who have accommodation and other costs 
provided. By industry the proportion on the NMW was estimated to be as high as 20.3 per cent 
in hospitality and 23.5 per cent in cleaning. Rates of receipt varied by firm size. Only 2.6 per cent 
of jobs in large companies were paid at the minimum wage with this rising to 8.3 per cent in 
‘micro’ firms. Women are more likely to be employed in minimum wage jobs. Using estimates 
which included a proposed increase to the rate the Commission reported that 2.6 per cent of 
employed adult males would be on the minimum wage as opposed to 4.3 per cent of women. 
(ibid p129) 
• New Zealand introduced a minimum wage in 1894 through arbitration boards and the Industrial 
Conciliation and Arbitration Act. This largely took the form of a basic wage for those covered by 
awards. In 1945 a more general minimum wage was established under the Minimum Wage Act, 
with the current minimum wage being based on the 1983 Minimum Wage Act. This provides for a 
statutory minimum wage set by the Governor-General on advice by the Executive Council.  Other 
than special provisions for young new entrants, certain trainees and some people with 
disabilities, a single minimum wage applies to all persons over the age of 15 years. In 2012 the 
wage was $NZ13.50 an hour for a 40 hour week. There is a legislative requirement for it to be 
reviewed annually. These annual reviews involve the initial preparation of an ‘Officials Report’ 
compiled by the Department of Labour which then leads to Cabinet consideration and 
recommendation to the Executive Council. Estimates of the scope of the minimum wage vary.  
While the New Zealand Department of Labour (2012) suggests there are 64,000 recipients other 
estimates are as high as 200,000 (Clark 2012). These convert to rates of incidence of minimum 
wage employment from 4 to 12 per cent of the workforce.  
• The history of a statutory minimum wage in France goes back to 1950 with the introduction of 
the Salaire minimum interprofessionnel garantie (Smig) which was based on a cost of a basket of 
goods for a single person living in the Paris region.  Since then it has evolved considerably – with 
the current incarnation the Salaire minimum interprofessionnel de croissance (Smic). In January 
2011 it was estimated that 10.6 per cent of employees (in the private sector, excluding 
agriculture and domestic employment and excluding apprentices and those in temporary 
employment) were paid at or near the minimum wage57. This rate ranged from around 30 per 
cent of employees in companies with one or two staff, to 4.4 per cent of those with more 
working in companies which have more than 500 employees. (DARES 2011). Employment on 
Smic was much more common amongst those employed on a part-time basis (25.2 per cent) 
than those employed full-time (7.3 per cent). In the fast food sector an estimated 61 per cent of 
employees were paid Smic, more generally across industry sectors the extent of dependence 
upon Smic varied from 35.1 per cent for accommodation and restaurant services, to two per 
cent or less in extractive industries, electricity and gas production and distribution, and 
information and communications. 
• Ireland introduced a statutory minimum wage in 2000. Prior to this minimum wages existed in a 
series of industries under the aegis of Wages Councils or Joint Labour Committees. As part of 
the response to the GFC the minimum wage was cut by €1 an hour by the then government in 
                                                          
57 The data used in this section are actual estimates of the population who would benefit from an increase in the value of the 
Smic – it thus also includes a small number of people who were paid above the actual rate of Smic of €8.86 in 2010 and €9.00 
which was the new level as of January 2011. 
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February 2011 but this was reversed only a few months later in April 2011 with a change in 
Government. The current rate is €8.65 per hour, with a lower rate being paid to those under 18 
years of age, in the first two years of employment and for trainees. As with other countries 
limited data is available on the contemporary use of the minimum wage. A recent estimate is that 
some 47,000 workers, or 3.1 per cent of the workforce, were in receipt of the minimum wage 
(Calleary 2010). Analysis in 2002 suggested a rate of 4.5 per cent (Nolan, Williams and Blackwell 
2003). 
• The US has a series of Federal and State minimum wages58 and a range of exemptions for some 
groups of employees59. The history of the Federal minimum wage goes back to 1938 and the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. The rate is legislated. States have had the capacity to set state specific 
rates above the Federal minimum. The Federal rate, as set in July 2009, was $US7.25 per hour, 
with this still in place in early 2013.60 Most data on the receipt of the minimum wage is restricted 
to those employees who are paid hourly rates. Amongst these employees, who account for 58.8 
per cent of wage and salary earners, 6 per cent of those aged 16 years and over were paid at or 
below the Federal Minimum Wage in 2010. This proportion included 24.9 per cent of those aged 
under 19 years and 13.6 per cent of part-time employees. Amongst those aged 25 years and 
over, 3.8 per cent of those paid hourly rates were paid at or below the Federal Minimum Wage.  
By occupation there was a strong concentration in the ‘food preparation and serving’ 
occupations where 25.7 per cent of employees are paid at or below the minimum wage, and 
12.0 per cent in ‘personal care and service’ occupations. At 7.3 per cent women are more likely 
to be paid at or below the minimum wage compared with 4.5 per cent of men. By race, 6.9 per 
cent of Black or African American workers on hourly rates received the minimum compared with 
5.9 per cent of Whites. (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011)61.  
As some states have minimum wages above the Federal rate the use of the Federal rate as a 
cut-off inappropriately underestimates the role of a minimum wage in these locations. To 
overcome this, if the analysis is limited only to those states that either have a minimum wage 
equal to or below the federal rate, or with no minimum wage at all, then the proportion of hourly 
paid employees in receipt of the minimum wage or less increases to 7.6 per cent. These states 
account for some 56.8 per cent of all people employed on hourly rates. 
• The minimum wage in Canada is determined at the provincial level and hence varies by location. 
Rates are also age based. The adult rate ranged, in 2009, from $Canadian $8.00 to $9.50 per 
hour. In 2009 it was estimated that some 5.8 of employees were employed on the minimum 
wage – with this rising to 10.3 per cent if a 10 per cent margin above the minimum was 
considered. Women (7.2 per cent) were more likely than men (4.3 per cent) to be paid the 
minimum wage, and minimum wage employment was highest amongst the young. Indeed 
teenagers, where 37.8 per cent were employed on the minimum wage, accounted for 60 per cent 
of all minimum wage workers. Young adults (20-24 years) accounted for a further 18 per cent, 
and had a rate of incidence of 10.3 per cent. In both these age groups this mainly involved 
                                                          
58 As at 1 January 2012 the Federal minimum wage was $7.25 an hour. Some 18 states and District of Columbia have higher 
minimum wages.  These include a cluster around $8.25, $8.80 in Oregon and $9.04 in Washington State. (US Department of 
Labor 2012) 
59 This includes a lower minimum wage for those persons whose earnings are supplemented by tips. 
60 In his State of the Union Address following his re-election in February 2013 President Obama proposed to Congress that 
the US minimum wage be raised to $9 per hour, and to index the minimum wage to changes in the cost of living. (Obama 
2013) 
61 Because a number of states have higher minimum wages, and unlike some other estimates of coverage, the US minimum 
wage counts use the precise value of the federal minimum wage as a cut-off it is possible that these estimates may 
understate the extent of minimum wage employment. However, even if this is the case the proportion would appear to be 
under 10 per cent of full-time workers, as data on full-time wage and salary earners indicates that the 10th percentile of 
earnings for these employees was $357 per week ($379 per week for those aged over 25 years). These levels are substantially 
above the Federal minimum wage, and above any of the state minimums. (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2012) 
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students working part-time – with 85 per cent of teenagers and 44 per cent of those in the young 
adult group falling into this category62. Only 2.8 per cent of employees aged 25 years and over 
receive the minimum wage. The industry sectors with the highest rates of minimum wage 
employment were agriculture (14.3 per cent), accommodation and food (22.5 per cent) and retail 
trade (12.3 per cent). (Statistics Canada 2010) 
• The Netherlands has had a national minimum wage since 1964, initially this was as an extension 
of collectively bargained minimum rates with a statutory minimum being legislated in 1969. The 
minimum wage in the Netherlands was €339.10 per week63 in 2013, with this rate being paid to 
people aged 23 years and over. It tapers in from 30 per cent for those aged 15 years and even at 
age 21 is only 72.5 per cent of the full rate. (Salverda 2009). Salverda reports that in 2005 some 
4.0 per cent of all employees aged 15-64 years were in receipt of the minimum wage – 4.9 per 
cent of women and 3.2 per cent of men. It was more common amongst part-time workers, 4.9 
per cent compared with 2.2 per cent for full-time employees, and some 16.8 per cent of 
employees aged 15-19 years and 10.5 per cent of those aged 20-24 years received the minimum 
wage. 
Table 15 summarises data on the incidence of minimum wage employment for the above countries. 
To the extent comparisons can be made, even on the basis of the EEH data, adult reliance upon the 
minimum wage in Australia would appear to be at the upper end of the distribution. Australia also 
has one of the highest incidences amongst youth of those countries for which data are available.  
More broadly it might be suggested that there are three clusters of countries which emerge from the 
data when adult reliance on the minimum wage is considered. These are: high reliance countries – 
Australia, France and potentially New Zealand; relatively low reliance, the UK and Netherlands; with 
the US and Canada sitting between the two. The different patterns of incidence by age group, and 
the data sources, inclusions and exclusions however make such a classification tentative, rather than 
definitive.   
This extent of use of minimum wages should though not be treated as analogous to low pay in 
general. Using a measure of low pay, whether a person earned less than two thirds of the national 
median hourly wage rate Schmitt (2012) reports that a quarter of all US workers work for low pay as 
do around 20 per cent of those in the UK, Canada, Ireland  and Germany. In contrast only 14.4 per 
cent of Australians do so – a level comparable to Denmark and Japan. Countries with low levels of 
low pay using this measure include Finland, Norway and Italy all of which have rates around 8 per 
cent. 
 
                                                          
62 Statistics Canada caution that this may overstate the proportion on the minimum wage as they have taken no account in the 
preparation of the estimates of any age specific rates which might apply. 
63 In addition a holiday leave loading and reimbursement of compulsory health levy are also paid. At the minimum wage these 
are estimated at around 15 per cent. 
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Table 15 Proportion of workforce in receipt of minimum wage, international 
comparison, around 2010 
 Junior  Adult  Total 
 Part- 
time 
Full- 
Time 
Total  Part- 
time 
Full- 
Time 
Total  Part- 
time 
Full- 
Time 
Total 
 - % - 
Australia            
-  EEH     6.4 2.9 4.1     
-   HILDA 29.0 34.3 30.5  19.4 5.2 9.1  21.7 6.5 11.5 
New Zealand            
-  Official 23.4 5.9 12.8  4.8 1.3 1.9  10.3 1.8 3.6 
-  Alternative   61.6    8.5  28.8 7.6 12.1 
Canada   20.7    2.8  18.5 2.9 5.8 
France         25.2 7.3 10.6 
Netherlands 14.3 10.3 12.8  3.1 1.3 2.4  4.9 2.2 4.0 
United Kingdom   10.2    3.8  9.1 2.3 4.2 
Ireland   49.0      15.0 2.0 4.5 
United States - all   15.2    3.8  13.6 3.1 6.0 
US – States at 
or below FMW 
 
         7.6 
Source and notes 
Australia EEH: ABS 2010 EEH, employer survey, excludes agriculture and domestic employment, up 
to 105 per cent of the minimum wage, excludes part-time managers and those paid junior rates 
Australia HILDA: HILDA Wave 11 (2011 data) ‘In confidence’ dataset, up to 105 per cent of minimum 
wage, Junior up to, and including age 20 
New Zealand (Official): Junior aged 16-24, Derived from NZ Department of Labour 2012 p17 and 
Statistics NZ 2011 Supplementary table 5  
New Zealand (alternative estimate): Junior aged 16-19 years (Maloney and Pacheco 2011 p31) 
Canada: 2009 data derived from household surveys, minimum wage used as cut-off. When 
increased to 110 per cent of minimum wage overall rate increases from 5.8 to 10.3 per cent, youth 
aged 15-24, (Statistics Canada 2010) 
France: 2011 data derived from employer survey, excludes agriculture, domestic employment, 
apprentices and temporary employment. (DARES 2011) 
Netherlands: 2005 data from household survey earnings at or below minimum wage, youth aged 15-
24,  (Salverda 2009) 
United Kingdom: 2010 employer survey, with some modelling, minimum wage cut off is minimum 
wage plus 1.9 to 2.2 per cent depending on employment type as data uses a later value of the 
minimum wage, youth under 21 (Low Pay Commission 2011) 
Ireland: 2002, Private sector employees, Junior aged under 18 years and all figures relate to the 
adult minimum wage (Nolan, Williams and Blackwell 2003) 
United States: 2010 data from household survey, employees paid hourly rates only earnings at or 
below the Federal Minimum Wage only, youth 16-24 years (US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2011) 
 
3.5.2 Minimum wage and part-time employment 
As seen in the above data the payment of minimum wage rates is, with exceptions such as 
Australian youth, more common amongst those employed on a part-time basis. This is most marked 
in the US and Canada where the ratio of full-time to part-time reliance on the minimum wage is 3.1 
per cent to 13.6 per cent and 2.9 per cent to 18.5 per cent respectively. It is the least marked in the 
Netherlands. 
A second feature of the relationship between part-time employment and the minimum wage is an 
association across countries between the level of the minimum wage and the proportion of people 
employed on a part-time basis. This is illustrated in Figure 11. As can be seen from the distribution of 
countries, and the simple trend line, there is a distinct positive relationship with higher minimum 
wage countries having higher rates of part-time employment. 
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Figure 11. International comparison – minimum wage and part-time employment 
 
Source: Derived from OECD 2011a 
 
While this relationship is less strong if the sample is simply restricted to the higher minimum wage 
countries (those over US$5PPP per hour), it nevertheless is suggestive that some form of labour 
market relationship exists between the level of the minimum wage and part-time employment. A 
number of mechanisms may come into play. For example, higher minimum wages may allow some 
persons to achieve their desired income levels through part-time employment. Alternatively higher 
minimum wages may lead employers to use part-time workers as a supplement to their workforce 
during high demand or high productivity periods – such as peak shopping hours – rather than 
maintaining a full-time workforce over ‘slack’ times. A further possibility is that where there is a large 
part-time workforce there are institutional and other processes which result in the setting of a higher 
minimum wage. 
3.5.3 International Context – Summary 
From the above comparisons, while the Australian minimum wage is relatively high compared with 
other countries, this is somewhat less marked when the minimum wage is considered as a 
proportion of median wages. In all countries, as with Australia, younger workers, especially students, 
are more likely to be in receipt of the minimum wage, notwithstanding whether, as in some countries, 
there are separate minimum wage rates for junior employees. In some cases junior employees are 
the main recipients of the minimum wage. Although it is difficult to make comparisons of the 
proportion of employees in receipt of the minimum wage, it would appear that, amongst the 
countries reviewed, Australia, along with France and potentially New Zealand, may have one of the 
higher levels of incidence. Interestingly the US, despite its reputation as a country with a high level of 
minimum wage employment, along with Canada, falls in the middle group of countries, with lower 
apparent rates of incidence in the UK, Ireland and the Netherlands64.  
While the Australian EEH data suggests approximately equal rates of incidence of minimum pay 
amongst men and women, this is not the case with estimates derived from household surveys and 
                                                          
64 This comparison does not however represent an analysis of the degree to which countries have a significant low income 
workforce, but rather simply reports on the role of the minimum wage. Hence while from the data it appears that Australia has 
a higher ‘minimum wage’ workforce than the US, it needs to be recalled that the minimum wage in Australia is higher. An 
alternative way of looking at the structure of earnings is to compare earnings at points in the income distribution. Doing this 
using purchasing power parities indicates that the earnings of a full-time adult employee in Australia at the 10th percentile of 
the earnings distribution is equal to 123.0 per cent of their US. This then drops to 109.2 per cent at the 25th percentile, 95.5 
per cent at the median, 85.2 per cent at the 75th and 76.6 per cent at the 90th. 
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across all countries for which data has been obtained, there is a strong gender bias with women 
being much more likely than men to be receiving the minimum wage for their work. There is also a 
strong tendency for a much higher proportion of part-time employees to be paid the minimum wage. 
In most countries, including Australia, there is a high concentration of part-time work in the 
hospitality sector including, where identifiable the fast food sector. 
A fuller understanding of the role of the minimum wage, and its impact on both the standard of living 
and on the cost of employment requires not just this type of comparison but also regard to post tax 
income and the gross cost of employing minimum wage employees. Less recent data are available 
on this. When the OECD reviewed minimum wages (OECD 2007) this indicated that the disposable 
income of a minimum wage earner relative to an average employee in Australia was 53 per cent 
compared with an average of 48 per cent across the OECD, and that Australian employer overheads 
for minimum wage workers were lower than the average, largely as a result of an absence of social 
security taxes. 
3.6 Workforce participation 
In considering the changing role of the minimum wage in supporting families, in particular given the 
earlier finding that minimum wage employment is frequently a complement to other employment, 
attention must also be given to changes in family workforce participation. These, as illustrated in 
Figure 12, have been profound – and clearly show that for couples with children the male 
breadwinner model has been eclipsed. In this paper this has particular implications for the role of the  
Figure 12. Couple families with dependent children, parental employment status 1983 
and 2011 
 
(a)  Families with dependent children over the age of 15 years only. In 1983 includes dependent students aged 
15-20 years, in 2011 students aged 15-24 years. 
Source: ABS 1983, ABS 2011 
 
minimum wage. It also has wider ramifications. Whitehouse (2004), for example, noted that the 
participation of women in the Australian workforce had increased from 25 per cent in 1911 to 55.3 
per cent in 2001. For married women it rose from 5.5 per cent to 57.3 per cent. She considered that 
notwithstanding this dramatic shift there had been little recognition of this in Industrial Relations. She 
concluded that the Australian arbitration system had only made limited progress in moving from “the 
male breadwinner model of the family and its nineteenth century social values” (ibid p410). 
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In 1983 exactly half (50.0 per cent) of all couples with a dependent child under the age of 15 years 
had a traditional single full-time breadwinner. This fell to 28.8 per cent in 2011. Over the same 
interval, the proportion of families with both partners being in the workforce increased from 39.4 per 
cent to 62.6 per cent. For families whose youngest dependent is a student, while data are less 
comparable due to changes in the age range used to define such students, a similar picture 
presents. In these families, there is a decline in the proportion of families with a single full-time 
breadwinner from 35.2 per cent in 1983 to just 18.6 per cent in 2011 and an increase in dual income 
families from 50.1 per cent to 69.4 per cent. 
3.7 The role of the Australian minimum wage - summary 
Estimates of the proportion of the Australian workforce employed on the minimum wage are also 
imprecise, but mainly fall in the range of 4 to 10 per cent of adult employees. Minimum wage 
employment is more common amongst the young and those in part-time employment. Although data 
series vary, it would appear to be more common amongst women. There is considerable variation in 
the incidence of minimum wage employment by occupation, industry structure and employment 
arrangement. Occupations with high levels of minimum wage employment include factory process 
workers, farm, forestry and garden workers, food preparation and trades and hospitality. 
Employment on the minimum wage is more frequent in small firms and for people reliant upon 
awards. 
In many ways this experience parallels that of a number of other countries, although the Australian 
minimum wage is distinguished by being one of the highest in both absolute and relative terms, and 
Australia has a relatively high incidence of employment at or close to the minimum wage. 
Although more likely to be in lower income households, minimum wage workers in Australia are also 
spread across a wide spectrum of middle and higher income households. An exception are part-time 
minimum wage workers who are quite heavily concentrated in lower income households, although 
this is likely to reflect hours of work rather than just the wage rate. Reflecting more general trends in 
the workforce participation of parents with dependent children, the ‘Harvester’ concept of a single 
breadwinner on the minimum wage supporting their partner and children has largely disappeared. 
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4 TRENDS IN THE MINIMUM WAGE OVER THE 
PAST 25 YEARS 
This section is concerned with more recent trends in the minimum wage, initially in terms of its 
relativity with other earnings, and then with regard to its interactions with the tax and transfer 
system.  The focus is mainly on changes in the past 25 years, with specific attention to the role of the 
minimum wage as a family wage over this period. 
4.1 Relative and absolute value of the minimum wage in 
Australia 
While this section is primarily concerned with changes over the past 25 years, initial considerations 
also look at changes over a slightly longer time scale – since 1975. This not just reflects the period 
for which comparable earnings and minimum wage series can be derived, but also take accounts of 
the period of possible divergence between the ‘metal workers’ minimum wage and the ‘NWC only’ 
minimum wage between 1978 and 1995.  
Figure 13. The minimum wage and weekly earnings of full-time adult non-managerial 
employees, 1975 to 2010 
 
Note: The ‘metal workers’ minimum wage has been used for the period between 1978 and 1995. 
Data are for May each year 
Source: Derived from ABS Survey of Employee Earnings and Hours, Cat No 6306.0, various annual publications, 
ABS CPI (2012), Minimum wage as per Appendix A 
 
Between May 1975 and May 2010 the real value of the minimum wage, in June 2010 dollar terms, is 
estimated to have increased by $58 – an increase of 12.0 per cent or annualised growth of 0.33 per 
cent. In contrast, median earnings of full-time adult non-managerial employees grew at an 
annualised rate of 0.85 per cent and average earnings of this group at a little over 1 per cent per 
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year. As illustrated in Figure 13, throughout this period the minimum wage remained well below the 
10th percentile of the earnings of full-time adult non-managerial employees – and grew more slowly.   
Observing the pattern of change over time shows there was little net real earnings growth between 
1975 and the early 1990s, with the gains of the 1970s being lost in the second half of the 1980s. 
Since the mid-1990s, earnings at all points of the distribution have increased, with this effect being 
most marked at the upper end of the income distribution. Indeed while the real value of the minimum 
wage grew by 8.3 per cent between 1996 and 2010, earnings at the 10th percentile increased by 14.9 
per cent; at the 25th by 19.4 per cent; median earnings grew by 24.1 per cent; those at the 75th 
percentile by 31.0 per cent; and at the 90th percentile by 40.2 per cent. 
Some of the relativities in earnings implied in this data are shown in Figure 14. This plots the value of 
the minimum wage as a proportion of earnings at other points in the earnings distribution. In addition 
to showing the ‘metal workers’ series (relative to earnings at the 10th, 25th and 50th percentile and 
relative to average earnings), this also shows the ‘NWC only’ series relative to the 10th percentile of 
earnings. Looking at these two minimum wage series relative to the 10th percentile earnings shows 
that the relative value of the minimum wage to the 10th percentile of earnings of 76.5 per cent is 
currently a little below the level before the series bifurcated (78.5 per cent). Over this period the 
‘metal workers; series shows an initial steep rise relative to the 10th percentile of earnings before 
plateauing until the early 1990s after which it declined. In contrast the ‘NWC only’ series shows an 
initial slow decline and then a very marked fall in the early 1980s after which it remained at around 60 
per cent of earnings at the 10th percentile. 
Figure 14. Relative value of the FMW to points of the earnings distribution of full-time 
adult non-managerial employees 1975-2010 
 
Source: Derived from ABS Survey of Employee Earnings and Hours Cat No 6306.0, various annual publications, 
ABS CPI (2012), Minimum wage as per Appendix A 
 
Assuming some relationship between the level of the minimum wage and earnings at the 10th 
percentile of the earnings distribution for non-managerial employees65 would suggest that while the 
initial increase in the metal workers award did not flow on to all minimum wage workers, by the early 
                                                          
65 As this data series currently suggests that only 4.1 per cent of these employees are on the minimum wage it is possible for 
trends in the 10th percentile of earnings to move independently of the coverage of the minimum wage. That is there could be 
decompression in earnings in the lowest decile of earners and hence the relativity is not informative of coverage. This though 
seems to be unlikely, as the minimum wage has also played a ‘foundational’ role of other low rates of pay and distributional 
data suggests that a considerable group are earning just a little above.  
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1980s, the ‘NWC only’ minimum wage had lost any substantial link with this point of the income 
distribution.   
By the time the new Federal Minimum Wage was introduced in 1997 the relativity of minimum wage 
to the 10th percentile of earnings was virtually the same as it was in 1976 and 1977 at around 81 per 
cent. Since then it has slipped to 76.5 per cent. 
Relative to median earnings the minimum wage declined from being 58.6 per cent in 1975 to 48.8 
per cent in 2010, and from being 54.8 per cent of average earnings to 43.0 per cent. That is, while 
average earnings of full-time adult non-managerial employees in 1975 were 1.8 times that of a 
minimum wage employee this increased to 2.3 times in 2010. Earnings at the 90th percentile 
increased from being 2.6 times the level of the minimum wage to 3.7 times. 
An alternative source of data on wage rates is the ABS EEBTUM series. As this is a household 
survey it has a richer demographic component including information on gender66. From this it is 
estimated that for males the ratio of the minimum wage to the 10th percentile of full-time earnings 
was 80.6 per cent in 1976 and 83.9 per cent in 2011. As a ratio of 20th percentile earnings it has 
fallen from 72.8 per cent to 70.3 per cent. For women both these ratios have fallen, at the 10th 
percentile of full-time earnings from 95.3 per cent to 91.4 per cent and at the 20th percentile from 
86.7 per cent to 74.3 per cent. These results would suggest that a substantial element in the possible 
fall in the ratio of the minimum wage to 10th percentile earnings derived from the EEH is a gender 
effect – that is a lesser dependence upon the minimum wage by women over time.  
This data, as illustrated in Figure 15, again allows for some consideration of the relative take-up of 
the ‘metal workers’ and ‘NWC only’ minimum wage over time. The first point to be noted is that very 
clearly for women over the period of the 1980s the metal industry minimum wage was above the 
wage paid to many low paid women. That is, this measure of the minimum wage was more than 100 
per cent of female full-time earnings at the 10th percentile indicating that it was not being accessed 
by a considerable group of women. At the same time however when the FMW was reintroduced and 
set at the ‘metal workers’ rate, there was only a slight shift in the relationship between the minimum 
wage and the 10th percentile of women’s’ earnings which remained in the mid to high 90s.  The 
absence of any ‘shock’ in this relationship at this time suggests that by this time the ‘metal workers’ 
minimum wage had become the norm for women. The data for males is a bit more ambiguous. While 
in 1999 the metal industry minimum wage was almost equal to 100 per cent of the 10th percentile of 
full-time earnings, in other periods it was around 90 per cent, not too different to the high 80s 
recorded after the reintroduction of the FMW. 
                                                          
66 The EEBTUM series has not been used extensively here as micro-data from this survey is not released and the level of detail 
available in the publications is not sufficient to allow the minimum wage to be observed.  
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Figure 15. Relativity of minimum wage to 10th percentile of earnings by gender, 
EEBTUM, 1976 to 2011 
 
Note: Data for August each year. 
Source: 10th Percentile of full-time earnings derived from ABS Cat No 6310.0 various years 
 
In conclusion this indicates that while the ‘metal workers’ minimum wage may overstate the effective 
minimum wage, especially in the early 1980s, it is a preferable measure to the residual estimate. 
4.1.1 Potential employment effects 
Between May 1986 and May 2010 the real value of the minimum wage grew by 1.3 per cent, 
compared with growth, over the same period, of 28.7 per cent in median full-time earnings for non-
managerial employees and 34.4 per cent in the average earnings of this group. 
Section 5 discusses the various theoretical models for understanding the impact of the minimum 
wage on labour demand, and the empirical evidence for these. However it is useful to consider at 
this point what classic labour market models would suggest about the implications of this lower 
relative growth in the minimum wage. This can be considered in terms of how many fewer people 
would currently be employed if the minimum wage had increased at a faster rate.  Underlying this is 
an assumption that labour demand responds to changes in the price of labour, with this being 
expressed in terms of a demand elasticity.  
Table 16 reports on modelling of the hypothetical impact of differential rates of growth in the 
minimum wage over the period 1986 to 2011. The first column reports the results if the minimum 
wage had increased at the same rate as median earnings. Assuming a relatively conservative labour 
demand elasticity of -0.267, this suggests there were an additional 62,025 jobs for low paid workers 
in 2011, compared with what would have been if the minimum wage had risen in line with median 
earnings. Most of these jobs (73.4 per cent) were for adults, some 39.4 per cent would be for full-
time workers and 76.5 per cent relate to those currently on or below the minimum wage. Women 
                                                          
67 Many estimates of labour demand elasticities exist.  A major survey by Hamermesh (1993) identified a range of estimates 
from -0.15 to -0.75, and suggests an elasticity of -0.3 a reasonable figure. Leigh (2003) estimated an overall elasticity of -0.13 
and a specific elasticity of -0.39 for young people in response to minimum wage changes in Western Australia, Lewis (2005) 
presents analysis which “suggests elasticities of employment for the minimum wage sector of -0.55 and -0.72 with respect to 
wages and real wages, respectively” (p 13) Harding and Harding (2004a) on the basis of the 2003 Safety Net adjustment 
estimates that the “elasticity of demand for minimum award wage workers with respect to minimum award wages of about -
0.2” (p 49). 
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held 58.2 per cent of the positions. If the minimum wage had kept pace with average earnings it is 
estimated the job loss would be 84,469. 
Table 16 Possible impact of employment of alternative rates of growth in the 
minimum wage, HILDA 2011  
Job loss If minimum wage increased since 1986 at: 
Same rate as 
median earnings 
Same rate as 
average earnings 
 - persons - 
Youth 16,479 21,988 
Adults 45,547 62,481 
Total 62,025 84,469 
Notes: 
(a) An increase at the rate of median earnings indicates a minimum wage in 2011 of 
$720 and at average earnings $75268. 
(b) Model assumes a labour demand elasticity of -0.2 
(c) In the model all persons on or below the minimum wage are assumed to be 
receiving the minimum wage.  The labour demand estimate is based on assuming all of 
these, and all people above the current minimum wage but below the ‘new’ minimum 
wage, would receive the new minimum wage. There would be no flow-on to other 
employees. 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ release 
 
If however labour demand is more sensitive to price a stronger effect will be felt. For example taking 
the demand elasticity to -0.3, would increase the potential losses to 93,000 if the minimum wage had 
increased at the same rate as median earnings and to 126,700 if the rate of growth had been the 
same as average earnings. If there was any flow-on from these increases to other employees so as 
to maintain their relative position in the earnings distribution then the impact of the loss would be 
magnified. 
As however discussed in Chapter 5 this type of estimate makes some assumptions about the nature 
of the labour market and employer responses which are subject to debate.  
4.2 Impact of taxes and transfers 
The effective income of a minimum wage worker depends not just on the value of the minimum wage 
and the number of hours a person works, but also costs they may incur in working, and the effect of 
taxes and the transfer system. 
Data on the cost of work are not readily available. These costs, which may include childcare, 
travelling costs, specialised clothing, etc, are also likely to vary considerably between individuals, 
and for many individuals, over time. For these reasons, despite the obvious importance of these 
costs to decisions about work, and the benefits derived, they are not considered here. 
Identifying the impact of taxes and transfers is more tractable, and is considered below. 
4.2.1 Impact of taxes and transfers 
People in receipt of the minimum wage frequently interact with both the tax and transfer systems. Of 
specific interest in this paper are the changes in these interactions over time, and the current impact 
of taxes and transfers on families with children where the minimum wage is a source of income. 
                                                          
68 These estimates are derived using the November 1985 ‘metal workers’ value of the minimum wage of $235.70; the increase 
in the median and average earnings of full-time non-managerial employees from the EEH for the period 1996 to 2010; and the 
increase in AWE for the period May 2010 to May 2011. (The use of AWE over this last period was necessary as data from the 
EEH is not available for 2011.) 
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The impact of transfers is important, not just because of the contribution these payments can make 
to household incomes, but also because a considerable proportion of people receive these 
payments in addition to earnings from employment at the minimum wage. Analysis of this is 
presented here in two parts. The first concerns the empirical data on the actual level of incidence, 
the second considers the ‘system based’ interaction using models of the tax and transfer system to 
identify the relationship with the minimum wage. As illustrated in Table 17 22.5 per cent of people 
who were adult minimum wage employees also received some income support payments. When 
account is taken of all transfer payments69, including estimated support for families with children, this 
proportion rises to 43.3 per cent. 
Table 17 Proportion of minimum wage workers receiving transfer payments 
by family status, HILDA 2011 
Family circumstance of 
minimum wage employee 
Proportion receiving Minimum 
wage 
recipients 
Income 
support Transfers 
 
Individual receives income 
support/transfers 
 
             - % - Persons 
Member of a couple 12.1 49.2 404,404 
Lone parent 60.3 77.2 63,724 
Child (21 years and over) 
living at home 29.0 29.8 183,246 
Other person 27.5 27.5 128,701 
    Total 22.5 43.3 780,075 
Either partner receives income support/ transfers 
Member of a couple 21.8 54.8 
 Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
The highest rate of receipt was by lone parents. Some 77.2 per cent of this group are estimated to 
be receiving some transfer payments in addition to their minimum wage earnings, with over 60 per 
cent reporting receipt of some income support. For members of couples the rate varies depending 
upon whether account is taken of individual receipt – or receipt by either member. In this latter case 
21.8 per cent of minimum wage earners who are a member of a couple also received some income 
support payments, with this proportion increasing to 54.8 per cent when all transfers are taken into 
account. Reported receipt of income support is much more common amongst those minimum wage 
workers who are working part-time, with 32.3 per cent of these also receiving some income support, 
compared with 8.8 per cent of those working full-time.   
The interactions between minimum wage employment and the tax and transfer system can result in 
people working on the minimum wage having quite disparate disposable incomes. For example, the 
disposable income of a single person, under the age of 60 years, who works full-time and earns the 
minimum wage was, in January 2012, $537.7270. This represented the gross wage of $589.30, less 
$42.74 income tax and $8.84 Medicare levy.  If, in contrast, this person was a sole breadwinner in a 
couple family with two dependent children and was renting privately, their total household 
disposable income would be $995.88, that is 85.2 per cent higher than the single person. An even 
                                                          
69 Transfers include all income support payments as well as Family Tax Benefit Part A, Family Tax Benefit Part B, Maternity 
Payment, Mobility Allowance, Carer Allowance, Telephone Allowance, Maternity Immunisation Allowance, Seniors Concession 
Allowance and Double Orphan Pension. Data on current receipt of income support payments is available in HILDA and is used 
in the above table. The dataset does not however contain information on current receipt of FTB. To estimate current receipt of 
transfers, previous year receipt of FTB has been added to current receipt of any other transfer payment.  
70 In this analysis all estimates are based upon an assumption that the nominated levels of income are received consistently 
across the financial year. 
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higher net income, $1,106.45 per week, would be received by an Age Pension couple if each worked 
half-time for the minimum wage. 
These variations in disposable income from the same level of wages, illustrated in Figure 16, arise 
from the interactions of the tax and transfer system with the minimum wage.  
Figure 16. Disposable income of households earning the FMW, January 2012 
 
Notes: 100/0 & 50/50 refer to the split of earnings between partners in couple income units. 
(a) In some cases this type of earning pattern may impact on the eligibility of people for receipt of a basic 
income support payment receipt. 
Source: Generated using the “Policy Alternatives Model” (PAM) maintained by David Plunkett. 
 
In the taxation system, in addition to the actual tax scales, the amount of tax a person pays depends 
upon a range of rebates and the tax treatment of couples. The rebates include: the Dependent 
Spouse Rebate – which results in the income of a single breadwinner with a dependent spouse some 
$45 per week higher than that of a single person; the Mature Age Worker Tax Offset which reduces 
the level of tax paid by those aged 60 years and over; as well as the differing levels of the Low 
Income Tax Offset for those with children. Where the income is generated by two people working 
part-time there is the impact of two tax free thresholds. 
Even more complex interactions arise in the transfer system. These include: the impact of residual 
eligibility for some base payments; support for families with children; and possible entitlement to rent 
assistance for those who are renting privately and pay above a minimum level of rent. Although full-
time employment on the minimum wage usually precludes eligibility for transfer payments, this is not 
necessarily the case with some payments such as the Age Pension, and potentially in some cases, 
where income testing of the payment is applied across both members of a couple.  
Figure 17 illustrates this in terms of the number of hours a person would need to work, at the hourly 
rate of the minimum wage, before their entitlement to income support is extinguished, and the 
proportion of their transfer payment that they retain up to this point.  
While a single allowee – such as an unemployed person on Newstart – could only work 30 hours 
before extinguishing their eligibility for income support, a single Age Pensioner would still retain 
some 56 per cent of their payment at this level of work. Indeed at the hourly rate of the minimum 
wage they would have to work some 62 hours per week before their earnings reached a level to 
extinguish receipt of some pension. 
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Figure 17. Amount of benefits retained by hours of work at the minimum wage, 
January 2012 
 
Source: Generated using the “Policy Alternatives Model” (PAM) maintained by David Plunkett 
 
While, in some cases, the continued payment of some levels of support can be seen more in terms 
of being an unavoidable consequence of relatively high rates of payment, and of withdrawal rates 
designed to ensure that there is positive gain from additional employment 71, other payments, 
especially to families with children have been deliberately designed to provide support as ‘in work 
benefits’ for those on low incomes. 
4.2.2 Impact of taxes and transfers 1986 to 2012, Single persons 
Between January 1986 and January 2012 the real value of the minimum wage, as at the beginning of 
January each year, and in December 2011 dollar values, increased by just 1.3 per cent – from 
$581.63 to $589.30 per week72. Within the period it fell from its initial level to as low as $517.16 in 
January 1996 before increasing again to its current peak. 
Notwithstanding the minimal, $7.67 per week, real growth in the minimum wage over the period, the 
disposable income of a single person working for the minimum wage would have increased in real 
terms by $53 per week. This has occurred, as illustrated in Figure 18, due to an almost halving of the 
income tax paid by such a person. (In this and the subsequent chart income, whether from earnings 
or transfers, is shown cumulatively above the x-axis, with tax (including the Medicare Levy) being 
shown as a negative below the axis, the solid line shows the net income of the household.) Whereas 
in 1986 such a worker would have paid an average income tax rate of 16.6 per cent, this had fallen 
to 8.8 per cent in 2012.73 
 
                                                          
71 That is, the fact that some people continue to obtain some income support with these relatively high levels of private 
income should not be interpreted as there being a welfare need for this assistance, but rather it is consequence of policy 
decisions which have placed a priority on the initial level of adequacy and on trying to avoid high effective marginal tax rates 
(EMTRs). 
72 The ‘metal workers’ series has been used for the period from September 1978 to April 1997. 
73 This period encompasses the introduction of the GST in 2000. As this tax impacted through increased prices which are 
controlled for in the use of real income this has no net impact on the results. 
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Figure 18. Real net disposable income single person on minimum wage 1986 to 2012 
 
Data are as at 1 January each year. Minimum wage series is the ‘C14’ metal workers series. 
Source: Derived from historical income support and taxation data. 
 
4.2.3 Impact of taxes and transfers 1986 to 2012, Families with children 
The impact of changes in the tax and transfer systems has been even more marked for those 
households in receipt of support for children. Figure 19 illustrates this for an archetypical single 
breadwinner couple family with two young dependent children, renting privately and earning the 
minimum wage74. 
While again the real value of the minimum wage has only increased by 1.3 per cent over the period, 
the disposable income for this family type has grown by 70.1 per cent. In December 2011 dollar 
terms it has increased by $410.55 from $585.33 to $995.88. Although these households have also 
benefitted from a fall in the income tax levied on their income, the major gains have occurred in the 
provision of support for their family.  Total transfers have increased from $94.55 per week to $449.32 
per week. This increase has been driven by three main areas of growth. The first are income tested 
per child benefits provided under FTB(A) and its predecessors; the second is the extension of rent 
assistance to low income working families in 1987 with the introduction of the Family Allowance 
Supplement; and third the introduction of direct support for a non (or minimal) working partner in a 
couple who is caring for young children. This support was initially provided by the Home Child Care 
Allowance which was then replaced with the introduction of Parenting Allowance in 1995, and 
subsequently Parenting Payment.  
 
                                                          
74 Analysis of income data suggests that there are very few families in this situation. As has previously been seen, of those 
families with dependent children under the age of 15 years, only 52,336 have a full-time minimum wage earner and in most 
cases their partner is also employed. Indeed only 19,600 of these households have a single breadwinner on the minimum 
wage without a partner employed. These account for 1.1 per cent of all couple families with a dependent child under the age 
of 15 years for whom income data are available. 
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Figure 19. Real disposable income of a single FMW breadwinner couple family with 
two children aged 3 and 8 years, 1986 to 2012 
 
Source: Data are as at 1 January each year. Minimum wage series is the ‘C14’ metal workers series, note the 
names of family support payments have changed over the period. Modelling assumes the household is paying 
private rent and is entitled to Rent Assistance. 
Source: Data for the period to 2007 as published in AFTS Architecture of Australia’s tax and transfer system – 
Figure 7.9 p238 (Henry 2008), updated using the “Policy Alternatives Model” (PAM) maintained by David 
Plunkett. 
 
4.2.4 Policy rationale for support for families 
While the original minimum wage was set in terms of a family of five, the question of support for 
children was a contested element of minimum wage policy (Whyte 1946). The initial introduction of 
child endowment in 1923 for lower paid Commonwealth public service employees arose directly 
from the recommendations of the 1920 Piddington Royal Commission on the Basic Wage. The 
introduction of child endowment (for the second and subsequent child) by the Commonwealth in 
1941 was similarly stimulated by the Basic Wage Inquiry of 1940 which found that while the wage 
was adequate for a family of three, it was not necessarily sufficient for larger families. 
Although this essential question of adequacy of low earnings for families has continued as the 
underlying driver of reforms in support for families, the policy rationale for these changes has had 
several more subtle emphases. The initial changes in the 1980s were largely concerned with 
ensuring that there were adequate incentives and rewards for families with children to seek 
employment rather than rely upon income support. As such they involved extending the support 
available to income support families to those in employment on low incomes. These policies were 
then shaped by the Hawke ‘child poverty’ commitment75, and consequently by policies designed to 
better target assistance and to ensure that there were appropriate work incentives for both members 
of couples.  
Notwithstanding this varying emphasis on particular strategies and policies the overall approach was 
summarised in the announcement of the 1994 ‘Working Nation’ changes “These measures mean that 
                                                          
75 In his 1987 election launch the Prime Minister Mr Bob Hawke announced, as an election pledge, "We set ourselves this first 
goal: by 1990 no Australian child will be living in poverty." (Hawke 1987) Later he has described this statement, which 
departed from his prepared speech that no child “will need to live in poverty” as one of his biggest mistakes. (The Age 2012). 
Nevertheless the statement heralded substantial increases in financial support to low income families with children. 
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unemployed couples will gain financially from working more, and therefore help reduce their 
dependence on the Social Security system. The measures will improve the incentive for unemployed 
couples to get a full-time job by supplementing the wage income from low income jobs.” (Keating 
1994) 
Similar themes were echoed four years later with the introduction of the ‘A New Tax System’ 
changes: “These measures represent a major social reform that provides substantial extra income to 
help lower income families raise their children and improves work incentives. They ensure that 
unemployed families will not incur a sudden drop in Family Allowance (and hence income) when they 
leave the income support system, improving incentives for them to obtain a full-time job. At the same 
time, these measures, combined with the tax cuts, will ensure that low income working families will 
have much better incentives to improve their circumstances.” (Costello 1998). 
In contrast to these earlier changes which were strongly couched in terms of providing ‘incentives’, 
the 2005-06 ‘Welfare to work’ changes were explicit in their goal of increasing workforce 
participation76. “Welfare reform plays a role in increasing participation by ensuring that people who 
can work do so. This is an important part of a broader response to demographic change” (Australian 
Government 2005 p 1). The changes introduced at that time were also explicit in supporting part-
time as well as full-time participation for some groups. “The outdated approach of people on welfare 
being expected to seek work only when they can work full-time will be replaced. Policy will focus on 
encouraging self-reliance and recognising the capacity of many recipients to work part-time.” (ibid p 
2) This latter was emphasised in the reduction in the taper rate for both Newstart and Parenting 
Payment Partnered. 
In subsequent changes, while the specific focus on work incentives has remained central, an equal 
emphasis has also been placed on the impact of changes on family income, and lowering tax rates. 
In the 2007-08 budget, although the specific rationale for changes was: “The tax cuts are aimed at 
improving work incentives for lower income and part-time workers. In combination with the changes 
in child care benefits, the tax cuts significantly improve work incentives for mothers” (Australian 
Government 2007 p8); the outcomes of the previous tranches of policy were discussed in terms of 
“The spending power of Australians has increased significantly since 1996-97 The increase in the 
wage level at which families become net taxpayers has been even more dramatic. For example, for a 
single income couple earning average full-time wages with two children … the point at which they 
become net taxpayers will be $50,813, a real increase of 41.5 per cent.” (ibid p34)  
4.3 Interpreting these changes 
With regard to the minimum wage these changes have had two specific impacts. The first is a small 
increase in the incomes of single persons on the minimum wage, notwithstanding the lack of growth 
in the wage itself. As a result improved living standards have been achieved for this group without 
increasing the real value of the minimum wage. The second is much more significant and is the major 
shift in the role of the minimum wage for families with children. This latter has had two elements.   
The first, reflecting changing patterns of workforce participation by women, is an effective 
expectation that partners in couples will be employed unless there are young children, or where a 
person is unable to work due to disability or age.  
                                                          
76 Prior to these changes there was a considerable degree of, possibly deliberate, ambiguity in many of the pronouncements 
on these policies. To a large extent these reflected political sensitivities with regard to traditional single breadwinner families 
and as to whether participation of ‘mothers’ should be an explicit target. As such the language tended to be around 
‘incentives’ and ‘choice’, rather than ‘expectation’ and ‘not eligible’. As also noted, a further approach to the government 
presentation of these policies has simply been in terms of increased household income. 
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Alternatively, this policy implies, in the absence of such employment, such couples are expected to 
accept lower incomes without compensation either through the wages or tax and transfer system. 
This was echoed in the report of the Australia’s Future Tax System (AFTS) review which 
recommended that dependency should be much more narrowly defined in the tax system: “The 
dependency offsets should be combined into a single offset to provide a tax concession where the 
taxpayer is supporting either a dependant who is unable to work due to disability or carer 
responsibility or where the taxpayer or dependant has reached Age Pension age.” (Henry 2009 p86) 
This policy is being progressively implemented, most recently with the quarantining of the 
Dependent Spouse Rebate to partners born before 1 July 1952 and those who are a carer or have a 
disability. (Swan 2011) 
The second is that support for children in low, and indeed many middle, income families has moved 
from the wages system to the transfer system. This again was explicitly considered in the Australia’s 
Future Tax System review. The committee proposed, from both a social welfare perspective – in 
terms of ensuring “children have access to a basic acceptable standard of living”, and on a horizontal 
equity basis (balancing the needs of those with and without children) that “The rate of family 
payments should reflect the direct costs of children in low income families”. (Henry 2009 p555) 
In aggregate these policies effectively mean that neither the support of a partner, nor of children, is 
seen today as functions of the minimum wage. 
Implicit in this change has been a realignment of the income of families and singles reliant upon the 
minimum wage. That is, while in January 1986 the real disposable income of a couple with two 
young children on the minimum wage of $585 was just 1.21 times that of the $485 received by a 
single person with the same gross earnings, by 2012 the ratio between the $996 of the couple and 
$538 of the single had risen to 1.85. Although this is still below the ratio used in most common 
equivalence scales77, it represents a much more ‘balanced’ outcome for these households given 
their relative needs. 
This thus suggests that if the disposable income of the family – which has risen, as noted, by 70.1 
per cent in real terms over this period represents an adequate, but low income, for such a family, 
then the level of the single minimum wage is approximately the same, or perhaps a little above, an 
equal standard of living for a single person. 
  
                                                          
77 Equivalence scales are used as a means of adjusting the incomes of households of different compositions to take account 
of their different levels of need so as to allow a comparison of their relative levels of well-being. The most commonly used 
scale is the ‘modified’ OECD scale. This gives a weight of 1 to the first adult in the household, 0.5 to subsequent adults and 
0.3 for children aged under 15 years. This scale would thus suggest that the couple requires an income 2.1 times that of the 
single person to be in an equivalent situation. 
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5 ECONOMICS OF THE MINIMUM WAGE 
The economics of the minimum wage is an area of contention. As well as much theoretical debate 
there is considerable debate as to the empirical evidence, especially with regard to the impact of 
increases in the minimum wage on employment. This can be attributable to a number of reasons.  
Firstly many different economic mechanisms are involved. Secondly the nature of labour markets are 
complex, both because of their institutional frameworks, and because of heterogeneity in both the 
demand and the supply of labour – that is labour is not a simple commodity. Thirdly, in terms of the 
study of the impact of changes in the minimum wage, the magnitude of many minimum wage 
adjustments are small, and their impact may be spread over time. Finally the consideration of the 
economic impact of minimum wages is rarely detached even amongst economic and other 
researchers from social, moral and political interpretations. 
This section looks at some of the theoretical models for understanding the minimum wage and some 
of the more recent research into the impact of changes in the minimum wage. 
5.1 The theory 
There are many theoretical explanations as to how minimum wages impact on labour markets. Some 
of the major ones are considered here. While, all too frequently, these are proposed and treated as 
competing theories, as will be discussed, an alternative approach is to recognise that each has some 
validity and the force, or relevance, of particular mechanisms is dependent upon the specifics of 
particular labour markets under different circumstances. The array of empirical findings gives some 
grounds for also considering this to be the case. 
This section initially considers the classical model of the labour market under perfect competition, 
and then briefly overviews the range of complementary approaches where such a market does not 
exist, or is distorted through regulatory or bargaining processes. Essentially these alternatives 
encompass two models of wage fixation.  The first is wage posting.  In contrast to the competitive 
market, where individual employers are effectively price takers, based upon the level of labour they 
require78, wage posting occurs in some non-competitive markets (for example where the market is 
dominated by a single firm – a monopsony, or where there is an asymmetry of information and 
individual workers do not know what the market value of their labour is, nor what other job options 
may be available) and involves employers offering employment at particular wage rates. 
Where economic rents arise, that is excess returns, due to less than perfect markets, bargaining 
models reflect situations where employers and employees essentially bargain over how any surplus 
from productive activity is to be distributed. This can occur at the individual level – in essence a 
model of wage posting with negotiation, or in collective bargaining – typically between an employer 
and a union. 
In addition labour is not a simple commodity. Individuals each have their own level of skills and 
ability. This is reflected in the labour market by a wide range of different prices for labour of different 
types, each essentially reflecting different submarkets with their own supply and demand, and 
productive capacity, and the ability of employers to substitute between these and for potential 
employees to operate in several markets. Furthermore individuals may choose how hard they wish to 
apply themselves, and for some, training may transform their productive capacity. 
                                                          
78 While ‘price takers’ this does not imply that they are passive, rather they are collectively competing with each other for 
labour with this being reflected in the equilibrium wage which is derived from this aggregate demand. 
 64 
 
Each transaction in labour markets can also be subject to frictions. These arise because of the time 
and cost for a worker to identify alternative employment opportunities and the cost for employers to 
find (and potentially train) replacement workers. These are taken into account in search and 
matching models.  
Finally one can consider the effects of a wide range of institutional factors. These include regulatory 
processes, including statutory minimum wages, the decisions of arbitration and other tribunals – 
many of which have a quasi-judicial and conciliation function which leads to wages being struck at 
rates other than what would be generated by markets, strong unions which may lead to a monopoly 
on labour supply, or employers acting in concert such as cartels, as well as decision making in non-
market sectors of the economy such as government employment. 
A further question related to the interaction of a number of these mechanisms is the role of low paid 
employment as a ‘stepping stone’ to better paid employment.79  
5.1.1 Model of a classical competitive labour market  
In classical terms minimum wages can be considered in terms of the demand and supply for labour, 
both of which are considered to be elastic. That is if the price of labour increases the supply of 
labour will increase, but demand will fall. 
In Figure 20 the labour market is in equilibrium at the point where wages are equal to We and 
employment is Ee. If however the minimum wage is set above this point – say W1, then the demand 
for labour will fall to Ed1, with unemployment equal to the gap between Ed1 and Es1 – the level of 
labour that people are willing to supply at this higher price. 
Figure 20. The competitive labour market 
 
 
 
                                                          
79 Another theoretical argument which is sometimes postulated is that a higher minimum wage can be merited as it will boost 
consumption. This tends to be proposed in two ways, the first in terms of the absolute level of consumption within an 
economy, the second is that minimum wage workers, relative to others, are more likely to consume, rather than save any 
additional income. These are not considered here although it is noted that within the Australian context these arguments 
appear to have little force. Firstly the small wages share of minimum wage employees would suggest that there would be little 
aggregate impact. Secondly the distribution of minimum wage workers across households by income would weaken any 
presumed greater propensity to consume. 
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Underlying this model: 
•  the labour demand curve reflects the declining marginal value of additional labour (with fixed 
capital) and employment decisions which are dependent upon whether or not the cost of 
additional labour exceeds the contribution that this labour makes to the marginal revenue 
product80; and 
• the labour supply curve reflects trade-offs for individuals between work and leisure, with 
individuals being willing to supply additional labour at higher wages. 
At the equilibrium point the market clears – that is all people who are seeking employment and have 
a reservation wage equal or below the market wage can obtain employment.  
5.1.2 Demand side 
The demand for labour in the classic model is elastic and negative, that is the amount of labour 
demanded by employers is dependent upon the price, and demand is decreasing in price. This 
reflects, as noted, the micro-economics of a firm’s decision as to whether they employ additional 
labour. 
The actual supply and demand for labour and the way firms use labour is however somewhat more 
complex. In the first instance labour is not homogeneous but rather comprises individuals with 
different skills, motivations and capacities. Secondly these differentiable types of labour can be used 
by companies, along with capital, for example machinery, in different combinations to make the 
same products. Hence the impact of an increase in a minimum wage may result in a decrease in 
demand for lower skilled workers, but an increase (of a lesser amount) in the demand for higher 
skilled workers. Alternatively it may result in the replacement of the low skilled labour with some form 
of technology – with a resultant further fall in employment. 
Of course alternative employer responses to a higher minimum wage could be to simply pay the 
higher wages and increase the cost of products, or absorb the costs.  In the first case – that of 
increasing product prices, a likely consequence, unless demand for the good is price inelastic, is a 
fall in demand for the product and hence declining employment. Typically, for example, an increase 
in the cost of fast food is likely to see the substitution of home production of meals. If, of course, the 
increase in prices is widespread the resultant inflation may result in the wiping out of the nominal 
value of the increase in wages. The alternative option for a firm, that of reducing profits may be 
feasible, in particular in some restricted situations where the firm is earning a return above the 
normal return on investment – as in some of the monopsony cases discussed below, or as a short-
term response to a minimum wage increase while a company ponders longer term adjustments. 
However in general, and over the longer term, a sustained reduction in profitability is likely to lead to 
the capital moving to alternative investment opportunities (which are not adversely affected by the 
minimum wage change). 
The nature of firms’ labour demand decisions is of course much more complex than the theory 
presents. Very few, if any, companies would know the marginal revenue product of each employee 
and make instantaneous employment/disemployment decisions on this basis. Rather it is more 
probable that firms will have some overall concept of medium term profitability, current revenue 
trends and costs, and will take decisions over time on this type of information. They may anticipate a 
change in the price of labour prior to any actual change in the minimum wage, in taking decisions on 
whether to expand and take on additional employees, or replacing employees who leave. 
Alternatively, after a change in the price of labour such as from an increase in the minimum wage, 
                                                          
80 This also needs to be understood in the context of a series of markets. The marginal revenue product is a function of prices 
and hence of the product market the company is in.   
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they may wait some time to assess the impact of this on profitability, or even test whether or not they 
can increase prices.  
In larger companies decisions on employment may take place at the plant level, rather than at the 
employee level. The relationship between minimum wage levels and the adoption of technology as a 
substitute is also unlikely to be linear. Frijters (1998), for example, discusses the potential role of 
‘technological switching points’ in the level of the minimum wage. Such switching points arise when 
the minimum wage increases to a level which generates a more significant rethink of the production 
process to adopt new techniques which may have a major impact on the levels of minimum wage 
employment.  
In addition both employment and disemployment decisions can be costly to the firm.  Firms 
frequently invest in building general and firm specific knowledge and skills in their workforce which 
they lose with any loss of staff – as well as often incurring specific redundancy and associated costs. 
Similarly not only does engaging new employees cost management time (and potentially involves 
direct costs associated with private recruitment), but also in the training of new workers and 
‘bringing them up to speed’. This can frequently cause firms to hoard labour, or defer recruitment, as 
well as potentially prefer to invest in upgrading the skills of current staff to make them more 
productive as a response to a minimum wage increase. 
While each of these types of processes may obscure the operation of the more fundamental 
mechanisms, and the timing of responses, they do not change the fundamental forces at work.  
5.1.3 Supply of labour – reservation wages – and income effects 
In the classical model labour supply is increasing with price. That is if wages are higher people are 
willing to provide more labour. For some this will be a simple incremental trade-off between hours of 
work and hours of leisure (or home production) with the higher income from labour compensating for 
a reduction in the amount of leisure the person consumes. For others it will occur as the price of 
labour exceeds their reservation wage – that is the minimum amount they are willing to accept for 
employment. For some this reservation wage may reflect a trade-off between the income they 
receive from transfer payments, as well as the cost of work including the cost of childcare. This latter 
combination of factors can impact on some subgroups of the population, for example older persons 
and dependent partners in a way that may involve considerable shifts in the supply of labour as 
segments of the population enter, or withdraw from the workforce. 
The responsiveness of labour supply to changes in wages – the elasticity of labour supply – is also 
not consistent across the population. Typically some groups such as married males are seen as 
having highly inelastic labour supply, that is, in Figure 20, their supply curve is closer to a vertical.  In 
contrast the supply of labour by married women, lone parents and older persons is usually much 
more elastic (see Dandie and Mercante (2007) for a review of recent estimates). 
While higher wages are usually seen as increasing labour supply, this is not always the case.  In 
some cases a higher wage may reduce the supply of labour. This results from an income effect. If 
some people are satisfied with the level of income they receive, and their wage rate increases, they 
can obtain the same level of income with a reduction in their number of hours of work and hence 
reduce their labour supply81. 
                                                          
81 This is of course one interpretation which can be placed on phenomena seen in Figure 2. For much of the 20th century 
employees, including minimum wage employees, have been willing to trade off what would have otherwise been potentially a 
very substantial effective increase in earnings for a major reduction in working hours. 
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Within economic units such as families labour supply can also be sensitive to the wage rates 
received by others, and hence an increase in one person’s wages may see another reduce their 
working hours. 
5.1.4 An efficiency wage 
The idea of an efficiency wage is a departure from the classic market approach. In contrast to the 
assumption that labour supply is a standard commodity, the efficiency wage is based on an 
assumption that an individual can and will change their work effort – and hence output – depending 
upon the wage they are paid. This was summarised by Stiglitz as “The efficiency wage hypothesis 
says that the services a labourer renders are a function of the wage they receive. One well-paid 
worker may do what two poorly paid workers can do”. (Stiglitz 1976) 
Such a response may have both positive and negative impacts on employment. To the extent a large 
number of inefficient employees are currently employed it may be negative. That is employers will 
employ a smaller number on higher wages in order to get the same value of production. Alternatively, 
to the extent this higher level of productivity generates a higher marginal revenue product, employers 
may take decisions to expand their level of production and employment. 
In the case of the minimum wage an efficiency wage argument suggests that a higher minimum 
wage will result in greater effort by employees thus boosting their productivity. At the same time 
there is some ambiguity as to whether or not the apparent productivity gains are wholly an individual 
response to the change in their own wage, or rather are a result of sorting – that is a higher minimum 
wage will induce employers to employ the most productive individuals. Indeed three different 
scenarios can be considered. The first is where an employer is indifferent as to whether to employ a 
larger number of less productive workers on a lower wage or a small number of more productive 
workers on a higher wage. A higher minimum wage will motivate the second choice. The second is 
where the job has a considerable capital component.  Here it would be expected that the 
indifference of the first case does not exist and hence the employer would have already engaged in 
sorting to find the most efficient worker. The third is where there is scope for an individual to boost 
their own productivity, either because they are ‘motivated’ by the higher wage, or because they 
know at the higher wage they are more likely to face competition from other workers for the job.  
In the history of the debate on the minimum wage all three of these approaches are cited. The first 
can be seen in Stiglitz (1976) and also in Webb’s (1912) argument for the introduction of a minimum 
wage: “if the conditions of employment are unregulated, it will frequently “pay” an employer … not to 
select the best workman, but to give the preference to an incompetent or infirm man, a “boozer” or a 
person of bad character, provided that he can hire them at a sufficiently low wage” (ibid p 978)  In 
contrast, “With a Legal Minimum Wage … he is economically impelled to do his utmost to raise the 
level of efficiency of his workers, so as to get the best possible return for the fixed conditions”. (loc 
cit).  
The use of capital argument is seen in Marshall (1890) who notes that while it may make little 
difference, for example, in low technology manual labouring, to an employer “whose wages bill for a 
certain piece of work is £100, whether that sum is divided between twenty efficient or thirty inefficient 
workers” but where “expensive fixed capital is used, it would be to the advantage of the employer to 
raise the time earnings for the more efficient workers” (ibid p457) 
The third is reflected in the frequently cited case of the introduction by Henry Ford of a ‘five dollar a 
day’ rate of pay for workers building the Model T. Although there are arguments as to the rationale 
for Ford’s strategy, a review by Raff and Summers (1987) concluded that it was an efficiency wage 
and that: “On balance it seems fair to conclude that Ford was able, by offering the five-dollar day, to 
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reduce the turnover among his workers and to extract much more intensive, and generally 
productive, effort from them” (p S83)  
This question of the potential costs of turnover leads to the role of labour market frictions  and a 
broader and more recent theoretical developments on matching and on variations to the assumption 
of a perfect market. These are discussed under monopsony markets. 
5.1.5 Monopsony 
A special case of the labour market which has had increasing attention in the minimum wage 
literature in recent years is that of a monopsony – a single buyer of labour.  For a monopsony 
employer profit maximisation can occur at an employment level and wage rate below the equilibrium 
which would occur in a competitive market. As a consequence a minimum wage, while still enabling 
the company to make a profit – consistent with what would happen in a competitive market, it can 
also lead to an increase in employment. While this theory was discussed by Stigler in 1946 as being 
“quite valid” he considered that it was “not very relevant to the question of a national minimum 
wage” (Stigler 1946 p 361), as it would only occur under a number of quite restrictive conditions. 
Empirical findings of apparent positive employment effects in some minimum wage studies resulted 
in a re-emergence of this theory as a possible explanation of the observed outcomes. (Card and 
Krueger 1995, Bhaskar and To 1999) 
A more sophisticated approach to the monopsony model is that of the dynamic monopsony, or 
imperfect search model. In this, rather than assuming that a perfect market operates, it is assumed 
that many workers will accept a wage offer as long as it is above their reservation wage because 
they lack knowledge of what the market equilibrium wage is. That is wages are ‘posted’ by individual 
employers rather than being determined by a market in the first instance. While some of the workers 
who accept this initial offer may move to other companies over time as they receive further job offers 
from companies paying closer to equilibrium wages, the businesses they initially worked for then 
recruits replacement workers – repeating their initial strategy. As such these businesses can be seen 
as effectively operating as monopsonies – in making the initial offers to those who have not received 
previous offers. Under these circumstances it is suggested that a “minimum wage can improve 
welfare because all wages are set too low as a consequence of employer monopsony power and 
because dispersed wages induces inefficient labor turnover in the economy” (Mortensen 1998 p 1). 
As noted by Zavodny (1998) such a situation can be typified in those sectors with large numbers of 
small employers. As seen earlier low wage employment is concentrated in many of these sectors. 
These studies identify scope for a welfare improving intervention with gains in both employment and 
wages where such an inefficient market exists. A counterpoint to this however has been put by 
Danziger (2009) who notes that, if the market is already operating efficiently, the introduction of a 
minimum wage without full-compliance can in fact generate a situation where small firms start 
operating as monopsonists and reduce both wages and employment. 
Of course if the minimum wage rises to the market equilibrium there are no future employment gains 
under this monopsony model as the gains from monopsony pricing of labour have been eliminated.  
Research by Fakhfakh and FitzRoy (2005) examined the employment size wage effect which is 
evident in many countries – highlighted by the concentration of low pay and minimum pay 
employment in small firms. Their results were consistent with a dynamic monopsony model while 
also finding evidence of rent sharing.  
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5.1.6 Bargaining and associated institutional models 
There are many approaches to institutional and bargaining models. Under a monopoly union 
approach it is considered that unions hold the ability to set wages, and firms then respond to this in 
terms of their labour demand curve.  Since this is downwardly sloping it implies that higher wages 
set by the unions may result in labour supply exceeding demand – and the generation of 
unemployment. Within this model this result may be acceptable, either because the overall result for 
all workers – including the unemployed, is better than could be achieved under alternative wages, or 
because the interests of those who are employed are given greater weight than those who are not 
employed. (Often seen as an insider/outsider model because those already employed are more likely 
to be union members and hence benefit from the higher wages, while those outside are not.) 
Alternatively bilateral bargaining models see unions (or some other collectivity of employees) as 
bargaining with employers over the distribution of excess profits (that is profits over the normal 
return on capital.) Within these models there are further issues such as whether unions are simply 
responsive to maximising outcomes for all workers, or whether, as argued by the median voter 
model, they need to concentrate on the interests of a particular segment in order to ensure their re-
election82. 
In the case of minimum wage setting many different institutional mechanisms come into play, with 
the balance of these varying across countries. These include: collective bargaining; independent, but 
state sanctioned bodies which may operate within an Industrial Relations, or a social policy 
environment, with varying degrees of participation by employers, unions and the broader community; 
or by direct government dictate. Such institutional frameworks as well as being influenced by current 
political and other power balances in particular countries, can also be the product of deeply 
embedded institutional frameworks, or social values. (Alesina and Glaeser 2004, Chapter 5) 
The structures which gave rise to the original Harvester decision, tariff protection conditional on a 
legal obligation to pay a living wage, clearly fall within this set of institutional arrangements. 
5.1.7 Minimum wage, education and training 
Several theoretical frameworks suggest a relationship between minimum wages, education and 
training. These models support arguments for both increased and decreased investment in skills and 
education as a result of the introduction of a minimum wage or an increase in its rate. 
As minimum wages are usually earned by low or unskilled employees, a higher minimum wage can 
improve the relative return for unskilled workers relative to those with greater skills. That is, it can act 
to reduce the premium paid for skills. In turn this may reduce the willingness of individuals to invest 
in developing such skills as they are less valuable to them. One possible consequence of this is, for 
example, that a high minimum wage for young people may make them less likely to remain in 
education. 
Potentially running counter to this is that a high minimum wage may result in employers being more 
selective as to whom they recruit for minimum wage positions, for example requiring a higher level of 
education and skills. In such circumstances a minimum wage may stimulate training – as higher skill 
levels become a prerequisite to being able to obtain employment – even at the entry level.   
This though in turn has the consequence of leaving those without such skills as unemployed, and 
indeed unemployable, without such training.   
                                                          
82 Given the shape of the earnings distribution with a strong skew towards the bottom tail, this model would also suggest that, 
given the median member is likely to be on a lower rather than higher income, they will favour wage outcomes which are 
redistributive. On the other hand if individuals in the middle of the distribution believe that they may be able to move to 
positions at the top of the distribution, they may be willing to live with more dispersed wages in the short term in the hope of 
securing a higher paying job in the future. 
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The impetus for training may also come from the firm. Again in cases where there are market 
distortions, including significant frictions, a high minimum wage may result in an increase in training 
effort.  
This subject has been given considerable attention by Acemoglu and Pischke. In a 1999 paper 
(Acemoglu and Pischke 1999) they identify the theoretical circumstances in which a firm may provide 
training to its employees.  Using Becker’s approach they note that in a perfect labour market an 
individual bears the cost of general training since there is no benefit for the employer since the 
individual gains the return on this through higher wages. Where however the market is not perfect, in 
particular where wages compression occurs, as is often the case around a minimum wage, this 
situation changes and to the extent training can generate higher productivity these gains can be 
taken by the employer and hence training may be offered. More recent work (Acemoglu and Pischke 
2001) suggests an employer may, in the face of an increase in the minimum wage, find it more 
profitable to improve the skills of their minimum wage workers than to recruit alternative workers.   
5.1.8 Minimum wages and transfers 
A key determinant of the reservation wage for many people is the level of income they might 
otherwise be entitled to from transfer payments. If the minimum wage is low relative to these 
transfers (and the additional costs that a person will experience in taking up employment) there may 
be little incentive for a person to take up employment at the minimum wage level. This is usually 
countered in the design of income support payments in three ways. The first is to set payment rates 
low enough to ensure a strong financial incentive for employment.  The second is to design tapers 
(the rate at which the payment is withdrawn as a person receives private income) in such a way that 
a person is always better off with additional earnings. Thirdly many payments impose conditionality, 
such as work tests, which require recipients of assistance to actively seek employment and to 
accept reasonable job offers, and involve sanctions where these obligations are not met. 
This relationship is frequently cited as a reason for keeping the rate of assistance provided under 
income support payments low. For example it was argued by the Australian Government interagency 
submission to the Senate Inquiry on the adequacy of the allowance payment system that “an 
increase in the base rate of Newstart Allowance has the distinct disadvantage of reducing 
employment incentives, especially for those who can only obtain low paying employment” (Australian 
Government 2012 p12) 
To the extent however that government is a player in both the setting of minimum wages and the rate 
of income support, the determination of neither is really independent of the other. That is, to the 
extent the government can affect the rate of the minimum wage they cannot wholly argue that their 
hands are tied in making decisions on the rate of income support. 
This in public debates can lead to some circularity. From the perspective of the minimum wage as a 
ceiling on the rates at which income support payments can be paid, it is argued that a high minimum 
wage is important to ensure adequate levels of income support can be paid. Alternatively some 
argue, such as Schmitt (2012) “More generous social expenditures may reduce low pay by forcing 
employers to raise wages to compete with social benefits” (p 3). Underlying this argument are 
assumptions about the capacity of employers to pay such higher wages. 
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Figure 21. Relative value of disposable income from minimum wage and 
unemployment benefits (Newstart), 1970 to 2011 
 
Source:  Minimum wage as detailed in Attachment A, income support data Australian Government 2013  
Section 5.2 
 
In January 2012 the weekly income of a single person on Newstart is $243.40 (excluding Rent 
Assistance) compared with a net income of $537.72 for the same person on the minimum wage – a 
replacement rate of 45.3 per cent. As illustrated in Figure 21, over the period since 1970 this rate has 
varied considerably. It rose from as low as 26.2 per cent in 1970, and after a dip in the mid-1970s, 
eventually gained a high of 53.9 per cent in 1997, from which it has since steadily declined. These 
variations were initially driven by real increases in the rate of income support payments83, but over 
more recent periods have been more affected by changes in the minimum wage and its taxation 
treatment, as this form of income support has been held flat in real terms. 
In contrast to this decline in the replacement rate of assistance to the unemployed, the replacement 
rate of the single pension for a pensioner of working age (typically a person on the Disability Support 
Pension or on Carer Payment) has risen over most of the period. Particularly noticeable in the chart 
is the rapid increase associated with the rise in the value of the pension (including bonus payments) 
over the past five years. Currently the single rate of pension represents a 69.6 per cent replacement 
rate for working full-time for the minimum wage, without taking account of the potential additional 
costs of work.  
5.1.9 Wage compression 
Wage compression is frequently associated with the operation of a minimum wage. It can occur 
where a statutory minimum wage is increased, but where other wages are determined by the market, 
or as an outcome of industrial bargaining. In this latter negotiations may involve trading-off the 
potential earnings of one group of employees for higher earnings for others. Frequently this involves 
a high wages floor – effectively a minimum wage – with lesser increments for other employees. This 
can arise both directly in the determination of rates, or through policies such as flat value wage 
increments across employees. 
Where this occurs a higher minimum wage may be agreed by employers as it does not impinge on 
the average cost of employment across the workforce. Over time however such trade-offs can 
                                                          
83 The pattern of change in the value of income support payments to the unemployed reflects a range of policy decisions in 
pursuit of different goals and priorities at different times. Initially in the early 1970s the objective was, on equity grounds, to 
bring the rate of this support into alignment with the rate of pensions, followed by the payment being frozen in the late 1970s, 
in response to a need for budget stringency and to improve incentives for work. This was followed by a series of ad hoc 
adjustments, and eventually indexation for changes in prices. 
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reduce the mobility of lower skilled workers, while increasing that of more highly skilled workers 
(Frandsen 2010), in particular where other employers may not have the same constraints on the 
wages they offer. On the other hand the higher minimum wage may introduce an incentive for 
employers to provide training to less skilled employees to boost their productivity. (Dustmann and 
Schönberg 2004, Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan 2004). In this case a lesser margin may be 
appropriate between their wage and that of others. 
While potentially leading to this type of wage compression, an alternative set of interactions can 
result in the minimum wage leading to increases in other low wages. The mechanisms of this depend 
upon institutional frameworks: 
• In Australia both the formulation of the basic wage as a foundational wage upon which other 
wage rates were constructed using a system of margins and loadings, and the co-determination 
of the minimum wage, and other wage rates in the current system, directly provide for this type 
of flow-on effect. While this has been somewhat mitigated at times through flat increases in the 
minimum wage rate, the compression from this is relatively low in contrast to what otherwise 
may have occurred. 
• Alternatively even when other wages are determined through the market, this cannot occur in 
isolation from relativities with the minimum wage. Employers may find it necessary to pay wages 
above the minimum wage to attract more productive or skilled employees and, to the extent the 
minimum wage is increased, these wages may need to be increased to at least maintain a 
differential.    
5.1.10 The minimum wage and productivity 
Essentially any long term sustainable increase in the minimum wage can only occur with an increase 
in the productivity of this labour. In some cases, as discussed, theories provide scope for 
productivity enhancing behaviours as a response to an increase in the minimum wage. These 
include: greater application to work by those in receipt of the minimum wage; improved efficiency in 
the operation of markets – reducing the costs of labour turnover; eliminating monopsony practices; 
and training. 
This raises a central question. In the long run, can these types of productivity enhancing responses 
provide sufficient returns to cover ongoing increases in the minimum wage? A subsidiary question is, 
if a higher minimum wage requires a more highly skilled minimum wage workforce, what is the fate of 
those who lack the ability or willingness to acquire these skills?  
While not addressing this latter question, Freeman (1996) identifies a specific role for the minimum 
wage in focusing attention on the issue of productivity: “But the long-term well-being of workers in 
the lower rung of the earnings distribution depends ultimately on increasing their productivity. If a 
minimum wage directs the attention toward the need to develop long-term policies that augment the 
productivity and skills of the low-paid, and of the firms for whom they work, it can provide an 
additional service as well as redistributing modest amounts to the low-paid.” (p 648) 
5.1.11 Who funds the minimum wage 
Except in the case of an efficiency wage effect, imposing or increasing a minimum wage essentially 
involve transfers from one group to another. This is again highlighted in Freeman (ibid) “Minimum 
wages do not increase the pay of workers by magic. Save in the case of monopsony, they do not 
raise national output, but rather take money from some citizens and pay it to others. Even in the 
monopsony case, moreover, there is redistribution from the firm to workers and consumers.” (p 640) 
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A number of such transfers have been identified in the preceding discussions. Wage compression 
involves transfers from potentially higher paid workers to those working on the minimum wage. 
Passing through of any cost increase to consumers through prices involves the population as a 
whole funding the increase. A fall in company profitability leads to reduced distributions to the 
owners of these companies. Displacement of some minimum wage workers results in an effective 
transfer from these displaced workers to both the remaining minimum wage workers and potentially 
a smaller group of more skilled workers for whom there is increased demand. A higher minimum 
wage may draw additional, more highly skilled, people into the workforce. Employment of this group 
is then likely to be at the expense of those already in the workforce with lower skills. 
These in turn have consequential impacts. Excessive wage compression can result in 
underinvestment in skills, potential pressures for wage increases which may wipe out the benefits of 
the higher minimum wage, or the movement of skilled labour to sectors with less constraint on wage 
setting. While such compression has been maintained in countries with strong institutions and a 
strong ‘social contract’, this can also carry a cost. Price pass throughs can result in shifts in 
consumption and hence a reduction in the demand for the products which have a large minimum 
wage employment component, or lead to generalised inflation which wipes out the gains of the 
higher minimum wage. Reduced profitability in one sector can result in capital and activity moving to 
other sectors, again with lesser reliance upon minimum wage employment. 
The impacts on governments can be ambiguous. An increase in minimum wages may result in higher 
taxation payments, and through income testing, lower transfer payments. Conversely if it has a 
negative employment effect, it may increase demand for transfer payments and lower company 
profitability may reduce taxation revenue. As a direct employer and funder of services which employ 
labour, governments also face higher costs. 
At times it is argued that an increase in the minimum wage can, through the increased spending of 
these workers, increase demand. For the reasons listed above this can only arise to the extent the 
minimum wage workers have a greater propensity to consume than the other groups who are 
effectively paying for the increase in the minimum wage. Further, as discussed in section 0 the 
distribution of minimum wage workers across households would suggest that the propensity to 
consume may not be all that different. 
5.1.12  Competing theories or theories for different circumstances 
Given the array of potential theoretical approaches to wage setting and the minimum wage, it is easy 
to dismiss these theories as being conflicting, or to cherry pick particular theories which tend to 
reinforce pre-conceptions or aspirations. 
An alternative approach, as intimated in the introduction to the section, is to recognise that each of 
the theories is seeking to simplify one dimension of a very complex relationship where at any one 
time several forces will be at play. More so, different circumstances may result in quite different 
weights to each of these. 
Cahuc (2006) notes, in regard to the merits of the perfect market and monopsony approaches and 
the effect of minimum wages on employment: “rises in the minimum wage do not always exert 
influence in the same direction. Everything depends on conditions at the outset. If the minimum wage 
is low, bordering on basic welfare, an increase in it attracts new workers whom firms have an interest 
in hiring.  But if the minimum wage is high at the onset, every increase incentivizes firms to trim from 
their payrolls those employees whose productivity has been overtaken by the new level of the 
minimum wage, without hiring an equivalent number of new, more productive workers.  Hence the 
minimum wage can be either helpful or harmful to employment” (pp45-46) 
 74 
 
Similar approaches can be taken to the relationship between other theories. While a minimum wage 
increase may work as a productivity wage, stimulating the level of effort some individuals will bring to 
their employment, because people are different, it may not have the same impact on others who may 
well end up being displaced. Similarly, depending upon traditions and institutions, while firm or 
industry based bargaining may give rise to collectively agreed high levels of minimum wages, an 
alternative where workers have low bargaining power at the firm level is that they may instead use 
their collective voting power to seek to have these instituted at a political level – for example through 
a statutory minimum wage. 
5.2 Research findings 
Although the minimum wage has been the subject of considerable empirical analysis, over a long 
period, research findings can be best described as apparently contradictory and disputed84. There 
are several reasons for this. The first is that changes in the minimum wage are often one of many 
different changes taking place in labour markets and economies and as a consequence it is often 
difficult to disentangle effects. Secondly, income and related labour market data are frequently noisy 
– as has been seen earlier in this paper there are considerable difficulties in even estimating the 
proportion of people on the minimum wage. Thirdly many changes in the minimum wage are 
relatively small and incremental, and may only impact on a small segment of the workforce while 
responses can be both anticipated and lagged. The consequence of this is that the response to any 
one change in the rate of the minimum wage is frequently relatively small. Further such a response is 
not necessarily simultaneous with the actual time the change in pay is made. This makes it difficult to 
identify effects in noisy data. At the same time cumulative and longer term change is more likely to 
be entangled with a range of other economic, including technological and international market, 
changes that are occurring and hence hard to isolate. Fourthly there are a multitude of potential focal 
points to be studied. For example, are changes in the minimum wage manifest in employment levels 
overall; in the employment levels of particular subgroups – such as the young and those with poor 
skills; or in terms of growth in employment of other groups of more productive workers; or do the 
changes impact on levels of training within firms; or changes in turnover rates? If, for example, prices 
are the channel through which the impact flows short-term studies of employment may pick up little 
effect. Fifthly, as seen in the discussion of the theories related to the minimum wage, the 
consequences of changes may be quite different in different situations. Attention to the context of 
specific findings is often subordinated by the desire to provide generalised conclusions. 
Finally this research, and interpretation of it, addresses a subject which is firmly entrenched in social 
and political values concerning equity and fairness and the appropriateness of various outcomes and 
interventions. At the broader level this sees considerable cherry picking in terms of the theories and 
evidence which features in the public debate. 
In looking at the literature this paper mainly is concerned with analysis conducted over recent 
decades. 
5.2.1 Disemployment effects – Card and Krueger vs Neumark and Wascher 
The divide in the findings of empirical data is perhaps most starkly seen in the work of Card and 
Krueger relative to that of Neumark and Wascher. Card and Krueger in their book “Myth and 
Measurement: The New Economics of the Minimum Wage” (1995) bring together much of the work 
they undertook in the 1980s and early 1990s on the impact of state minimum wage changes in the 
                                                          
84 As well as disputation around the specific findings of published studies it has also been suggested (Doucouliagos and 
Stanley 2008) that the literature has been selectively published with a bias in favour of studies showing statistically significant 
and negative impacts on employment. 
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United States, in particular with regard to the fast food sector. This is accompanied by other analysis 
including a critical review of earlier minimum wage studies, analysis of the role of the minimum wage 
on the level and distribution of household income and on the evaluation of the effects of minimum 
wages on the value of companies. The results of this body of research, they claim, “call into question 
the standard model” (op cit p. 1) and that their book “presents a new body of evidence showing that 
recent minimum wage increases have not had the negative effects predicted by the textbook model. 
Some of the new evidence points towards a positive effect of the minimum wage on employment; 
most shows no effect at all. Moreover, a reanalysis of previous minimum wage studies finds little 
support for the prediction that minimum wages reduce employment.” (ibid). 
This work has been very influential and has been one of the factors driving the new focus on aspects 
of the labour market such as the role of monopsonies and training effects. 
Neumark and Wascher were active, and critical, in the debate around the work of Card and Krueger 
and have continued to undertake new studies of the impact of the minimum wage. Their book 
‘Minimum Wages’ (Neumark and Wascher 2010) draws on this body of work including a reanalysis of 
the work of Card and Krueger and a wide review of other studies. In introducing their book they 
summarise their findings as: ‘Based on the extensive research we have done, and our reading of the 
research done by others, we arrive at the following four main conclusions regarding the outcomes 
that are central to policy debate about minimum wages. First, minimum wages reduce employment 
opportunities for less-skilled workers, especially those who are most directly affected by the minimum 
wage. Second, although minimum wages compress the wage distribution, because of employment 
and hours declines among those whose wages are most affected by minimum wage increases, a 
higher minimum wage tends to reduce rather than to increase the earnings of the lowest-skilled 
individuals. Third, minimum wages do not, on net, reduce poverty or otherwise help low-income 
families, but primarily redistribute income among low-income families and may increase poverty. 
Fourth, minimum wages appear to have adverse longer-run effects on wages and earnings, in part 
because they hinder the acquisition of human capital.” (pp 6-7) 
There is clearly little common ground in these two interpretations of the evidence. 
5.2.2 Australian research 
In recent years there has also been a resurgence in research on the minimum wage in Australia. 
Much of this has arisen due to the restoration of a formal minimum wage, and the activities of the 
AFPC and FWA, including funding research projects. A substantial component of this activity has 
been concerned with seeking to estimate the size and composition of minimum wage employment 
and of its impact on household incomes. In contrast there has been relatively little direct research on 
the impact of the minimum wage on employment in Australia. Rather most of the debate on the 
potential effects has been based upon the international research.  
Employment effects 
Two empirical studies have looked at the impact of the state minimum wage in Western Australia. 
Leigh (2003, 2004) found that increases in the state minimum wage85 were associated with a fall in 
employment, with this being most strongly felt amongst young people. “On six occasions between 
1994 and 2001, the Western Australian minimum wage was increased, by between 3.49 per cent and 
9.29 per cent. After each of these increases, the employment to population ratio in Western Australia 
fell, relative to the Rest of Australia. Aggregating these six changes, the elasticity of labour demand 
with respect to the Western Australian statutory minimum wage is estimated to be –0.13. The 
                                                          
85 Underlying this study was the fact that the WA State Minimum Wage, operating under the State ‘Minimum Conditions of 
Employment Act’ differed from the award minimum wage between 1994 and 2002. This provided a ‘natural experiment’ which 
could be exploited to test the impact of the different minimum wage in that State.  
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employment impact is most substantial among younger employees, with the elasticity of labour 
demand for workers aged 15–24 estimated at –0.39.”(Leigh 2003 pp 370-371) 
Plowman (2007) used a different approach which focused on the association between the minimum 
wage and employment changes in particular submarkets within WA. His conclusion was that “the 
minimum wage has had little effect on employment in general, but has impacted, in small measure, 
on employment in vulnerable sectors. That impact has affected part-time rather than full-time 
employment.” (Plowman 2007 p 20) 
Lewis (2006), using aggregate data to derive elasticities of labour demand, suggested that “if the 
minimum wage had been kept constant in real terms between 1994 and 2004 about 290 thousand 
extra jobs would have been created” (p. 19). Harding and Harding (2004a), looking at minimum rates 
in general rather than just the FMW, used data from a survey of small businesses to estimate the 
labour demand effect of changes in minimum rates. They conclude that a one per cent increase in 
the minimum wage reduced employment by 0.2 per cent in the short-term (p. 11). The study also 
found that there was not strong evidence to support a monopsony model of employment for the 
businesses they studied. 
In contrast Lee and Suardi (2010) analyse changes in employment to population ratios in Australia 
between 1977 and 2008 and come to a ‘tentative conclusion’ that “the seven minimum wage 
increases in Australia from 1997 to 2003 appear to not have had any significant negative employment 
effects for teenagers” (p. 21). In considering this finding it needs to be recalled that the actual level of 
increase in the real value of the minimum wage over this period was relatively small – rising in real 
terms, in the data cited by Lee and Suardi, from $359.40 to $397.00 in 10 years.  
Wheatley (2009) in a study of relative trends in low and high skilled employment in Australia 
examined the potential role of the minimum wage in reducing the relative level of low skilled 
employment between 2001 and 2007. He found a statistically significant effect with a one per cent 
increase in the ratio of the minimum wage to average earnings associated with a 1.4 to 1.6 per cent 
reduction in low skilled versus higher skilled employment, depending upon how higher skilled 
employment was defined. 
While not related to the minimum wage per se a useful and challenging insight into how markets may 
respond to wages shocks, and the importance of institutional factors was the introduction of equal 
pay in Australia. Gregory and Duncan (1981) found that despite a relative earnings growth of 30 per 
cent for women there were no major employment effects. That is there was neither substitution of 
male for female labour nor falls in demand for female employment.86 The authors ascribe this result 
to the extent of labour market segmentation. 
Adjustment and productivity 
Hancock (1998) in reviewing the history of the role of the minimum wage in Australia places a strong 
emphasis on the institutional factors decisions being taken in the context of a bargaining model of 
wages. Specifically he suggests that in such a model the focus of the task taken on by tribunals was 
in addressing the risk of those with low bargaining powers losing out: “Protection of the low paid in a 
labour market characterised by disparities of bargaining power has, since the introduction of 
industrial arbitration, been among the major functions of the tribunals.” (p62) 
                                                          
86 In a somewhat allied study the role of institutions on mediating labour market outcomes to shocks such as this was 
addressed by Hamermesh (1985) in analysis of the impact of youth and female employment in the 1960s and 1970s.  He 
contrasted the difference in the US and Canada in the response to increased labour supply by women. In the US youth wages 
fell relatively to women’s and there was strong growth in the employment of both groups. In Canada relative wage rigidities 
led to youth unemployment. In other countries it resulted in declines in youth participation in the labour market. 
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The role of tribunals was also the focus of Eggleston (1983) who was concerned with the relationship 
between productivity and wage settlements in Australia. His historical analysis suggests that there 
was a lack of transparency in this. He concludes that these tribunals “have always recognised that 
productivity is a factor to be taken into account in fixing of wages and working conditions. It is rather 
less clear, however, just how the tribunal has made use of its conclusions as to increased productivity 
in actually fixing the level of award wages.”(p526) This finding may reflect the extent to which tribunal 
decisions are legalistically based on ‘evidence’ presented to them in an adversarial system, and 
frequently concerned with the resolution of disputes and finding ‘acceptable’ outcomes rather than 
as independent investigators who take decisions on the basis of clear economic or social criteria.  
Research for FWA undertaken by the Workplace Research Centre (Evesson et al 2011) used a case 
study approach involving multiple waves of qualitative research covering employers and employees 
in 20 firms. The objective was to identify enterprise responses to a range of issues associated with 
the minimum wage. The research reported that “minimum wages increases were viewed by the 
majority of case study employers as neither having a pronounced impact on nor constituting a 
significant pressure on the enterprise’s performance. Minimum wages increases were primarily 
regarded as one pressure on the enterprise among many.”(p ii) Earlier qualitative work by Wearne, 
Southwell and Selwyn (2008) found, from a survey of 92 firms, that employers used a range of 
disparate adjustment mechanisms in response to increases in wages. The most common responses 
were: “increased prices; reduced staff costs through changes to staff strategy [including] business 
owner/manager personally working increased hours, reduced staff hours, reduced staff hours 
attracting overtime and penalty rates; and reduced staff costs through increased staff efficiency and 
productivity.” (p. 52) 
The question of the relationship between the minimum wage, productivity and business 
competitiveness was also considered by Farmakis-Gamboni and Yuen (2011). This used existing 
literature for analysing the role of the minimum wage, complemented by empirical analysis of the 
relationship between wage setting, especially reliance upon award rates and a wide range of aspects 
of business including survival rates, productivity and innovation. The paper concludes that the 
minimum wage can have many impacts on competitiveness and productivity through a range of 
mechanisms, but that much of the evidence on causality was unclear and that “the overall effect of 
minimum wages on productivity for Australia is ambiguous” (p. 80). 
Minimum wage and well-being 
Section 3.3.5 and 3.3.6 present contemporary analysis of the circumstances of current minimum 
wage employees, including the distributions of these across households by household income and 
various measures of well-being. This analysis builds upon a strong base of work in this field.  
Richardson (1998) extensively analysed 1989-90 data to identify the relationship between being 
employed on a low wage and levels of household income. She found low wage workers were a 
diverse group. In particular as a group there were few distinguishing features other than their wage 
level and in terms of other characteristics they resembled other workers. Although she reports that 
these employees were distributed in higher and middle income households, in addition to those with 
lower incomes, she concludes “A cut in low wages that focuses on those on, or around, the 
Australian Industrial Relations Commission minimum would be quite regressive.”(p 577) This analysis 
was further developed (Richardson and Harding 1998) using 1994-95 data. Again the authors found 
considerable diversity in the low wage population. This paper concluded “that an increase in the level 
of low and even minimum wages is not a very efficient instrument for equalising the distribution of 
equivalent family income” (p27). 
The relationship between low pay and household income in Australia was also examined by 
McGuinness and Freebairn (2007). They report that: “Low paid employees, and more so in the case 
of full-time employees, are spread fairly evenly across households with different incomes.” 
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Dockery, Ong and Seymour (2008) looked more widely at the relationship between minimum wages 
and well-being in Australia. They focused on the relative outcomes of those working on the minimum 
wage and those without employment, and changes in well-being when a person moved between 
these states. A number of different measures of well-being, including income, life satisfaction and 
financial stress were considered. The study concluded: “the AFPC should be extremely wary of the 
potential impact of higher minimum wages on employment. The evidence is that unemployment is 
associated with substantially worse outcomes — in terms of general wellbeing and financial 
prosperity — than those experienced by people working in minimum wage jobs. On the other side of 
the coin, it seems that increases in the minimum wage will have virtually no effect on the wellbeing of 
those affected and lead to relatively minor improvements in disposable incomes….” (pp 203-204). 
The paper also noted that the financial impacts of such transitions were often relatively low because 
of the extent to which transfer payments operate to supplement the incomes of many low earners.  
5.2.3 Other US research  
As indicated the Card and Krueger vs Neumark and Wascher debate is far from resolved and there 
continues to be considerable debate on the impact of minimum wages in the US. Some of this seeks 
to rework the data used in these analyses, others bring new approaches or use additional sources of 
data. Burkhauser (2010) in providing an ‘American perspective’ on the minimum wage in Australia 
summarised a range of his own and other research. He reported, in particular, on the relationship 
with well-being, noting that increases in state level minimum wages had had “no effect on state 
poverty rates” (and indeed potential job losses). In contrast he noted that alternative policy strategies 
such as an EITC could have strong effects, especially for groups such as lone parents. 
The following discussion draws upon some of the more recent work that has been undertaken. 
Employment effects 
Ropponen (2011) has undertaken a re-examination of the two datasets used by both Card and 
Krueger and Neumark and Wascher on the change in minimum wage in New Jersey in 1992. In their 
respective studies while Card and Krueger found employment had increased in fast food restaurants, 
Neuman and Wascher found a negative effect. Ropponen reports that when data from each of the 
studies is re-analysed, the individual findings of each of the studies are largely upheld. However he 
reports that what was significant was that both datasets showed a similar pattern of employment 
gains in small restaurants and losses in large ones. Schmitt and Rosnick (2011) on the other hand 
find neither an employment effect, nor a firm size effect in their research on city specific minimum 
wages in San Francisco, Santa Fe and Washington. In contrast to the finding of relatively small or no 
employment impacts, in studying the impact of changes in the New York State minimum wage on 
people aged 16-29 years, without a high school diploma, Sabia, Burkhauser and Hansen (2012) 
found very strong effects. They report that employment for this group fell by around 20 per cent in 
response to an increase in pay from $US5.15 to $US 6.75 per hour – implying a labour demand 
elasticity of -0.7. (p 372) 
Dube, Lester and Reich (2011) in their analysis of the US labour market find support for a model 
which takes account of labour market frictions. In policy simulations their model of the teenage 
labour market suggests that an increase of the US minimum wage from $5.15 to $7.25 per hour, 
would increase average teenage wages by 3.4 per cent, reduce separations by 2 per cent and 
reduce teenage employment by a bit under 0.4 per cent. This result is generated because the 
minimum wage shifts the employment distribution away from high-turnover, low-wage firms to low-
turnover, high-wage ones.  The authors note however that this result does not take account of the 
potential consequences of any passing through of the additional costs in products. A further 
limitation to the broader applicability of these results is whether they are specific to the very high 
labour turnover (62 per cent) amongst US teenagers – more than 3 times the rate of adults. Earlier 
work by these researchers (Dube, Lester and Reich 2010) looking at the impact of changes in 
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minimum wages between 1990 and 2006 on the restaurant sector found no significant employment 
effects. 
Again looking at teenagers, Allegretto, Dube and Reich (2011) implemented a new analytical 
approach to try to overcome some potential technical biases in earlier studies of the impact of 
minimum wage increases in the US. Their results confirm the existence of various biases in the 
methodologies, but conclude that their analysis “indicate[s] that minimum wage increases – in the 
range that have been implemented in the United States – do not reduce employment among teens” 
(p 238).  The methodology they used to come to this finding has though been disputed by Neumark, 
Salas and Wascher (2012)  
Addison, Blackburn and Cotti (2011) considered the effect of the minimum wage on youth 
employment in the US over a period of economic downturn. They use three different datasets which 
encompass periods from the mid-2000s to the end of the decade, that is covering the recession of 
2007 – 2009. Their conclusion was that they did not find any strong negative impacts of minimum 
wage increases on employment. They suggest two possible reasons for this. The first is the 
concentration of such employment in industry sectors where labour demand is relatively insensitive 
to forced wage increases. (The sectors they analysed were food services, food and beverage stores 
and service stations.) The second factor was the actual size of the increases in the minimum wage. 
They report that while the minimum wage increased relative to the average manufacturing wage 
between 2006 and 2009, the increases in the value of the minimum wage left its real value at rates 
similar to those over most of the 1980s and 1990s, and well below that of the period from 1940 to 
1970. 
Adjustment effects 
Meer and West (2012) focused their research on outcomes at the firm level, rather than on overall 
employment levels. They find that “while the minimum wage does not appear to have strong 
immediate effects on the level of total employment it significantly reduces rates of job growth.”(p 19)  
In contrast to some of the research discussed later, they found that the effect was more pronounced 
in established firms than new entrants, and there was no effect on the actual entry and exit of 
establishments. Rohlin (2011) again looking at establishment level data suggests to the contrary that 
“minimum wage increases are not detrimental enough to cause existing establishments to decrease 
employment, or leave the areas by shutting down or moving to an adjacent area with a lower 
minimum wage” but that “minimum wage policy does in fact decrease new establishment activity in 
industries that depend on minimum wage earning workers” (p116) 
Hirsch, Kaufman and Zelenska (2011) focus on fast food restaurants in two US states and report that 
they could find no significant impact on employment and hours from minimum wage increases.  
Rather they report that about two thirds of the cost increase was passed through in higher prices, 
with the balance impacting through lower profits, wage compression, reduced turnover and higher 
performance standards. 
Minimum wages, training and education 
Using a classical model of the labour market Sutch (2010) points out that minimum wages, if set 
above the market equilibrium, will have a capital deepening effect. This can take two forms. The first 
is through innovation by firms and the replacement of labour with technology. The second is through 
individuals’ investment in their human capital to raise their productive capacity to or above that of 
the minimum wage. He estimates, for the US, that the “cumulative effect of the minimum wage 
increases beginning in 1950 was to add 0.7 years to the average high school experience of men born 
in 1985” (p 20) This contribution was only part however of the range of factors which saw a 3.9 year 
increase in this experience. 
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Other earlier research in the US on the link between minimum wages and education and training in 
the US includes Neumark and Wascher (2003) who report a negative impact of minimum wages on 
school enrolment. Acemoglu and Pischke (2001) however found only no or small effects of minimum 
wages on training in the US. 
Income distribution 
In responding to proposals to redress increasing inequality in the US Heckman (1996) suggests the 
use of broader based labour or income subsidies, either as an EITC or a direct wage subsidy to 
cover the gap between productivity and wage rates. These he considers preferable to alternative 
options, especially increasing minimum wages. “In contrast, policies that reduce the demand for the 
unskilled, like minimum wage laws or increases in union wage scales, are generally bad ideas. They 
increase the wages of those who remain employed but at the same time have the perverse effect of 
increasing inequality among the least skilled, and reducing their employment.” 
The impact of the real decline in the value of the minimum wage in the US on the earnings 
distribution in the US was considered by Autor, Manning and Smith (2010). Focusing on inequality in 
the lower tail of the earnings distribution, they report that while the low level of increases in the 
minimum wage was a contributing factor to inequality in this part of the distribution, especially for 
women, it was not the primary factor. 
5.2.4 The UK minimum wage 
There is a substantial body of research in the UK on the impact of the introduction of the National 
Minimum Wage (NMW) in 1999 and subsequent increases in its value. A substantial portion of this is 
funded by the Low Pay Commission as part of its evidence base. On the whole this has not found 
significant or consistent direct employment effects, although some studies have done so. Further a 
number of the more recent studies suggest the existence of some adjustment mechanisms which 
take some time to play out. The ambiguity of many of the findings of this research is typified by 
Dickens, Riley and Wilkinson (2009) who report “The evidence on employment is mixed, but overall 
there is no compelling evidence to indicate that the large NMW rises had an adverse effect on 
employment.”(p. 7) at the same time they suggest “there is evidence to suggest that some of the 
larger upratings in the NMW may have had small adverse impacts on hours worked for particular 
groups of low paid workers” (p. 9). Subsequent work by these authors (2011) suggested a positive 
labour supply response at the age of 22 years when the full adult rate of the NMW cuts in which sees 
an increase in the employment rate of low skilled employees. Their most recent work (2012) presents 
a re-examination of the evidence of the impact of the NMW since its introduction. While they report 
that their findings are not ‘out of line’ with the existing literature, they make two stronger findings. 
The first was the introduction of the NMW reduced employment retention for women employed on a 
part-time basis by some 3 percentage points. The second is that adverse impacts deepen with 
recessions. 
Fidrmuc and Tena Horrillo (2011), as well as disagreeing with the above findings of Dickens, Riley 
and Wilkinson concerning a positive labour supply response at age 22, conclude their analysis by 
suggesting that the “NMW may have more pronounced impact on employment than the previous 
literature suggests” (p.3). In making this claim they cite the specific effects arising from the age 
related rates of the NMW; and the experience of some sub-groups such as older workers. More 
generally they report “We find evidence that NMW increases depress employment …. The negative 
effect on employment appears especially among the older workers, … We also find that both effects 
are strengthened during the periods of tight labour market conditions when unemployment rises.”   (p 
15-16)    
Changes in the policy intent behind NMW decisions were highlighted by Butcher (2012). While mainly 
concerned with the way in which the Low Pay Commission took account of research in its decision 
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making, and presenting a summary of the substantial body of research that has been undertaken, 
the paper also reflects on the motivation of the LPC. This is concerned with the extent to which 
decisions were framed in terms of the relationship between the level of the minimum wage and 
growth in average earnings. He reports that while initial decisions were taken to increase the 
minimum wage at a faster rate than average earnings, in 2006, the LPC indicated that “the phase in 
which the Commission is committed to increases in the minimum wage above average earnings 
growth is complete”. That is, the initial decisions of the LPC involved a deliberate policy of earnings 
compression in order to reshape the income distribution. 
Such a finding emphasises the need to understand the context of decisions and their specific 
characteristics. In a study which was primarily concerned with the potential impact of the NMW 
during the recession associated with the GFC Bryan, Salvatori and Taylor (2012), report that the 
“2010 uprating reduced both men’s and women’s weekly hours by around 2-4 hours” (ibid p4). There 
were also effects on youth and they find that the combined impact of the higher minimum wage and 
lower hours resulted in a weekly income loss of around 5 per cent. With regard to the specific 
purpose of this study they found little evidence that the recession had increased the sensitivity of 
employment and hours worked to the NMW. 
Dolton, Bondibene and Wadsworth (2010) use local area data, especially variation in the relative 
incidence of minimum wage employment in different locations, to review the operation of the UK 
National Minimum Wage between 1999 and 2007. Of interest to the researchers were the 
employment effect and the impact on the wages distribution. They conclude that the NMW led, in the 
medium term, to a significant fall in wage inequality. Their analysis indicates, mainly since 2003, that 
employment grew slightly faster and unemployment fell in those areas where the NMW had its 
greatest impact. This latter finding though was qualified as no testing was undertaken of the 
possibility that this was linked to other policy interventions. Later work by these authors (2012) finds 
some small positive employment effects in more recent years, along with compression of earnings. 
This finding is consistent with Butcher’s view that this was a deliberate objective. This study did not 
though consider the impact on hours worked and hence the overall impact on labour demand cannot 
be determined. 
In a paper for the UK Resolution Foundation on the future of the British minimum wage Manning 
(2012) concludes that there is little evidence of any negative effect on employment but then cautions 
“nor does the evidence give us significant confidence to experiment with a much higher national 
minimum wage”(p 2)  
Dickens, Manning and Butcher (2012) sought to identify how changes in the NMW affected the 
earnings of other workers87. They report the spill-overs were significant and that changes in the value 
of the UK minimum wage affect the earnings of those receiving up to 140 per cent of the minimum 
wage – around the 25th percentile of earnings. Grossman (1983) suggest that the spill-over effect is 
triggered by two mechanisms. The first is that firms seek to minimise a fall in the relative wages of 
other workers as this may cause them to reduce their work effort. The second is a potential increase 
in demand for better skilled and more productive workers as a substitute for the now more costly 
minimum wage employees. 
Impact on incomes 
The way in which changes in individual earnings inequality translate into changes in household 
income inequality has been looked at by a number of studies. These include Brewer, May and 
                                                          
87 Unlike Australia in the UK the NMW is determined on a statutory basis independent of other wage setting. This is a 
characteristic of the arrangements in a number of other countries. Under these arrangements there is no structural linkage 
which permits increases to affect other wages.  Rather the transmission is typically through collective bargaining where the 
higher minimum wage may be used as an argument for increasing the wages for other groups to reflect their relatively higher 
productivity. 
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Phillips (2009) who found that the gains from minimum wage increases were largest for those 
households in the third and fourth deciles of working age households. That is, the strongest 
outcomes were for lower middle income households, rather than those with the lowest incomes.  
The impact of the introduction of the NMW on poverty amongst households with employment was 
considered by Sutherland (2001). She reported that the direct effect of the NMW on poverty rates, 
and the intensity of poverty, was small. She did suggest however that there may be some incentive 
effect in motivating jobless people into employment.  
Adjustment mechanisms 
Given the lack of any clear and consistent findings of any strong negative impact of the NMW on 
employment, there has been a substantial shift in focus in research in the UK to explore in more 
detail how firms actually adjust to changes in the increases in the NMW.  
Rizov and Croucher 2011 report that there is “significant evidence that the introduction of NMW led 
to increases in productivity in all low-paying sectors and the increases are more marked in larger 
firms” (p. 27) Draca, Machin and Van Reenen (2011) in contrast report finding no evidence of the 
NMW leading to productivity gains, rather they find it reduced firm profitability and there was a “hint 
that the long-run adjustment may be through lower rates of net [firm] entry into sectors most affected 
by the NMW” (p. 150) 
Galindo-Rueda and Pereira (2004) reported some evidence of slower employment growth in service 
sector companies in localities which were more exposed to the NMW. No similar result was seen in 
the production sector. They suggest from their analysis that the NMW may be “making potential 
entrants in low paying sectors and areas more reluctant to pursue investments at the profitability 
margin”. (p. 8).  
If, as some of this research suggests, it is firm entry and exit which is important as a mechanism of 
adjustment to the minimum wage, this may suggest why little immediate impact of wage changes 
can be found. That is, decisions on firm entry or exit are more likely to occur in the medium rather 
than the short term. The identification of this mechanism may also have implications for the 
relationship between the minimum wage and productivity. Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003) report 
that some 50 per cent of labour productivity growth, and 80-90 per cent of Total Factor Productivity, 
in manufacturing in the UK between 1980 and 1992 arose from external restructuring – exit, entry 
and changes in market share – with only the balance being driven by internal changes such as new 
technology and organisational change. If a key driver of productivity is the entry, exit and other forms 
of restructuring of firms, and the minimum wage impacts on the rate that these occur, it is possible 
that the minimum wage may affect productivity across the economy in part through this mechanism 
and hence will not be observable at the firm level. 
Machin, Manning and Rahman (2002) studied the introduction of the NMW in 1999 in the care home 
sector. In addition to finding that it resulted in a compression of earnings in the low part of the 
earnings distribution, there was some evidence of reduced employment and hours in the sector. The 
authors were however cautious about extrapolating this finding beyond the industry they studied. 
Georgiadis (2008) also looked at the impact on this sector and reports evidence of the minimum 
wage operating as an efficiency wage. Specifically this analysis found that the cost of the increases 
in the NMW were able to be offset by reduced levels of supervision. This effect was seen in changing 
proportions of people being employed as junior and senior care assistants. 
Wadsworth (2009) found that there was some evidence of firms passing on the cost of the minimum 
wage in the form of higher prices, although a simple pass through pricing model did not seem 
sufficient to describe the range and timing of changes. Metcalf (2007) identified five probable factors 
for there not being a marked employment response to the NMW. These were: some improved 
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investment in human capital; increasing prices of products; falling profits; changes in hours of work; 
and the effect of labour market frictions.  
Lanot and Sousounis (2011) reviewed the relationship between the NMW (defined as a proportion of 
the cohort specific median wage) unemployment and education. While not finding a single consistent 
relationship, the research found a negative association between the minimum wage and higher 
education and apprenticeship completions and a relatively small negative association between a 
higher minimum wage and employer provided training for workers aged 16 to 25 years.  It did not 
however find any relationship between the NMW and the rate of finishing secondary school. 
Crawford et al (2011) in looking at similar outcomes, while concluding that there was little evidence 
of significant effects, nevertheless cautioned that there was “some support for the notion that the 
minimum wage might be having a negative effect on young people’s education and labour market 
outcomes, particularly the likelihood of being in full-time education for men”. Looking more directly at 
work related training, and across age groups, Arulampalam, Booth and Bryan (2004) rejected the 
hypothesis that there were negative impacts on work related training resulting from the introduction 
of the NMW. Rather they find some evidence of significant positive effects of a 10 per cent increase 
in the probability of a person receiving training. Turning to the policy agenda they conclude “Finally, 
our estimates suggest that two of the UK government's goals - improving wages of the low-paid and 
developing their skills - have been compatible, at least for the introductory rates of the minimum 
wage.” (p C93) 
Swaffield (2012) finds some evidence of the NMW being institutionalised into the wage setting 
mechanism for low income earners. She finds that employers comply with the minimum wage even 
when it is raised more than might be otherwise expected, given other earnings growth. On the other 
hand she found evidence of employers “holding down or offsetting the wage growth that they might 
have awarded in periods of low minimum wage increases, possibly to compensate for future or past 
minimum wage upratings” (p21). This suggests that NMW decisions are to a degree simply a 
substitute for wage increases which otherwise would have occurred. It also adds evidence to the 
proposition that the timing of changes in the minimum wage and any market responses may not 
necessarily be closely aligned. 
5.2.5 New Zealand 
Maloney and Pacheco (2010) report a strong increase in minimum wage incidence rates in New 
Zealand between 2000 and 2008. Over this period they estimate that the proportion of the workforce 
on the minimum wage increased from around 3 per cent in the late 1990s to around 10 per cent in 
2008. In part this was a mechanical effect of the rising wage floor absorbing those who had 
previously been paid at rates above the minimum wage. They estimate that 2/3 of this ‘mechanical’ 
effect was offset by spill-over to rising wages across the wage distribution. A second labour market 
response they identified was a tendency for a minimum wage increase for one group to increase 
non-minimum wage employment of groups who are close substitutes. They find no evidence of job 
loss associated with the increase in the minimum wage. 
Two major changes in minimum wages for youth in New Zealand have been studied by Hyslop and 
Stillman. The first reforms occurred in the early 2000s which saw the adult minimum wage extended 
to 18 and 19 year olds, and a substantial but lesser increase in the rate of the minimum wage for 
those aged 16 and 17 years. While the results were sensitive to assumptions made in the analysis, 
with some suggestion of positive employment for groups and negative study and workforce 
participation, for others they concluded: "we find no consistent and robust evidence of any adverse 
effects of the changes on teenage employment”. (Hyslop and Stillman 2004 p 16). The second 
change, in 2008, effectively increased minimum wages for 16 and 17 year olds by 28 per cent. In this 
case Hyslop and Stillman (2011) again found no immediate impact of this on the employment of this 
age group. They did though identify a slight decline – of some 3 to 6 percentage points in the 
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employment rate – in the subsequent two years. This decline however appears to be quite large as a 
share of employment. The estimated fall of some 4,500 to 9,000 jobs identified in the study needs to 
be compared with the actual employment level for this age group of 39,500 in 2010. This decline did 
not impact on unemployment as the job loss was largely amongst those who were also engaged in 
education. 
Pacheco and Cruikshank (2007) found nuanced effects of the earlier large minimum wage increase 
for youth on school participation. While the initial introduction of the minimum wage had a positive 
effect on school enrolment by 16-19 year olds in NZ, subsequent increases had a negative effect.  
The first effect is interpreted by these researchers as the initial level of the minimum wage being 
below the reservation wage of these young people. In such a situation where the employment they 
sought was likely to be remunerated at the minimum wage, this would cause them to continue in 
education rather than accepting employment at a wage lower than the one they sought. The latter 
negative impact is consistent with more classical explanations of an incentive effect. 
5.2.6 Employment effects in other countries 
Skedinger (2011) reviewed the impact of minimum wages in the Swedish retail sector which is 
subject to a collectively bargained minimum wage. He found that, over the period 2001 to 2008, 
during which the real minimum wage rose by 25 per cent or more, there had been an increase in 
separations for those in receipt of the minimum wage, and evidence of substitution by more highly 
paid workers. The impact in terms of hours worked was mitigated by the lower average hours 
worked by those whose employment ceased. Previous research he undertook in the hotel and 
restaurant sector between 1979 and 1999 (Skedinger 2002) found negative employment outcomes 
associated with minimum wage increases. He also (Skedinger 2012) used the introduction by the 
Swedish government of a targeted cut in payroll taxes to consider the effective impact of the 
minimum wage on youth employment. While the overall magnitude of the cut was very small, he 
found a strong effect on the probability of entry into employment by young people affected by the 
minimum wage. In this case the 11 per cent reduction in the payroll tax increased the probability of 
job entry by 6-8 per cent. This he estimates is equal to an elasticity of net employment to wage costs 
of -0.57, suggesting that youth employment at the level of the minimum wage is highly sensitive to 
minimum wage increases. 
Lemieux (2011) considered the impact of the various State level minimum wages on youth in Canada 
using data from 1997 to 2010. For teenagers he found no spill-over effects from minimum wage 
increases to other workers and a disemployment effect, in particular for those aged 15 and 16 years. 
He found no discernible effect for young adults. Negative employment effects were found more 
widely by Campolieti Gunderson and Riddell (2006). They report “Minimum-wage increases in 
Canada have led to substantial adverse employment effects. The elasticities for youths (16–24) range 
from −0.17 to −0.44 with −0.30 being a reasonable point estimate.” 
Canada was also the focus of analysis by Strobl and Walsh (2011). They found, between 1981 and 
2004, that a higher minimum wage was associated with a fall in the teenage employment to 
population ratio and with an increase in poverty. This latter occurred because of the loss of teenage 
employment in low income families. Similar findings are also found by Sen, Rybczynski and Van De 
Waal (2011) who found that a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage was associated with a 3 to 
5 per cent drop in teenage employment and a 4 to 6 per cent increase in families with incomes below 
the Canadian Low Income Cut-Offs (LICO) – a measure frequently used in Canada as an income 
poverty line. 
Pinoli (2010) considered the impact of changes in the minimum wage in Spain. The analysis suggests 
that in some cases adjustment to new minimum wages is made in anticipation of change, and as a 
result is not wholly identified in studies that simply consider post increase changes. The modelling 
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suggests a 10 per cent increase in the minimum wage for a young adult will generate a fall of 4.7 per 
cent in the probability of employment prior to the change, and 6.7 per cent after. 
A negative impact of minimum wage increases on employment was also found in Portugal. Centeno 
Duarte and Novo (2012) report that for minimum wage and other low paid workers a one per cent 
increase in the minimum wage resulted in a reduction of 0.5 per cent in the likelihood of these 
workers remaining in employment. The effect was larger for those on the prevailing minimum wage, 
for those working in manufacturing relative to services and young people. The effect on successful 
job search was more severe than that on continuing employment. 
Using employer based surveys Nolan, Williams and Blackwell (2003) report little impact of minimum 
wage increases in Ireland on employment. One potential reason for this is that around three-quarters 
of firms were not employing people on the minimum wage, although this varied considerably across 
sectors. They report that only 5 to 7 per cent of firms said that they would be employing more staff in 
the absence of minimum wage legislation. 
As has been noted previously, while Germany does not have a centralised minimum wage, sectoral 
minimum wages are established through collective agreements. This has given rise to research in a 
range of fields, firstly the potential impact of introducing a national minimum wage, and secondly 
sectoral studies of changes in minimum wages within specific collective agreements. 
Müller and Steiner (2010) modelled the potential effect of the introduction of a €7.50 per hour 
minimum wage in Germany88. This suggested that such a minimum wage, taking into account 
immediate labour demand changes and the effect of price increases, would reduce labour demand 
by some 220,000 people with most of the impact being on marginally employed people. They find 
that at the household level the redistributive impact would be small.  
Aretz, Arntz and Gregory (2012) studied the impact of the large increases in the minimum wage in the 
roofing sector in Germany. In this research they found very marked effects, especially for firms in the 
former East Germany to whom the minimum wage was extended. These effects, measured in terms 
of a reduction in the probability of remaining in employment, were seen not just for the lowest paid 
employees who were directly affected by the minimum wage, but spilled over to other employees. In 
former West Germany the spill-over was largely limited to employees in the lower part of the wages 
distribution.  In former East Germany while most marked for the lower decile, they were recorded 
across the wages distribution. The authors suggest that these results were most probably due to 
capital-labour substitution induced by the higher wages. The magnitude of the minimum wage 
change this study focused on was large, as was the response.  For firms in the former East Germany 
the increase in the minimum wage was up to 57 per cent – and the fall in probability of remaining in 
employment up to 28 per cent. 
In a departure from much research on minimum wages which has tended to focus on groups such 
as teenagers and unskilled men, Addison and Ozturk (2011) consider the impact on prime age 
women. From their 16 country study which covers the period from 1970 to 2008 they find very strong 
and consistent disemployment effects. This study also suggests that institutional factors also impact 
differently on women with some of the better outcomes being associated with less regulated markets 
and an unfavourable impact from collectively bargained minimum wage. (As cited earlier the 2012 
study by Dickson, Riley and Wilkinson in the UK also found an impact on women.) 
Although less of an issue in Australia because of the extent low wages are largely co-determined 
along with the minimum wage, the question of the spill-over of increases in minimum wages to the 
                                                          
88 This level had been raised in political debate in Germany. It is a level well below the minimum contained in collective 
agreements in Germany and below that of some of the high minimum wage countries such as France where the SMIC is 
currently €9.22. 
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wages paid to other employees has been the subject of some investigation. Cette, Chouard and 
Verdugo (2012) report that around 20 to 30 per cent of discretionary increases in the French 
minimum wage are reflected in long term average earnings (p.10). Using a different strategy, but 
again looking at the French labour market, Aeberhardt, Givord and Marbot (2012) report significant 
spillover effects of increases in the minimum wage on the earnings distribution of both men and 
women up to the seventh earnings decile. However in the UK Stewart (2011) who looked at wage 
inequality in terms of the ratio of the 10th to 50th percentiles of earnings could not identify any spill 
over effect. 
5.2.7 The role of bargaining and other models 
The work of Addison and Ozturk cited above identified the role of institutional factors in the 
outcomes of changes in minimum wages. The range of different mechanisms for setting a minimum 
wage was examined by Boeri (2012). In a cross national analysis he focuses on the relative impact of 
government legislated minimum wages (such as the US, the Netherlands and New Zealand) and 
collective bargained minimum wages, with a group of countries, including Australia and the UK being 
classified as having intermediate ‘consultative’ arrangements. He finds that collective bargaining 
regimes result in a higher minimum wage relative to average earnings. This supports the argument 
that in such situations unions are willing to trade off higher earnings for potentially higher earning 
employees for a higher minimum wage – hence leading to a compression of the earnings distribution. 
Such a wage bargaining model was considered by Christofides and Oswald (1992) in examining 
wage setting in unionised sectors of the Canadian labour market. Their analysis suggested that a 
bargaining model effectively represented the operation of the labour market with real wages being an 
increasing function of previous profits in the employer's industry, and a decreasing function of the 
level of unemployment. Wage bargaining in these circumstances they considered could be seen as a 
form of rent-sharing.  
Boockmann reported in 2010 on a cross country meta-analysis of research on the employment 
effects of minimum wages and of the extent of labour market regulation. This latter included the level 
of employment protection, benefit replacement rates and the extent of wage bargaining 
coordination. Around half the studies were from the US with the balance covering some 14 other 
countries. The study reports that there is considerable heterogeneity between countries and that 
“Higher benefit replacement rates and union-employer bargaining coordination decrease the negative 
effects of the minimum wage, while stricter employment protection reinforces the negative 
employment effects.”(p. 13) 
Croucher and White (2011) undertook, for the UK Low Pay Commission, an extensive review of the 
international literature on the youth employment effects of the minimum wage. In this they conclude 
that while the employment effect appears to be relatively small, it should not be rejected as an 
adverse consequence of increases in the minimum wage. As with many other studies, they report 
that the effect is less severe where the minimum wage is a bargaining outcome. They also report 
potential negative consequences for young people are mitigated where there are other labour market 
interventions to support youth employment. 
The relative roles of different mechanisms in wage determination were more broadly considered by 
Cahuc, Postel-Vinay and Robin (2006). Using French labour market data they suggest that 
competition, especially alternative employment offers from other firms, are the main driving factor in 
wages, although there was also evidence of bargaining. This though was unevenly distributed with 
the wage bargaining power of low skilled employees generally being low.  
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5.2.8 Low paid jobs as a stepping stone 
The role of low paid employment as a ‘stepping stone’ into better paid work is frequently an issue in 
the debate about the role of the minimum wage. Theoretically a number of processes can be 
envisaged. Low paid employment may provide individuals with the opportunity to develop skills, both 
specific technical skills and those which are important to employability such as attitudes to work. It 
can also be seen as a means by which people can gain ‘credentials’ and demonstrate this capacity 
to other employers. Under these circumstances it can be argued that an important objective for 
minimum wage setting is to maximise the opportunities for the creation of these types of jobs. 
Conversely it has been suggested that a period of minimum wage employment may have more 
negative implications – such as signalling to other employers that the person lacks the capacity to 
perform at more productive levels, and indeed as a result it can trap them into ongoing low wage 
employment.   
Support for the concept of low paid work as a positive ‘stepping stone’ has been found in the 
German labour market by Knabe and Plum (2010) and Mosthaf (2011). Both studies find that for 
those without a college degree obtaining a low paid job was an effective pathway to higher paid 
employment. A related study (Mosthaf, Schank and Schnabel 2009) found that while being in a low 
paid job increases the likelihood of a woman remaining in low paid employment, relative to high paid 
employment, the future earnings prospects of low paid women were better than that of the 
unemployed, and for some it can act as a stepping stone. 
A wider, cross national review of the role of low wage jobs as a stepping stone was undertaken by 
Richardson and Miller-Lewis in 2002. This study emphasised the heterogeneity of the population of 
low paid workers. While recognising that low-wage jobs acted as a stepping stone for many, the 
authors argued that more deliberate policy interventions, in particular education and training, were 
important to help many who would otherwise remain in low paid employment. They also suggest that 
there is a need for some firms to rethink job quality and to move away from low wage, low training 
and high turnover strategies. 
A more negative finding comes from Stewart (2007). In analysis of the British Household Panel 
Survey between 1991 and 1996 he finds that there is a high probability of moving from low paid 
employment to unemployment and concludes “in terms of future employment prospects, low paid 
jobs are closer to unemployment than to higher-paid jobs” (ibid p529). He suggests that the reason 
for this is that low paid jobs do not provide the opportunity for individuals to improve their human 
capital. 
In Australia McGuinness and Freebairn (2007) report from analysis of HILDA data, up to 2004, “For 
about a half of low paid employees, a low paid job, especially if it is full-time, is a stepping stone to a 
higher paying job in the future.”(ibid p81)  The question of low paid employment as a stepping stone 
in Australia has also been considered in a series of projects undertaken by the Melbourne Institute. 
In a synthesis of this research (Melbourne Institute 2011) reports: “All studies find that the stepping 
stone theory holds. That is, being on low pay, in casual employment, or in part-time employment is a 
better starting point for obtaining a higher-paid, permanent or full-time job than the alternative of not 
being in employment at all.” The report cautions though that these beneficial results were not 
universal and indeed a substantial group fail to exit from low paid work. Research by Butterworth et 
al (2011) introduces a further cautionary note. It finds that poor quality jobs – as defined by those 
with poor psychosocial attributes – were no better, and in some cases had even more adverse 
effects on mental health, than unemployment (Butterworth et al. 2011). 
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5.2.9 Minimum wages and in work benefits 
An increasing segment of the literature is now concerned with the interactions between minimum 
wages and in work benefits89. This reflects the increasing use of in work benefits in a number of 
countries to increase the incomes of those on low earnings, especially families with children, and to 
improve work incentives especially correcting distortions introduced by means testing income 
support. As such these programs have some similar goals to those of the minimum wage. In 
particular they can be used in association with minimum wages to target policies and as such relieve 
the burden on the minimum wage as an instrument to achieve improved living standards for those 
with low incomes, something which, as has been seen earlier, it does highly inefficiently.  
In work benefits can be delivered as employment conditional transfer payments or tax credits. The 
objectives of these policies are usually described as being ‘to make work pay’. As such they tend to 
have two functions. In some cases it is to make the return from work ‘worthwhile’ relative to the 
income people may receive from welfare payments, especially where these payments are rapidly 
withdrawn in the face of private income. In other cases the role is more of an absolute – of 
generating an adequate income from employment where earnings are insufficient to achieve this.  In 
some cases they are specific payments conditional on employment, in others they operate more as 
an extension of welfare payments. Australian support for families fits more into this latter category. 
Some 11 OECD countries provide what can be considered to be general in work payments or related 
tax credits90. In some cases these provide benefits to all people, in others provision is limited to 
families with children only (Immervoll and Pearson 2009). While these policies are designed in many 
different ways a particular feature of in work benefits in the UK, New Zealand and Ireland is that they 
feature a minimum number of hours of work. This type of targeted in work benefit can however be 
complex to administer and by their very design they can involve high effective marginal tax rates at 
some point. Indeed these reasons have been cited as part of the rationale for the proposed 
                                                          
89 While an emerging field in current policy and research, the historical roots of these types of policies are very deep. An often 
cited early case of in work benefits or wage subsidies was the Speenhamland poor laws. These operated in England between 
1795 and 1834 as part of the old poor laws.  Under this provision poor, mainly, agricultural workers were eligible for poor law 
relief as a top up to earnings. These policies have been subject to various interpretations over time. The 1832 Royal 
Commission to Investigate the Poor Laws (Senior and Chadwick 1834) reported considerable discontent with the “pressure of 
the evils which allowance to the able-bodied has produced, and by the apprehension of the still greater evils which it may be 
expected to produce”. It reported that this provision led to employers reducing wages and offering irregular rather than full-
time employment and that “The labourer feels that the existing system, though it generally gives him low wages, always gives 
him easy work. It gives him also, strange as it may appear, what he values more, a sort of independence. He need not bestir 
himself to seek work; he need not study to please his master; he need not put any restraint upon his temper”. Indeed they 
conclude that “The History of the Poor Laws abounds with instances of a legislation which has been worse than unsuccessful, 
which has not merely failed in effecting its purposes, but has been active in producing effects which were directly opposed to 
them, has created whatever it was intended to prevent, and fostered whatever it was intended to discourage.” On this basis 
they recommended an abolition of the relief component – recommending instead that relief be by means of the establishment 
of workhouses. 
Polanyi (1944) saw the Speenhamland laws as being the major factor in the prevention of the development of an effective 
labour market during the industrial revolution. He states with regard to the abolition of these provisions: “Out of the horrors of 
Speenhamland men rushed blindly for the shelter of a utopian market economy” (p107). More recent analysis, much of which 
has drawn upon the extensive data collected by the Royal Commission but not fully used in its own work, has questioned 
these earlier approaches. Blaugh (1963 p170) views it as a mechanism which operated to address a problem of structural 
unemployment with areas taking “recourse to the policy of subsidizing wages wherever the attraction of urban industry made 
itself felt too weakly, leaving a pool of surplus manpower and substandard wages”. Boyer suggests it was effectively used by 
cropping farmers as a form of unemployment benefits so as to maintain a labour force sufficient for their seasonal needs. 
(Boyer 1986)  
Notwithstanding these latter interpretations in much contemporary debate the Speenhamland laws are presented as evidence 
of welfare based wage supplements driving down wages, or as evidence of unintended consequences of well-intentioned 
policies and of cross subsidies between sectors. 
90 The OECD identifies 16 countries with some form of in work benefit. In some of these cases however the payments are only 
transitional for people exiting unemployment benefit receipt or involve a diminution of social security charges – effectively a 
wage subsidy. 
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introduction of ‘Universal Credit’ in the UK as a replacement for the working families’ tax credit. 91. 
Notwithstanding these negatives, this type of approach has particular relevance to situations where 
tax credits are seen as essentially complementing minimum wage policy. This is because the hours 
provision of the criteria enables the payment to be targeted to those who have low earnings despite 
a substantial level of work effort, that is because of a low rate of pay, rather than flowing to those 
who may earn a substantially higher hourly rate but for a much lower work effort. 
The relevance of these tools was recognised in the 1998 OECD Employment Outlook which called 
for countries to consider integrated approaches which combined both minimum wages and in work 
benefits. They argue that: “a well-designed policy package of economic measures, with an 
appropriately set minimum wage in tandem with in-work benefits, is likely, on balance, to be 
beneficial in moving towards an employment-centered social policy” (OECD 1998 p. x).  
International literature 
Burkhauser, Couch and Glenn (1995) argue that, given the extent to which a considerable proportion 
of minimum wage increases flow to non-poor households and the potential negative impact on 
employment, although “Both the minimum wage and the EITC provide the working poor with higher 
effective wages … the minimum wage is a far more costly method of shifting income to the working 
poor” (p. 41). Balanced against this however is the extent to which a lower minimum wage 
associated with an Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) may result in a reduced incentive for employers 
to invest in boosting the skills and productivity of minimum wage employees. 
Kenworthy (2011) also advocates an EITC to address the problem of low-wage employment. He 
considers that the historical capacity of the US economy to deliver wages growth at the bottom in 
the post war period was a result of limited product market competition, low shareholder pressure for 
short term profits, and the ability of unions to bargain over the gains this produced. He considers all 
of these institutional components have withered and that while some gains may be made in 
improved education, high performance work organisation and ‘shared capitalism’, substantial gains 
will require an expansion of the EITC as a redistributive mechanism which encourages employment 
while boosting incomes. 
This same question is considered, from the supply side, by Malul and Luski (2009). Their analysis 
indicates that an EITC can impact differently on different groups. Firstly for people with a high cost of 
acquiring human capital and a short horizon of earnings, who would face reduced employment 
prospects from a higher minimum wage, it acts to boost the level of employment and earnings. On 
the other hand it tends to discourage those with a low cost of acquiring human capital and a long 
horizon of earnings from making the additional investment in training – something this group would 
do if the minimum wage was increased. They suggest the two approaches could most effectively be 
used if they could be targeted at different groups. 
                                                          
91 Notwithstanding the apparent positive outcomes that have been reported for the policy, the United Kingdom Government 
has announced its intention to replace the program with a new ‘Universal Credit’. While this will continue to operate as in work 
benefit it brings together both the means testing of income support payments and tax credits so as to generate a smoother 
taper – removing the specific incentives to work more than 16 hours and more than 30 hours. It is argued that the program will 
produce better outcomes for many lower income households and improve the returns for employment for those on the lowest 
incomes and for primary breadwinners. It will also though generate much stronger incentives for people to work a very small 
number of hours, and reduce the incentive for second earners to participate in employment. As a whole the package has more 
negative outcomes for lone parents. It is also being accompanied by an extended regime of conditionality which will, for a 
single minimum wage worker, continue until they are working 35 hours a week. This may tend to reduce the impact of lowered 
incentives, and boost the effect of increased financial effects for others. (Department of Work and Pensions 2012, Brewer, 
Browne and Jin 2012) In effect these changes shift the role of incentives from ones specifically tailored to encourage 
substantial levels of participation (either 16 or 30 hours) to a regime which is more neutral to the hours worked. It is posited 
that the higher incentives to take up jobs ‘’at a low number of hours per week” will act as a stepping stone into the workforce. 
(DWP 2012 p21) 
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Neumark and Wascher (2011) have also addressed the differences in the impact of the minimum 
wage and the EITC in the US for different population groups. The analysis found some substantial 
differences. For single women with children, the EITC boosts employment and earnings, and when 
combined with a higher minimum wage, these positive effects are enhanced. In contrast the 
employment and earnings of less-skilled minority men and for women without children are more 
adversely affected by the EITC when this is coupled with a higher minimum wage. The authors 
conclude that the finding emphasises the importance of understanding the institutional and policy 
framework in which a minimum wage operates. 
Lee and Saez (2010) undertake a theoretical analysis of optimal wage and tax policies in a 
competitive labour market. They conclude that where the goal is to increase the number employed 
(the extensive margin) that policies which effectively reduce the tax on this employment – either 
through an EITC or by reducing payroll taxes are welfare improving, even when funded by higher 
taxes on others.   
Mortensen and Pissarides (2001) conclude from modelling using a search and matching equilibrium 
model, with some caveats, that “an employment subsidy targeted at low-skill workers but financed 
by a wage tax on high wage workers, a policy equivalent to an ‘earned income tax credit’ in our 
framework, can induce increases in the employment and wage of low-skill workers with little increase 
in the unemployment rate of high wage workers”. (p 27) 
Immervoll and Pearson (2009) focus on how the two policies, and potentially wage subsidies 
directed at employers, can effectively be combined with the goal of obtaining “additional policy 
leverage to tackle the dual challenge of high rates of non-employment and in-work poverty.” They 
specifically argue “the case for a minimum wage becomes stronger when IWBs [In Work Benefits] are 
in place … a minimum wage improves the targeting of IWBs. By preventing wage levels at the bottom 
from falling, they prevent employers from ‘pocketing’ the value of IWBs by lowering wages” (p 39).   
Marx, Marchal and Nolan (2012) also undertake a cross country analysis of the net income of 
minimum wage earners in the European Union and the US. This research finds, as with other studies 
that the role of minimum wages as an anti-poverty measure is 'inherently constrained”. They 
emphasise however the importance of maintaining some type of minimum wage as a benchmark 
floor for the wages system in order to avoid potential erosion effects on wages from in work benefits. 
As policy strategies they suggest negative income taxes or some form of in work benefits, including 
child benefits, but warn that it is “unlikely that optimal one-size fits all solutions exist” (p21). 
While the US EITC is often seen as an example of the type of measure which could be used to 
deliver an earnings supplement to a low minimum wage, it should be noted that the evidence of its 
role over a long period is more limited. Dowd and Horowitz (2011) report that 60 per cent of 
recipients were on the program for only one or two years and just 20 per cent for more than five 
years. One reason for this finding was relatively high levels of earnings mobility. The authors report 
that this effect may be reducing and note those on low incomes who entered into the program in 
1990 were less likely to move up the earnings distribution. 
In reviewing the broader role of in work benefits, including parental leave and childcare benefits, 
Kolm and Tonin (2012), in somewhat of a departure from other research, focus on the benefits which 
might be achieved as a consequence of in work benefits moderating wage demands. These they 
report include lower unemployment and higher job creation. They also suggest as lower wage 
demands will boost overall labour demand, to the extent some of this will also involve higher demand 
for skilled labour, the net impact on training would be positive. 92 
                                                          
92  In a cross national study mainly concerned with the balance of growth in wages and productivity Meager and Speckesser 
(2011) found weak evidence of this relationship and suggested that wage moderation may increase employment in the 
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In summary this literature suggests that there is a strong case for using both in work benefits such as 
an earned income tax credit in association with a binding minimum wage. Such a combination of 
instruments can allow increases in disposable income to be achieved by low earning households 
without putting pressure on labour demand, and permits a degree of targeting of these gains to low 
income households, rather than to all low earning rate individuals.93 
5.2.10 In work benefits in Australia 
As demonstrated earlier, some aspects of Australia’s income support and family assistance systems 
effectively operate as in work benefits. Sometimes this is a consequence of deliberate design, and 
sometimes as result of other program priorities such as lower tapers. It is however rare for the 
decisions on these to have been taken as part of a deliberative policy also encompassing minimum 
wage policy. 
The explicit use of in work benefits in such a case was central to the ‘Five economists plan’ put 
forward by Dawkins, Freebairn, Garnaut, Keating and Richardson in 199894 (Dawkins 2002) as an 
alternative to ‘living wage adjustments’ as part of the Safety Net Reviews. Specifically the plan 
suggested suspending living wage adjustments (which encompassed the minimum wage as well as 
other minimum award rates) for some four years and the introduction of a tax credit targeted at low 
income earners in low income households. It was initially estimated that this may increase 
employment by 2.5 to 3 per cent and reduce the unemployment rate by 1.25 to 1.5 percentage 
points. (Later estimates reduced these impacts, bringing the unemployment rate reduction down to 
1.0 to 1.25 percentage points.)  
The McClure Review (2000) also specifically considered the options related to the minimum wage in 
the context of policies to boost workforce participation in Australia. Taking into account the potential 
negative employment effects of increasing the minimum wage, as well as the inefficiency of this as a 
means of boosting the incomes of low income households, the Committee’s preferred approach was 
the development of in-work benefits. They saw these as a means to “increase the employment 
opportunities for people on income support payments” and this strategy “may have the advantage of 
taking the pressure of the wages system by ensuring adequate income for low skilled full-time 
employees and their families” (ibid p26). The Committee also rejected strategies associated with 
lowering the level of income support as a means of generating stronger employment incentives. 
Dawkins (2001) reiterating the theme of the five economists, as well as the findings of the McClure 
Report, considered the potential role of a low pay commission in Australia as a means of setting the 
minimum wage. Specifically he considered that traditional Australian industrial relations institutions 
were not necessarily well suited to the task, given their adversarial nature and tendency to consider 
wages in isolation from the tax transfer system. At the same time, while recognising the limitation of 
the minimum wage as a means of increasing incomes of low income households, and the potential 
negative employment effect, he emphasised a need to maintain a minimum wage. His reasons for 
this position was the potential for employers to exploit workers with poor bargaining power and, in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
medium to long term. At the same time their research suggested that the relationship was not simple and did not hold 
consistently over time and over countries. One reason suggested for this was that excessive wage moderation may reduce 
innovation activity 
93 It is to be emphasised that the interaction of an EITC and a binding, externally set, minimum wage is potentially quite 
different to that between and EITC and low wages where the latter are simply determined by the market. Leigh (2010) for 
example reports that “10 percent rise in the generosity of the credit reduces hourly wages for high school dropouts by 5 per 
cent, and reduces wages for those with only a high school diploma by 2 per cent” (p 33) 
94 The plan was presented to the Prime Minister as an open letter. Its objective was to propose a set of coordinated policies to 
reduce the level of unemployment to 5 per cent. At the time it was prepared, while unemployment had fallen from peaks as 
high as 11 per cent in 1992 and 1993, the rate of decrease had stalled and it appeared to be settling around 8 per cent. The 
actual goal of 5 per cent which they proposed was not achieved until 2005. 
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the event of the development of any in work benefits, to avoid the inappropriate transfer of wage 
costs from employers to government. 
A potential role for earned income tax credits was also discussed in the consideration of the 
Australia’s Future Tax System (AFTS) Review (Henry 2009). A focus was on the potential of an in 
work benefit to be used as an alternative to relying upon taper rates in the income support system.  
As has been discussed previously, a feature of the Australian income support system is the degree 
to which some minimum wage employees (and potentially others) can retain some portion of their 
income support even with quite substantial employment. In reviewing these instruments the AFTS 
reported that while they considered the use of tapers or EITCs made no difference to the incentives, 
which mechanism was used could be important in areas such as “signalling effects (such as the 
weight given to work)” (p 498). An EITC was also seen as having the advantage of potentially tailoring 
the nature of incentives to groups. One strategy the review contemplated was to introduce a benefit 
structure where “a 100 per cent withdrawal rate could be applied and earned income tax credits 
could be used to achieve a desired pattern of effective marginal tax rates. For example, single parents 
could be given a different set of work incentives compared to single people without children.” (ibid 
p527) 
Taking this further, three specific advantages of an EITC over the use of benefit tapers can be 
suggested. Firstly it provides a clear demarcation between support for those unable to obtain work, 
and for those who have found a degree of self-sufficiency. Not only is this potentially an important 
‘signal’, but in moving people off ‘non-work’ benefits it means that regression to full reliance would 
involve a need to reapply for the benefit – rather than just ‘slipping back’ onto full payment. 
Secondly, as an EITC focused on work, rather than simply as a way of means testing, there is greater 
flexibility in introducing additional targeting into the EITC, for example, requiring minimum hours of 
work for receipt. Thirdly it allows for the sort of tailoring identified by the AFTS for particular groups. 
In considering the options for the introduction of an EITC in Australia Ingles (2001) comes to 
relatively equivocal findings. In large part this is because of the extent to which family payments in 
Australia already play an important role in providing income supplementation to low income families 
with children. More generally he emphasised the need for any potential policy steps in this direction 
to be well integrated with other elements of the tax-transfer system. 
A more critical view of the role of wage subsidies is given by Watson (1999) “Irrespective of the final 
level of family income, the message which very low paid work sends to the worker is that they are not 
worth much in the eyes of society. If they can only survive by virtue of a government ‘top up’, their 
sense of independence is also compromised.” (p 15) A similar approach is taken by Briggs, 
Buchanan and Watson (2006) in a Policy Paper for the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. 
This suggested an approach of strong government intervention to control both bottom and top 
wages – through a high minimum wage and high taxation of top earners, as well as stronger sector 
based collective bargaining. 
As noted, one of the difficulties that can arise from an EITC which is directed at supporting 
substantial labour market participation by those on low incomes, is that it can treat those working 
low hours on high rates as being the equivalent of those who work substantial periods on low wage 
rates. An alternative way of addressing this is through a differentiated tax regime for full and part-
time workers such as that which has been suggested by Belchamber (2011). This would see part-
time workers taxed at a rate of 15 per cent on all earnings up to $32,000 at which point they would 
then move onto the full-time workers’ scale (which would have a $32,000 tax free threshold). 
A final issue, raised by O’Donnell and Arup (2001) is that of the relationship between income support 
and employment from a legal perspective. They suggest that as the legal nature of employment has 
taken an extending variety of forms, the work-welfare divide requires reconfiguration.  
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5.3 The theory and evidence 
While the breadth of the theory and evidence on the minimum wage in many ways appears to be 
contradictory, as argued here, this in not necessarily the case. Rather, as noted by Cahuc, it is far 
better to conceive of the various theories as being complementary and necessary components of an 
explanation of the complex set of interrelationships which exist in labour markets. As such, the force 
of particular theories will depend very much on specific circumstances and institutions. Given this, it 
is not surprising that there is a diversity of findings in empirical analysis. That is, rather than 
identifying conflicting processes, the diversity of findings is better seen as illustrating the ways in 
which these different mechanisms are operating in different contexts. The contradictions arise when 
it is assumed that a single one of the theories wholly explains all labour markets under all 
circumstances and without bounds.  
Taking this into account it can be reasonably suggested that: 
• To the extent labour markets are competitive, and in the long run, the underlying mechanisms of 
price, supply and demand operate. That is, an increase in the minimum wage is likely to result in 
a decrease in demand for labour; 
– The impact of this may however be manifest over time, including changes in labour demand 
as a result of firm entry and exit and in the reshaping of productive processes, rather than 
simply reflected in short-term employment levels. 
• Given the many imperfections of the markets, interventions such as a statutory minimum wage 
may result in improved employment outcomes, especially in the short to medium term. This 
essentially involves setting the minimum wage at the equilibrium which would be derived from 
the market; 
– Even in the longer run search and other frictions are likely to remain. Again the role of a 
minimum wage in responding to these is bounded. 
– There are also deliberate distortions that may be introduced. These include wage bargaining 
which trade off the potential higher earnings of some groups, to increase the wages of 
others, or industry protection and related policies which again are based on transfers from 
one group to another95. The stability of these, and the costs they impose, may or may not be 
sustainable over time. 
– A minimum wage is also an important component of interaction between the labour market 
and the tax and transfer systems. Specific roles include ensuring that any in work assistance 
is not taken by employers through lowering wages and the minimum wage needs to be set 
so as to allow the payment of adequate levels of income support. 
• A higher minimum wage is also sustainable with an increase in the productive capacity of those 
who receive it. While there is some evidence of an association between higher minimum wages 
and training, important issues remain unresolved. Critical is the question of the capacity of all 
individuals to develop, even with training, sufficient levels of productive capacity to justify higher 
wages.   
Also, potentially critical to more recent waves of research, is the extent to which specific research 
results are a consequence of the particular characteristics of the labour market and economies at a 
                                                          
95 Typically tariff protection requires consumers to pay higher prices for products from protected sectors, while subsidies 
involve transfers from one group in the population to another. 
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point in time. Over the past few decades most advanced western economies have experienced 
considerable structural change. Unemployment, and in particular youth unemployment, has been 
well above that of the post war decades; there have been considerable shifts in the participation of 
women, especially married women; and the expansion of education has generated a new workforce 
of students seeking part-time employment. These are circumstances which permit considerable 
sorting in employment and may also obscure the operation of other processes.   
Industry structure has also changed. Manufacturing96, a sector which in some countries was a 
bastion of minimum wage employment, has shrunk in relative terms as a source of employment in 
most countries, and in absolute terms in many. ‘New’ minimum wage sectors such as fast foods 
have developed particular forms of labour demand – frequently part-time and often with an 
orientation to youth. Many countries have also seen profound changes in the nature of labour market 
institutions and regulation including declining levels of unionisation and the emergence of flexible 
employment arrangements. 
Each of these, along with many other changes, are likely to have had their own impact on the 
response of the market to changes in the minimum wage, as will changes in the future.  
                                                          
96 Australia has quite high levels of minimum wage employment in occupations such as ‘factory process workers’ and in total 
around 11.7 per cent of minimum wage employees are in this sector. In the US the rate of minimum wage employment in 
manufacturing is only one third of the overall average, in the UK in the manufacturing sector minimum wage employment 
appears to be mainly limited to food processing and textiles. 
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6 AUSTRALIAN FUTURES 
This final section is concerned with the future role of the minimum wage. The circumstances of the 
past 25 years are unlikely to be repeated in the next 25 years, and the challenges faced by the 
economy and society will be very different. In particular the minimum wage of today has undergone a 
major transformation in its role in comparison with that which it played 25 to 30 years ago. In broad 
terms the minimum wage has shifted from being a family wage to become a wage for a single 
person. The support for families in receipt of this level of earnings has been taken by the state, and 
by changing patterns in family workforce participation. 
This is a transformation which has been possible because of the specific nature of the Australian 
Minimum Wage and its historical roots. It is also a transformation which may be considered to have 
occurred with minimal adverse outcomes, and as an evolutionary process without clear intent. It is 
however a transformation which has largely run its course, and in the future much more attention 
may be needed to be given to what the minimum wage is seeking to achieve, the costs and benefits 
of this, and the alternatives that are available. 
If the minimum wage continues to simply be maintained in real terms, and in the absence of other 
changes,  as productivity gains are made in other sections of the workforce, and as the workforce is 
increasingly composed of more skilled and educated workers, an escalation of earnings inequality is 
probable. Further such a static minimum wage rate may impose a dilemma for setting the rates of 
income support. Either these will also need to be held down, again risking increased inequality or, if 
they are increased, this may reduce returns for employment for the unemployed and others, and 
hence their incentives to gain employment. This latter is an outcome which is likely to thwart the 
objectives of a high participation agenda. 
This agenda will also be severely challenged if the minimum wage increases without a substantive 
increase in the productivity of people employed at this level. It is unclear to what extent such gains 
can be achieved, especially in the context of changing industry structures, and the limited impact of 
decades of investment in labour market initiatives. 
These are not decisions that need to be taken in the short term, nevertheless there is a strong case 
for the development of, if not a guiding strategy, at least a common understanding of the choices 
which will need to be made over time. 
6.1 Evolving role of the minimum wage  
As documented in earlier sections, the role of the Australian minimum wage has evolved 
considerably since the Harvester decision of 1907. Most significant has been the change in the role 
of the wage from being a ‘family wage’ to that for an individual. 
This transition, which was particularly marked in the period between the mid-1980s and 2008, was 
effectively achieved by holding the real value of the wage constant, as living standards rose. The 
substantial increases in the level of support provided to families through the tax and the transfer 
system has meant that the living standards of those families reliant upon the minimum wage as their 
sole source of earnings increased markedly, reflecting gains across the community as a whole. 
While the living standards of single persons reliant upon the minimum wage have increased a little 
over the same period, they have slipped relative to a couple with children on the same earnings. This 
is the nature of the realignment.  
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From a labour costs perspective the real minimum wage has increased only slowly if at all97. This 
means that to the extent there are disemployment effects of a minimum wage, such pressures have 
not been great. On the other hand this trend has meant that the minimum wage has tended to fall 
behind other earnings and indeed there is evidence, even amongst lower paid workers, of an 
earnings decompression relative to the floor imposed by the minimum wage. 
Notwithstanding these changes, the Australian minimum wage remains one of the highest across all 
developed nations, and it can be argued that while rates of unemployment and labour market 
disengagement are high amongst some groups, Australia has not experienced the same degree of 
labour market polarisation and disadvantage faced by other countries.98 
6.2 Pathways for the future of the minimum wage 
It is probable that we have reached a point where this transition has effectively worked its way 
through and choices need to be made.  Three major pathways can be identified:  
• A minimum wage which, as with the Australian minimum wage over recent decades, is held flat 
in real terms 
• Increasing the minimum wage broadly in line with wages and productivity gains more generally 
across the community; or 
• Maintaining the minimum wage as with the first pathway, but seeking to top up the incomes of 
low income workers to ensure that their living standards do not drop relative to others in the 
community. 
The first of these, while minimising pressures on the labour market, brings with it questions of the 
impact of such a policy on inequality and income distribution. These impacts arise from the failure of 
such a minimum wage to reflect overall improvements in living standards, and the degree to which it 
may impose a ‘cap’ on the extent to which income support payments can be paid. 
The second pathway essentially requires that the individual productivity of minimum wage 
employees grows at rates consistent with that of the rest of the workforce. If this is not achieved 
then increases in the minimum wage are likely to be at a cost to employment for unskilled low wage 
workers. 
The third requires the introduction of alternative mechanisms, such as an earned income tax credit, 
by which income top ups can be provided to those with low incomes. Traditionally in Australia this 
has only been undertaken for families with children. It also represents a potential shift in perceptions 
about the role of employment. 
                                                          
97Although the cost of employing a minimum wage worker has moved more substantially due to the introduction/extension of 
the Superannuation Guarantee this in large part has not changed relativities between different groups of employees. 
98 A much more pessimistic reading of the current situation is given by Frijters and Gregory (2006). This argues that the effect 
of economic restructuring and technological change is such that there has been a “massive shock to the distribution of 
marginal productivity over the population that has made many individuals unemployable at the current wage floor” (ibid p214).  
and that: “At the bottom end of the labour market, marginal productivities dropped fast so that now over a million Australians 
are effectively receiving some form of long term government income support. ... The change in institutions following these 
shifts in marginal productivities has been slow in coming, but now seems inevitable. In the coming years it appears that 
Australia is on a trajectory of reduced minimum wages, harsher access regimes for income support , more decentralised labour 
negotiations and changes in marginal taxation and benefit withdrawal rates” (ibid p222).  
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6.2.1 Should there be a minimum wage at all 
Of course some would consider that a fourth pathway exists – that of abolishing the minimum wage 
and allowing all wages to be simply set by the market. There are a number of strong grounds for 
rejecting this and to consider that a substantive binding minimum wage should be maintained as part 
of a coherent set of economic and social policies. 
• It provides protection against exploitation for particularly vulnerable groups in the community, 
especially those with very poor bargaining power and information asymmetries, including 
barriers such as poor English language skills. 
• When set at or below the market equilibrium it can have positive impacts on employment in the 
face of the presence of monopsonies. 
• A minimum wage provides an important benchmark in the setting of rates of income support. 
(That is, in the absence of a minimum wage there is no ‘floor’ to the wages and hence any 
potential rate at which income support is provided may be higher than wages.) 
• To the extent in work benefits are provided by government it controls the ability of employers to 
exploit these by cutting wages. 
6.3 National priority objectives 
Choices about the nature and level of the minimum wage and the trade-offs implicit in these are 
complex and need to be guided by priorities and aspirations. There are many different values which 
individuals will bring to such decision making and many of these are deeply contested.  At the same 
time some aspects of a consensus on some aspects of an Australian national agenda for economic 
development have emerged. These are used here to establish a framework to consider the options. 
6.3.1 A participation agenda 
A core strategy of both the current Australian Government and its predecessor has been a 
‘participation and productivity agenda’99. 
This approach was described by Peter Costello when Treasurer, as “we need to ensure that people 
are able to work to their full potential. We do this through improvements to participation and 
productivity. ... We have put in place policies that are delivering improvements now, and will continue 
to do so for many years to come.  With record low unemployment rates, the challenge is to reduce 
barriers to participation and help people rejoin the workforce where possible.” (Costello 2007)   
Similar themes were emphasised by the current Prime Minister Julia Gillard “We must do the hard 
work of building an economy with higher productivity growth and higher workforce participation - the 
long-term drivers of future prosperity. ... Equally important is the need to maximise participation in the 
workforce. A high-participation economy will sustain stronger growth, stronger public finances, and 
will better support the pressures on services caused by an ageing population. A high-participation 
economy will sustain hope and purpose in individual Australians and gives security and choices to 
their families.” (Gillard 2010) 
                                                          
99 At various times the policy has also been articulated as ‘population, participation and productivity’, although there has been 
less consensus on the population component. Further, while the objectives of the agenda have been similar, the priorities 
within it, and strategies for pursuing it have varied. This is particularly marked with regard to education which has played a 
much more significant role under the current government. 
 98 
 
The development of the participation agenda has many motivations. These include: the impact of 
demographic change; addressing welfare dependency and promoting social inclusion; and concerns 
about longer term economic growth, including the impact of a resurgent resources sector.  
The publication over the past decade of regular ‘Intergenerational Reports’ (IGR) as a means of 
looking at budgetary and other pressures in the medium to long term has contributed to a growing 
awareness of the impact of demographic shifts on the Australian workforce. One aspect of this is the 
size of the workforce relative to the population. The 2010 IGR (Australian Government 2010) reports 
that the ratio of people aged over 65 years to the population of ‘working age’ (15-64 years), which 
was some 12 per cent in 1970, and 20 per cent in 2010, is projected to increase to some 37.6 per 
cent in 2050. Further, while there has been a growth in female workforce participation since the 
1970s, this has been somewhat offset until the early 2000s100 by a fall in male participation. Even to 
the extent this has resulted in higher workforce participation and hence total labour supply, it has 
been partially offset by a fall in average hours of work. The IGR suggests this latter will continue as it 
is anticipated that much of the increased participation will be by women with family responsibilities 
and older workers. Both these groups have a relatively high propensity to work on a part-time basis.  
A consequence of all of these factors is a growing fiscal gap. That is, expenditures, in many cases 
associated with the health and other needs of older Australians, are projected to grow more rapidly 
than the revenue which would be derived from existing taxation structures. These are pressures 
which would be significantly addressed by higher levels of workforce participation and productivity 
growth. 
The second pressure cited by these policies is a need to respond to the increase in ‘welfare 
dependence’. From the mid-1960s to mid-1980s the proportion of the population aged 15 to 64 
years in receipt of transfer payments increased steadily from 5.8 per cent in 1964, to 21.1 per cent in 
1984. After a brief decline at the end of the 1980s, it then further increased to reach a peak of 24.9 
per cent in 1996. Although it has declined since it remains high.  
While some of this growth in receipt of income support reflects deliberate policies which have 
extended support to groups in need who had previously been ignored, and demographic change, 
these do not fully account for the phenomena. This has given rise to considerable concern as to the 
extent of welfare dependency including the possibility that this may be driven by the receipt of 
income support becoming perceived as a substitute for participating in the workforce. It has also 
resulted in a flow of policies seeking to address this. The rationale for these was stated in the Report 
of the Reference Group on Welfare Reform as “Australia’s social support system must do more than 
provide adequate levels of income support for people in need. It must ensure that people are actively 
engaged socially and economically, including in the labour force, to reduce the risk of long term 
social and economic disadvantage for themselves and their families” (McClure 2000 p 3). This 
recognition of the role of employment in generating social inclusion is also reflected, as noted 
previously, in the legislation under which the Australian minimum wage is determined. A recent 
literature review for Fair Work Australia summarises the pathways between employment and social 
inclusion as “paid work could be seen as promoting social inclusion by its impact on: a person’s 
resources (such as income, access to goods, services and credit, or human capital); a person’s social 
networks and support; and a person’s mental and/or physical health.” (Nelms and Tsingas 2010 p14). 
The third ground is ongoing need for labour, and in particular skilled labour, in Australia’s industries. 
This encompasses not just the demands of the resources sector, but also maintaining and building 
other sectors of the economy. 
                                                          
100 Underlying the importance of the participation agenda, while the IGR identifies a growing fiscal gap, it also assumes that 
this occurs despite achieving a rise in the participation rate of the 15-64 year age group from 76.2 per cent in 2009-10 to 79.7 
per cent by 2049-50. A failure to achieve this would involve a considerable increase in the magnitude of the gap. 
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6.3.2 The goals of the participation agenda and the minimum wage 
Accepting that the balance between these elements is perhaps more contentious than the general 
thrust of participation agenda, the policies can be seen as comprising four more specific goals: 
• Maintaining living standard growth, especially for low income households 
• Boosting participation and rewarding and valuing employment 
• Breaking out of the welfare model 
• Promoting training and productivity. 
The relationship between these and the minimum wage, and possible pathways are considered 
below: 
6.4 Aspects of the choice of pathway 
Before considering the merits of particular pathways for the future evolution of Australia’s minimum 
wage policy in the light of these goals, it is useful to first consider some aspects and policy choices 
which emerge in considering the options. The first of these is concerned with whether there are 
options which will permit a higher minimum wage to be paid; the second focuses on the relationship 
between the minimum wage and household living standards; and the third addresses the nature of 
work. 
6.4.1 Does training provide a productivity path to a higher minimum wage 
The most optimistic interpretation of the participation and productivity agenda is encompassed in 
the vision of generating, across the population, through improved education and training, high levels 
of individual productivity which will drive higher earnings, including higher minimum wages. Under 
this vision those currently with low skills, both inside and outside of the workforce, will be able to 
overcome the barriers these impose and provide employers with a highly skilled workforce which, in 
turn, will permit the development of new and innovative forms of employment, as well as ensuring 
high and increasing living standards. 
There are strong grounds for believing that there are considerable gains to be obtained from having a 
more highly skilled workforce, and opportunities for many of those with low skills to redress this, and 
to build their capacity and abilities though education and training. It is also probable that there are 
limits to this. Rather it may be expected that there will remain many who may not be able, or not be 
willing, to make the investment that these policies will require, or potentially be unable to function at 
the level they may need to in order to justify a higher wage level101. 
In such a case increasing the minimum wage above the rate of productivity growth of those 
employed in these positions comes at a cost. Although, as discussed previously, such a cost could 
be spread in different ways, without there being marked change in Australian institutions, it is most 
likely to be carried by the least skilled and most vulnerable in our society through high and persistent 
unemployment – or withdrawal from the labour force. 
                                                          
101 For example, one approach to higher productivity is more intensive work effort. This and a range of other possible 
demands on employees in order to achieve higher levels of productivity may increase their sense of stress. Given the extent to 
which this is one of the factors for people being unable to participate in employment there is risk that some of these policies 
may be counter-productive. 
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The evidence of the impact of training, especially through active labour market programs directed at 
those who are experiencing unemployment and other disadvantage is mixed. A recent meta-review 
by Card, Kluve and Weber (2010) concludes that positive medium term results can be gained from 
class-room based and on the job training – but that there is no evidence that current programs are 
more successful than those implemented in the 1980s. Similarly researchers including Sala and Silva 
(2011) and Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2005) identify productivity gains from training. In this 
latter it is reported that “An increase of 1 percentage point in the proportion of employees trained is 
associated with a 0.6 per cent increase in productivity and a 0.3 per cent increase in wages”.  Other 
researchers are less positive. Heckman (2012) considers that remedial interventions for 
disadvantaged adolescents, along with public job training, adult literacy and other education 
programs for disadvantaged adults are difficult to justify and have low rates of return. He argues 
rather that a focus needs to be placed on “non-cognitive abilities—including strength of motivation, 
an ability to act on long-term plans, and the socio-emotional regulation needed to work with others” 
and that for this to be effective interventions must be early – in particular in the earliest years of a 
child’s life and before they enter school.   
A further real challenge is that while many programs can achieve gains ‘on average’, these are not 
spread across all participants, with the most disadvantaged at times being the least successful. If a 
policy of founding an increasing minimum wage is to be based upon building the productivity of the 
group most likely to remain employed at this level, that is those with the least capacity, this outcome 
is not sufficient, as these will again be the people who will be excluded.  
6.4.2 Other possible pathways to a higher minimum wage 
Other than the productivity path the alternative options for a higher minimum wage involve some 
form of transfers from one group to another. As discussed these include higher prices for some 
products and services, wages compression, and potentially lower profits. None of these appear to 
be viable long term and sustainable options. 
To the extent price change is relied upon, it is to be expected that this will reduce demand for high 
minimum wage intensive products and services and hence result in a decline in employment in these 
industries. The potential for this effect can obviously be seen in some of the sectors which have high 
concentrations of minimum wage employment, such as food services where high prices may reduce 
the consumption of fast food and other prepared meals in favour of home production. In the 
hospitality sector higher domestic prices may lead many to holiday overseas, as well as reducing the 
attractiveness of Australia as a tourism destination. Similarly higher production costs for Australian 
manufacturing industries will result in the loss of price competitiveness with imported products. 
While of course re-erecting tariff barriers might seem to be a way of limiting this latter outcome, the 
cost of these across the economy has been well recognised in the past. Further to the extent such 
strategies impose costs on other sectors of the economy – such as pushing up the price of inputs to 
export oriented sectors – they generate losses elsewhere, and promote conflict between industry 
sectors. 
In the community services sector any increased costs would need to be met by increased user 
charges or higher government subsidies. This latter of course would further aggravate the fiscal gap, 
and require action such as increased taxation. 
The second method is that of reducing profits. A common experience in many OECD countries over 
recent decades has been a major fall in the labour share of national income. In Australia the wage 
share of factor income rose from 50.2 per cent in 1959-60 to a peak of 60.7 per cent in 1977-78 
before declining to 52.1 per cent in 2010-11. (ABS 2012) This trend has given some force to 
arguments suggesting that higher wages, including minimum wages may be able to be funded by a 
rebalancing of the capital and labour shares. (ILO 2007). Other analysis suggests that these 
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arguments are not as strong as they initially sound. The OECD (2012) identified capital deepening 
and increased productivity as being the main drivers of the changing shares. In the case of 
productivity where the gains are substantially as a result of the impact of new technology the 
research would suggest that labour has been less successful at bargaining for a share of these. 
While the study reports that minimum wages policies have only made a minor contribution to date it 
cautions “minimum wages are estimated to depress the labour share in the long run. A higher 
minimum wage is likely to induce greater investment in labour-saving innovations and firm sponsored 
training, whose benefits ...are not fully reaped by workers in terms of higher wages.” (ibid p111)  
Again in thinking about the relevance of this to the potential to fund a higher minimum wage from 
profits, the sectoral distribution of low pay needs to be considered. There is little evidence to 
suggest that the highest profits, or these shifts in labour share, have occurred either across the 
sectors with high concentrations of minimum wage employment, nor, remembering some 40 per 
cent of minimum wage employment is in firms of fewer than 20, in the small business sector. 
Similarly one cannot neglect the potential response in these sectors to lower profits as a 
consequence of higher minimum wages – labour replacing technology and potentially a shift in 
investment towards more profitable sectors. 
The third mechanism is that of wages compression. Essentially this involves one sector of the 
workforce cross-subsidising another. Typically it requires higher skilled workers forgoing gains from 
their productivity in order to pay for higher wages for those with lesser skills. Potentially, and more 
benignly, it can involve those workers with the strongest bargaining power sharing the gains from 
bargaining with those in weaker positions. This is a path which continues to be followed in some 
countries but it requires a strong, and relatively widespread, institutional framework, such as those 
seen in a number of European labour markets, but which no longer exists in Australia.   
This is also a question which has been considered in recent wage reviews in Australia. In the 2011 
review the Minimum Wage Panel reflected upon its previous approaches to the use of flat or 
proportionate increases and the tendency for the former to compress relativities. They noted that: 
“The ACTU claimed that this compression of wage relativities is unfair because it diminishes the 
extent to which award rates of pay properly reflect the level of skill and responsibility inherent in 
different jobs and the value attached to those jobs. ... It also referred to adverse consequences for 
workforce development, productivity, prosperity and social inclusion as compression of relativities 
reduces incentives to improve skills”. (FWA 2011 c2011/1 p80) 
6.4.3 The minimum wage household income and inequality 
Traditionally a central interest in the level of the minimum wage has been on its contribution to the 
incomes of low income households, and hence the standard of living that they can achieve and the 
extent of inequality. From this perspective it was assumed that increasing the value of the minimum 
wage would deliver considerable gains to such households. 
As has been detailed in this paper, and other analysis, this assumption is far from valid. While the 
minimum wage does play a more important role in the incomes of low income households than it 
does for those with higher incomes, the match between low earning rate employment and low 
income households is very loose. The majority of minimum wage workers do not live in the poorest 
20 per cent of households, even when these households are restricted to those with earnings from 
employment. Indeed only around 30 per cent of the income flow from minimum wage employment 
flows to these households and only a little over half flows to the poorest 40 per cent.  
A second issue is even to the extent minimum wage earners are found in these low income working 
households a very high proportion of them are employed part-time. Indeed in the poorest 20 per cent 
of households with some earned income there are some 93,000 full-time adult minimum wage 
employees and 146,000 adult minimum wage earners who are working part-time. 
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Given this, the use of the FMW as a means for increasing the incomes of low income households 
would appear to be poorly targeted and inefficient. Most of the benefits would flow to higher income 
households and an increase in the rate will do relatively little to address the extent to which low 
incomes are driven by limited part-time employment. 
6.4.4 The role of employment 
Using an EITC or similar mechanism to ‘top up’ earnings, while totally consistent with what has 
already occurred for families with children, can also be seen as a departure from the expectation that 
employment should be a means of ensuring economic independence. As such some would argue 
that society would be better off without jobs that cannot pay a ‘living wage’. For example the 
Australian Catholic Commission for Employment Relations (2002) argues “it is also appropriate to 
question whether the social security system should be used as a replacement for the payment of a 
just wage by employers. In particular, Catholic Social Teaching proclaims that it is the responsibility 
of the employer to pay a just wage and that the role of the State is to establish a minimum code or 
standard in relation to wages to ensure that the needs of the worker and his or her dependents are 
met.” Similarly a previously cited Watson (1999) argues that such a top up would compromise the 
sense of independence of these employees. 
As noted however, these types of arguments would appear to ignore the extent to which government 
already intervenes directly and indirectly to reduce inequality, such as support for children, but also 
through housing subsidies, access to health care and other services.  In addition of course the level 
of what would need to be paid in such a ‘living wage’ would also be affected by the extent to which 
these workers are required to pay a wide range of taxes and other government charges.   
Notwithstanding the extent to which it is already accepted that interventions are required to 
supplement earnings to generate adequate outcomes for some groups, there is a case for any 
extension of this to be taken consciously and with a clear understanding that as such the 
employment goal for many may not be to achieve economic independence from their work, but 
rather through their work these people are making a contribution towards meeting their needs and 
fulfilling a mutual obligation to the rest of the community to maximise the degree to which they are 
self-supporting, even if a gap remains.   
This debate however only considers one part of the equation. A further element, central to many 
discussions about social inclusion, and the nature of citizenship, is the potential benefits of 
employment which go beyond the income gains. Three concepts of this can be considered. The first 
is that of employment as an obligation of citizenship, the second is that all productive employment 
generates benefits for the community and increases the potential consumption of all members, the 
third, and most focused on in social policy debates are the direct benefits for individuals from 
employment. 
The McClure Report (2000) in supporting a strong participation agenda, including the potential role of 
in work benefits as a supplement to earnings states: “Participation in paid employment is a major 
source of self-esteem. Without it, people can fail to develop, or become disengaged from, 
employment, family and community networks. This can lead to physical and psychological ill health 
and reduced life opportunities for parents and their children”. This centrality of employment is also 
seen in the principle enunciated by the Australian Social Inclusion Board (2009) of “Helping everyone 
get the skills and support they need so they can work and connect with the community”. While 
qualifying what they mean by ‘decent work’ this is also reflected in the ACTU (2009) view of a Fair 
Society “Congress believes that participation in decent work is the single most important pathway to 
address disadvantage for working age Australians and their families.”  
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The position statement by The Royal Australasian College of Physicians, Australasian Faculty of 
Occupation and Environmental Medicine (2010) on realising the health benefits of work states that 
“evidence‐based research also provides some very good news about the relationship between 
health and work. Work, in general, is good for health and wellbeing”. In addition to income five other 
benefits are nominated: “Ensuring that some physical activity is undertaken on work days; Providing a 
sense of community and social inclusion; Allowing workers to feel that they are making a contribution 
to society and their family; Giving structure to days and weeks; and a decreased likelihood that 
individuals will engage in risky behaviours, such as excessive drinking.” 
6.5 Making decisions 
The fortuitous period over which Australia was largely able to hold the real minimum wage stable as 
it transitioned from being a wage sufficient to meet the needs of a family to being one for an 
individual, without imposing a large social cost, is coming to an end. While a relatively small group in 
the community are living in households wholly or primarily reliant upon the minimum wage, it is likely 
that if their incomes do not increase then the country will face increasing inequality. Yet increasing 
the minimum wage so as to maintain living standards will potentially act to exclude many from 
employment. 
6.5.1 Weighing up the pathways 
In section 6.2 three possible pathways are identified for the future development of the minimum 
wage in Australia: continue holding the minimum wage flat in real terms to minimise employment 
pressures; allowing it to increase – roughly in line with average earnings growth in the community 
and rely upon training interventions to improve the productivity of those with low skills. The third, as 
with the first, would be to maintain the Minimum Wage at around its current value and to utilise 
transfers, potentially in the form of an EITC, to boost the income from employment, if this is seen as 
being insufficient to allow individuals to achieve the standard of living which may be appropriate in 
the light of general community trends. 
The relative merits of these against the national goals and aspirations previously outlined are 
considered below. 
Maintaining living standard growth, especially for low income households 
Over the past 25 years the living standards of both singles and families with children reliant upon the 
minimum wage have increased, notwithstanding the fact that the minimum wage has essentially 
remained flat in real terms. This has been achieved through tax and transfer policies. 
However as detailed, because of the distribution of minimum wage workers across households, and 
the role of part-time employment, the minimum wage is a relatively poorly placed tool for achieving 
growth in living standards of low income households. Rather to pursue this objective policies are 
required which: 
• Are much more targeted at those households on low incomes 
• Seek to boost the participation of those working only limited hours, including minimum wage 
workers. Such policies could include those which address impediments to participation – such 
as child care provision – as well as a sharpening of the focus of participation objectives of 
transfer payments onto achieving substantial levels of participation, rather than concerns about 
marginal EMTRs across a very wide range of incomes. These latter could for example take the 
form of minimum hours of part-time work for eligibility for support. 
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Looking at the larger question of inequality, the role of the minimum wage is limited not just in terms 
of its relative role with respect to the lowest income households, but also to the extent increasing 
inequality has been largely driven by income growth at the very top of the income distribution. 
Boosting participation, rewarding employment and promoting social inclusion 
Substantial increases in the minimum wage unless matched by productivity gains are likely to have a 
negative impact on labour demand, although a positive effect on labour supply. This combination 
results in increased unemployment. Even with higher productivity there will be pressures on keeping 
gains in employment as employers may use a higher capital to labour mix to achieve levels of 
production with less employment. To the extent a higher minimum wage draws more highly capable 
people into the workforce, it may also result in substitution for existing employees with lower 
productivity and the further shuffling of those with the lowest skills further to the back of the 
unemployment queue. On the other hand the macroeconomic benefits of higher productivity and 
income may have a positive impact on economic growth and competiveness. 
Although it may be argued that a lower minimum wage may boost employment it is not likely that 
simply holding the minimum wage flat in real terms, while average earnings grow, will have any such 
effect, although it is likely to stem job losses. 
Employment as a social participation goal recognises that a job provides much more for individuals 
than just the income they derive from it. Options such as an EITC provide the opportunity to focus 
economic policy on the employment objective in this context, and to use the transfer system as a 
complement to meet the income goal. 
Breaking out of the welfare model 
This goal is, in the first instance, closely linked to the first – to the extent people can gain 
employment many of them can move out of the welfare system. Similarly any reduction in 
employment opportunities – especially those for people with low levels of educational achievement, 
poor skills and potentially broken work histories – will tend to reinforce reliance upon income 
support.  
This though is only part of the relationship. Under the existing structure of income support payment 
means testing a considerable group of part-time minimum wage workers (as well as workers earning 
at a higher rate) are eligible to receive some portion of income support payments.  If income support 
payments increase more rapidly than the minimum wage, this problem will be exacerbated. 
As identified by the AFTS, alternative delivery mechanisms exist through mechanisms such as an 
EITC.  These can be delivered through the taxation system or directly as payments. The advantages 
of going down this path is that it provides a clear separation of the welfare system – directed at 
those who are unable to support themselves, and a separate system which supplements the efforts 
of individuals through paying in work benefits. Such a separation also allows for a clearer 
demarcation between being wholly reliant upon welfare and being in employment. It also permits the 
tailoring of in work assistance to meet the priorities of achieving appropriate labour market 
outcomes, rather than design directed at the welfare function. 
The disadvantages of moving to a separate scheme is that it would require the program to either be 
run by agencies which are primarily identified as providing welfare, or the development of new 
delivery mechanisms, with potential duplication of existing mechanisms. 
Promoting training and productivity  
The relationship between training, the minimum wage and productivity has been discussed 
extensively, in particular the capacity of the provision of training as a means of allowing an increase 
in the minimum wage. 
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There is also the potential for increases in the minimum wage to generate pressures for some 
employers to provide additional training to those workers whose wages are being increased. Some 
people may also, on their own volition, seek to upgrade their skills to improve their chances of 
gaining employment and accessing this higher wage.   
What is unknown is the countervailing impact on those unable or unwilling to develop their skills and 
meet the demands of a more intensive workplace. As such there is the potential for a group to be 
excluded. 
Alternatives such as an EITC, while avoiding this possibility, may blunt the pressure on individuals 
with an unwillingness to invest in their skills.   
6.5.2 How do we proceed? 
Taking a decision on the strategy which should be adopted is not one which needs to be made 
immediately, however the question does need to enter into the public debate.  
There is a clear need for future policy with regard to the minimum wage, its role and level, to be 
guided by a clear perspective of the outcomes that are sought and with the appropriate development 
of complementary policies. This is true of whichever direction is chosen. There is also a need for a 
strong consensus across sectors.  Simple ad hoc decision making, for example, through annual 
reviews which simply focus on whether a change needs to be made on the basis of current 
circumstances and without thought or commitment to the need for underlying mechanisms, be they 
training or in work benefits, will not suffice to make the structural changes required.  
It is also a decision that needs to be guided by improved data and analysis: 
• As highlighted in this paper information on many aspects of the current role of the minimum 
wage, even in terms of the number of people who are paid at this rate, is sorely lacking. These 
gaps become even greater when areas such as the employment impact of changes in the rate of 
the minimum wage are concerned. 
• There is also a need for an evaluation of the challenges of the training agenda. To what extent 
can training sufficiently boost the skills of the minimum wage workforce to achieve the 
productivity gains consistent with growth in the minimum wage? Can these gains be achieved 
universally across the population? What is the minimum skillset that should be expected of a 
minimum wage worker? What is the cost of this training and who will fund it? 
Finally there are questions about policy priorities. To what extent should the welfare system act as a 
subsidy for employment, is there a need for it to be more prescriptive about the levels, both 
maximum and minimum, of workforce participation that people should be expected to achieve.   
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APPENDIX A: EVOLUTION OF THE MINIMUM WAGE  
Table 18 The minimum wage November 1907 to July 2012 
 Minimum wage series ($) Changes in value 
(from Sept 1978 on) 
Con-
sumer 
Price 
Index 
(g) 
Estimated real 
value of 
Minimum wage 
($2012) 
 Harvester 
/Basic 
wage (a) 
Basic 
wage 
(b) 
Mini-
mum 
Wage 
(c) 
Divergence 
- NWC 
only (d) 
Divergence 
- Metal 
workers (e) 
FMW (f) 
 Value  Notes Series 
I (h) 
Series 
II 
Nov-07 4.20        2.7 279  
Jun-13 5.10        3.3 280  
Jun-14 5.10        3.4 271  
Jun-15 5.30        3.9 245  
Jun-16 6.00        4.0 274  
Jun-17 6.30        4.2 272  
Jun-18 6.30        4.5 255  
Jun-19 6.60        5.1 235  
Jun-20 7.20        5.7 226  
Jun-21 8.60        5.0 309  
Jun-22 8.10        4.8 302  
Feb-23 8.05 8.05       4.9 296  
May-23  8.05       4.9 295  
Aug-23  8.50       5.0 309  
Nov-23  8.75       4.9 319  
Feb-24  8.50       4.9 311  
May-24  8.45       4.9 310  
Aug-24  8.40       4.9 309  
Nov-24  8.30       4.9 305  
Feb-25  8.35       4.9 307  
May-25  8.45       4.9 311  
Aug-25  8.55       4.9 315  
Nov-25  8.60       4.9 315  
Feb-26  8.65       5.0 315  
May-26  8.80       5.0 318  
Aug-26  9.05       5.0 326  
Nov-26  8.85       5.0 319  
Feb-27  8.80       5.0 318  
May-27  8.75       5.0 318  
Aug-27  8.65       5.0 315  
Nov-27  8.80       5.0 320  
Feb-28  8.90       5.0 324  
May-28  8.80       5.0 320  
Aug-28  8.80       5.0 320  
Nov-28  8.70       5.0 315  
Feb-29  8.70       5.0 313  
May-29  9.05       5.0 324  
Aug-29  9.05       5.1 322  
Nov-29  9.05       5.0 326  
Feb-30  9.05       5.0 329  
May-30  8.70       4.9 320  
Aug-30  8.60       4.8 320  
Nov-30  8.30       4.7 317  
Feb-31  7.11       4.6 279  
May-31  6.93       4.5 280  
Aug-31  6.75       4.3 280  
Nov-31  6.52       4.3 274  
Feb-32  6.43       4.2 274  
May-32  6.48       4.2 280  
Aug-32  6.39       4.1 280  
Nov-32  6.30       4.1 279  
Feb-33  6.17       4.0 276  
May-33  6.42       4.0 290  
Aug-33  6.33       4.0 289  
Nov-33  6.33       4.0 287  
 107 
 
 Minimum wage series ($) Changes in value 
(from Sept 1978 on) 
Con-
sumer 
Price 
Index 
(g) 
Estimated real 
value of 
Minimum wage 
($2012) 
 Harvester 
/Basic 
wage (a) 
Basic 
wage 
(b) 
Mini-
mum 
Wage 
(c) 
Divergence 
- NWC 
only (d) 
Divergence 
- Metal 
workers (e) 
FMW (f) 
 Value  Notes Series 
I (h) 
Series 
II 
Feb-34  6.38       4.0 287  
May-34  6.50       4.0 290  
Jun-34  6.60       4.1 293  
Sep-34  6.60       4.1 292  
Dec-34  6.60       4.1 291  
Mar-35  6.60       4.1 290  
Jun-35  6.60       4.1 289  
Sep-35  6.60       4.1 288  
Dec-35  6.80       4.1 296  
Mar-36  6.80       4.2 295  
Jun-36  6.80       4.2 294  
Sep-36  6.80       4.2 291  
Dec-36  6.80       4.3 288  
Mar-37  7.00       4.3 293  
Jun-37  7.00       4.3 291  
Jul-37  7.30       4.3 303  
Sep-37  7.30       4.4 301  
Oct-37  7.50       4.4 309  
Dec-37  7.60       4.4 312  
Mar-38  7.70       4.4 314  
Jun-38  7.70       4.5 312  
Sep-38  7.70       4.5 310  
Dec-38  7.80       4.5 312  
Mar-39  7.80       4.5 310  
Jun-39  7.90       4.6 312  
Sep-39  7.90       4.6 309  
Dec-39  7.90       4.7 306  
Feb-40  8.00       4.7 310  
May-40  8.00       4.7 308  
Aug-40  8.20       4.7 312  
Nov-40  8.30       4.8 313  
Feb-41  8.50       4.8 316  
May-41  8.60       4.9 317  
Aug-41  8.60       5.0 313  
Nov-41  8.70       5.1 310  
Feb-42  8.80       5.2 306  
May-42  9.00       5.3 307  
Aug-42  9.30       5.4 311  
Nov-42  9.50       5.5 314  
Feb-43  9.60       5.5 314  
May-43  9.60       5.6 311  
Aug-43  9.80       5.6 314  
Nov-43  9.70       5.6 312  
Feb-44  9.60       5.6 309  
May-44  9.60       5.6 310  
Aug-44  9.60       5.6 311  
Nov-44  9.60       5.6 311  
Feb-45  9.60       5.6 311  
May-45  9.60       5.6 311  
Aug-45  9.60       5.6 311  
Nov-45  9.60       5.6 309  
Feb-46  9.60       5.6 308  
May-46  9.70       5.7 310  
Aug-46  9.80       5.7 311  
Nov-46  9.80       5.7 308  
Dec-46  10.50       5.8 327  
Feb-47  10.60       5.8 330  
May-47  10.60       5.8 327  
Aug-47  10.70       5.9 327  
Nov-47  10.90       6.1 325  
Feb-48  11.00       6.2 320  
May-48  11.40       6.4 323  
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 Minimum wage series ($) Changes in value 
(from Sept 1978 on) 
Con-
sumer 
Price 
Index 
(g) 
Estimated real 
value of 
Minimum wage 
($2012) 
 Harvester 
/Basic 
wage (a) 
Basic 
wage 
(b) 
Mini-
mum 
Wage 
(c) 
Divergence 
- NWC 
only (d) 
Divergence 
- Metal 
workers (e) 
FMW (f) 
 Value  Notes Series 
I (h) 
Series 
II 
Aug-48  11.60       6.5 321  
Nov-48  11.90       6.7 320  
Feb-49  12.20       6.8 324  
May-49  12.40       7.0 320  
Aug-49  12.70       7.1 323  
Nov-49  12.90       7.3 319  
Feb-50  13.30       7.4 324  
May-50  13.50       7.5 325  
Aug-50  13.80       7.8 319  
Nov-50  14.20       7.9 324  
Dec-50  16.20       8.2 356  
Feb-51  16.90       8.2 372  
May-51  17.60       8.6 369  
Aug-51  18.90       9.1 375  
Nov-51  20.00       9.6 376  
Feb-52  21.00       10.3 368  
May-52  21.60       10.6 368  
Aug-52  22.70       11.0 372  
Nov-52  23.10       11.2 372  
Feb-53  23.10       11.3 369  
May-53  23.40       11.4 370  
Aug-53  23.60       11.5 370  
Jun-56  24.60       12.5 355  
May-57  25.60       12.8 361  
May-58  26.10       13.0 362  
Jun-59  27.60       13.2 377  
Jul-61  28.80       14.2 366  
Jun-64  30.80       14.4 386  
Jul-66  32.80 36.37      15.5 423  
Jul-67   37.37      15.9 424  
Oct-68   38.72      16.5 423  
Dec-69   42.22      17.1 445  
Jan-71   46.22      17.9 466  
May-72   50.92      19.4 473  
May-73   60.10      20.5 529  
May-74   68.10      23.3 527  
Jan-75   76.10      26.4 520  
May-75   80.10      27.4 527  
Sep-75   82.90      28.6 523  
Feb-76   88.20      30.2 527  
Apr-76   93.20      31.0 542  
May-76   96.00      31.0 559  
Aug-76   98.50      31.8 559  
Nov-76   100.70      32.6 557  
Mar-77   106.40      35.3 544  
May-77   108.40      35.3 554  
Aug-77   110.60      36.1 553  
Dec-77   112.30      37.7 537  
Feb-78   114.00      37.7 546  
Jun-78   115.50      39.0 534  
Sep-78    115.50 127.50  $12.00 
Supplementary 
payment (j) 39.7 525 579 
Dec-78    120.10 132.60  4.0% NWC 40.6 534 589 
Jun-79    123.90 136.80  3.2% NWC 42.4 527 582 
Nov-79    123.90 141.90  3.7% Work value case  43.4 515 590 
Jan-80    129.50 148.30  4.5% NWC 44.7 523 599 
Jul-80    134.90 154.50  4.2% NWC 47.0 518 593 
Jan-81    139.90 160.20  3.7% NWC 48.8 517 592 
May-81    144.90 166.00  3.6% NWC 50.0 523 599 
Dec-81    144.90 190.20  $24.23 
Metal industry 
award (k) 54.3 481 632 
Jul-82    144.90 203.80  $13.57 Metal industry 56.6 462 650 
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 Minimum wage series ($) Changes in value 
(from Sept 1978 on) 
Con-
sumer 
Price 
Index 
(g) 
Estimated real 
value of 
Minimum wage 
($2012) 
 Harvester 
/Basic 
wage (a) 
Basic 
wage 
(b) 
Mini-
mum 
Wage 
(c) 
Divergence 
- NWC 
only (d) 
Divergence 
- Metal 
workers (e) 
FMW (f) 
 Value  Notes Series 
I (h) 
Series 
II 
award (k) 
Oct-83    151.10 212.60  4.3% NWC 64.0 426 599 
Apr-84    157.30 221.30  4.1% NWC 65.2 435 612 
Apr-85    161.40 227.10  2.6% NWC 68.1 428 602 
Nov-85    167.50 235.70  3.8% NWC 71.3 424 596 
Jul-86    171.40 241.10  2.3% NWC 75.6 409 575 
Mar-87    181.40 251.10  $10.00 NWC Tier 1 81.4 402 556 
Sep-87    188.70 261.10  4.0% NWC Tier 2 84.0 405 561 
Feb-88    194.70 267.10  $6.00 NWC  85.5 411 564 
Sep-88    200.50 275.10  3.0% NWC first 
amount 
90.2 401 550 
Mar-89    210.50 285.10  $10.00 
NWC second 
amount (l) 92.9 409 554 
Aug-89    220.50 295.10  $10.00 NWC Tier 1 95.2 418 559 
Mar-90    230.50 305.10  $10.00 
NWC second 
structural 
efficiency 
adjustment 100.9 412 545 
Apr-90    230.50 308.20  $3.10 
Minimum Rates 
Adjustment (m) 100.9 412 551 
Jan-91    230.50 314.40  $6.20 
Minimum Rates 
Adjustment (m) 106.0 392 535 
Apr-91    236.30 322.30  2.5% NWC 105.8 403 550 
Sep-91    236.30 325.40  $3.10 
Minimum Rates 
Adjustment (m) 106.6 400 551 
Dec-93    244.30 333.40  $8.00 NWC 110.0 401 547 
Sep-94    244.30 333.40  $0.00 
SNA First (catch 
up for those 
without first) 111.9 394 537 
Mar-95    252.30 341.40  $8.00 SNA Second 114.7 397 537 
Sep-95    260.30 349.40   $8.00 
SNA 3rd 
confirmed  117.6 399 536 
Apr-97       359.40 $10.00 
SNR 
Determination of 
federal minimum 
wage 120.5  538 
Apr-98      373.40 $14.00 SNR   120.3  560 
Apr-99      385.40 $12.00 SNR   121.8  571 
May-00      400.40 $15.00 SNR   125.2  577 
May-01      413.40 $13.00 SNR   132.7  562 
May-02      431.40 $18.00 SNR   136.6  570 
May-03      448.40 $17.00 SNR   141.3  572 
May-04      467.40 $19.00 SNR   144.1  585 
Jun-05      484.40 $17.00 SNR   148.4  589 
Oct-06      511.76 $27.46 
AFPC Wage 
setting decision (n) 155.7  593 
Oct-07      522.12 $10.26 
AFPC Wage 
setting decision 158.6  594 
Oct-08      543.78 $21.66 
AFPC Wage 
setting decision 166.5  589 
Jun-09      543.78 $0.00 
AFPC Wage 
setting decision 167.0  587 
Jul-10      569.90 $26.00 
FWA Annual 
Wage review (o) 172.1  597 
Jul-11      589.30 3.4% 
FWA Annual 
Wage review 178.3  596 
Jul-12      606.40 2.9% 
FWA Annual 
Wage review 180.4  606 
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(a) As per detailed discussion in Table 19. 
(b) Commonwealth Basic Wage "6 Capitals" Labour Report No 54 1968 and 1969 p 335 (ABS Cat No 6101.0) 
(c) Minimum Wage “Unweighted average of 6 Capital Cities” variously taken from Labour Reports (ABS Cat No 
6101.0) 1973 p307, 1975 p93, 1976 p100, 1977 p80 1979 p108. 
(d) Series adjusted for National Wage Cases only excluding payment specifically flowing to Metal Industries 
Award and other Awards. From 1978 to 1984 reported increases taken from Victorian Year Book – various years 
(ABS Cat No 1300.2), subsequent amounts taken from NWC decisions. 
(e) As per (d) but including amounts flowing to metal industries  
(f) Taken from decisions as indicated. 
(g) September 1948 on from ABS 6401.0 September 2011 Time Series Spreadsheets Tables 1 and 2. Data prior 
to this data has been derived from “Retail Price Index Numbers – Australia Long Term Linked Series” Year Book 
Australia 1988 (ABS 1988 Cat No 1300.0 p680). In this latter series the annual estimates have been used for 
June and other quarters derived by linear extrapolation. The two series have been linked by using average 1948-
49 data. 
(j) Dollar value taken from AMWU Research Centre Spreadsheet. Herbert (1979) reports “Further in the Metal 
Industry Award, a scheme of supplementary payments was introduced by a Full Bench of the Commission. 
Under this scheme part of the over-award payments applicable to employees in particular classifications have 
been transferred into the award, and the level of over-award payment reduced by a corresponding amount.” 
(k) The metal industry agreement ratified 18/12/1981 included an initial increase of $25 and subsequent increase 
of $14 from 1/6/82 in the fitters rate. This was to be applied pro-rata to other classifications. (Mulvey 1983) The 
estimated increases of $24.20 and $13.60 represent a ratio of 96.9%. This is apparently above the actual ratio 
with the fitters’ rate, however this increase has been used as it permits the completion of a consistent series. 
(l) The amount of $285.00 is cited in the 1989 National Wage Case (AIRC Print H9100 p12) as the minimum 
classification rate for a “Metal industry worker, grade 1” 
(m) The Accord Mark V provided for “Minimum Rates Adjustments (MRAs) to bring about consistency in award 
classifications across different industries. MRAs to be implemented in 4 instalments. Such MRAs are to protect 
low paid workers and establish stability in the award system” (Easson and Forrest 1994). Estimates of the value 
of the MRAs and their timing have been derived from known changes from National Wage Cases and data 
included in Table A12.2 of the Report of the Review of Veterans’ Entitlements (Clarke, Riding and Rosalky 2003 
p759). 
(n) The decision (AFPC 2006 p 63) states: "The Standard FMW increases by $27.36 per week bringing the 
weekly rate to $511.86”. This increase however only took the rate to $511.76 which is the base figure used in 
the following decision. 
(o) Increase described as $26.00, actual increase given dollar value of the minimum wage cited was $26.12. 
The Basic Wage between 1907 and 1922 
In this paper the ABS series for the minimum wage has been used from 1923 to 1978. Identifying the 
value of the Basic Wage between 1907 and 1922 presents a number of difficulties. Between 1907 
and 1913 the wage essentially stood at the Harvester standard of 7s a day. From 1913 to 1920 it was 
subject to a series of decisions, effectively seeking to index it for changes in prices. In 1921 
automatic indexation was introduced, along with a 3s increase in the wage ‘Powers 3s’ in 1922 (ABS 
1967). This latter was intended to work as a buffer to ensure that the real value of the basic wage did 
not drop below the Harvester standard, given that the indexation was undertaken on a retrospective 
basis. 
A detailed description of the processes over this data is given by Forster (1980). Essentially it can be 
considered as a steep learning curve as the court sought to develop an approach to maintaining the 
real value of the Harvester wage. This included: the development of meaningful price indexes; 
deciding on how to use price indexes over time (such as whether to use annual or quarterly data); 
the difficulty of having a large number of location-specific price indexes (especially where the original 
Harvester decision was a flat rate across locations102); the ongoing development of a range of 
                                                          
102 Higgins noted this as an issue in 1913 (7 CAR 58) where with reference to the original Harvester decision he states 
“Assuming this basic wage as established for Melbourne in 1907, it follows from other figures of the Commonwealth 
Statistician that the proper basic wage for Sydney was not 7s., but more. For it appears that …the basic wage in Sydney 
should be treated as 7s. 6d. in 1907. It will be recalled that I found the 7s. in Melbourne, on Melbourne evidence.  When I 
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awards each with their own minimum rates; and balancing the industrial relations component of the 
court’s decision making and the inherent nature of court decisions with an essentially technical 
question of how to index. In addition the Court needed to take account of quite significant price 
changes over the period, with periods of both inflation and deflation. This process was not made 
simpler by the fact that Higgins as President and Powers as Deputy at times took different 
approaches to a number of questions in their individual decisions. 
The most frequently used (Withers, Endres and Perry 1985, Vamplew 1987) series for the minimum 
wage prior to the ABS series is that developed by Macarthy (1972). This is based upon an exhaustive 
study of all of the Awards, Consent Awards, and Industrial Agreements made by the Court between 
1901 and 1921 and the development of a weighted average being based on location and industry. 
This series has not been used here.  Rather the focus has been placed on developing a series which 
can be considered to reflect the Court’s deliberation on what the contemporary equivalent to the 
Harvester decision was.  This approach was adopted for a number of reasons. These include the 
extent the Macarthy series includes some increases in earlier years before the Court deliberated on 
the actual need to update the Harvester decision, the inclusion of agreements and consent awards 
which did not necessarily reflect actual Court considerations of the rate of the Basic Wage, and the 
extent to which an average series, even adjusted for some prices, includes a wide range of location 
specific and industry specific decisions.  The basis of the series used here is described in Table 19. 
Table 19 Derivation of minimum wage series 1907 to 1921 
Year Source and notes Weekly value) 
(Shillings) Dollars 
1907 Harvester Decision (2 CAR 1) 7s. per day 42s. $4.20 
1913 Federated Gas Employees (7 CAR 58) 8s. 6d. per day: In this decision the 
lowest rate for Yardmen and other labourers was set at 8s. 6d. in 
Melbourne and 8s. 3d. in Hobart. The decision contained extensive 
discussion by Higgins about the process of updating the Harvester 
Decision.  (The Melbourne figure is used, 51s per week.) 
In the slightly later Australian Builders’ Labourers Federation case (7 CAR 
210) the rates are expressed on an hourly basis and there are some 
specific allowances – but the decision notes that the rates are sufficient 
“for Melbourne … so as to afford a net income of 50s per week.”(ibid 
p222) 
51s. $5.10 
1914 Federated Tanners and Leather Dressers (8 CAR 145): £2.11.0 per week:  
This rate was set for a range of miscellaneous occupations including 
“persons not otherwise provided for” (ibid p176). In discussion Powers 
refers back to Higgins Decision in the previous year to award 8s. 6d. 
This rate was also awarded in the Millers case (8 CAR 9) for Victoria “All 
adult workers not otherwise mentioned or provided for in this Agreement 
shall be paid not less than £2.11s. per week” (ibid p42). 
In the Telegraph case (8 CAR 119) Higgins indicates that “The basic 
wage, which would on the Australian mean cost of living be 43s. in 1907, 
should now be … 53s. per week” (ibid p127) he awarded a lowest annual 
amount of £132 (just under 51s. per week).103 
51s. $5.10 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
came to deal with the cost of living in other places, I invited all parties who disputed 7s. as the appropriate figure in these 
places to bring evidence on the subject; but no evidence – at all events, no satisfactory evidence – was adduced to show the 
higher cost of living in Sydney; and I treated both cities alike, as no sufficient grounds for differentiation was established.” (ibid 
p70) 
103 This and other decisions relating to Commonwealth Government employment tend to differ from other awards made by the 
court in a number of respects. This appears to reflect the extent to which this employment was seen as being a permanent 
career. In addition to decisions usually being based on an annual salary the base rates tended to be determined only for the 
first year of service after which a higher rate was paid.  In addition, for single men under the age of 25, an unmarried rate was 
paid which was below the lowest married rate which has been set at the equivalent to the basic wage. 
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Year Source and notes Weekly value) 
(Shillings) Dollars 
1915 The Federated Artificial Manure Trade and Chemical Worker’ Union of 
Australia (9 CAR 181) This decision explicitly referred in its summary to 
the daily rate of the “Basic wage for Melbourne district raised to 8s 
10d.”(ibid p181). The same amount was provided in the Federated Gas 
Employees case (9 CAR 226) for Melbourne workers. 
Other decisions include the Letter Carriers Association (9 CAR 52) in 
which the Basic Wage is described as being £132 per annum (just under 
51s per week) (ibid p67). The Federated Glass Founders’ (9 CAR 226) 
provided £2.14s, although the Federated Miners (9 CAR 330) were 
awarded 8s 6d. per day. 
53s. 5.30 
1916 The Australasian Meat Industry Employees’ Union (10 CAR 465) decision 
noted “If, then, 42s. was the proper basic wage in 1907, the proper basic 
wage now should be fully £3 per week; and I shall award 
accordingly.”(p484) This amount was also awarded in the Federated 
Artificial Manure Trade and Chemical Workers’ Union case (10 CAR 522) 
and that of the Storemen and Packers (10 CAR 629). 
60s. 6.00 
1917 The Federated Gas Employees Industrial Union (11 CAR 267) This 
awarded to those working for ‘the Melbourne companies’ “10s. 6d. per 
day or shift” to labourers and yardmen – as well as other occupations not 
described in the award (p 291). 10s. 6d. was also awarded as the Basic 
wage for miners in Mount Lyell (11 CAR 17), although a consent award for 
Tanners and leather workers agreed to a minimum of £3 1s. 6d (11 CAR 
796) while £3. was awarded to the Millers (11 CAR 316) with this amount 
also being cited in the Engine Drivers decision (11 CAR 197) 
63s. 6.30 
1918 The Federated Coopers of Australia (12 CAR 427) decision states “The 
basic wage fixed, according to the Statistician’s figures for the cost of 
living in the six capital cities, 1917, at 63s. per week” (p 427) 
63s. 6.30 
1919 Federated  Carters and Drivers Industrial Union of Australia decision (13 
CAR 214), in addition to discussing the need for an inquiry into the 
question of the setting of a federal living wage, awarded £3 6s. for 
labourers. In the Federated Gas Employees Industrial Union case (13 CAR 
437), in September 1919, Higgins stated “I propose, therefore to treat 
10s. 10d. as being prima facie the basic wage for Melbourne”(ibid p457). 
The Australasian Meat Industry decision (13 CAR 153) provided a 
minimum rate of £5. 3s. 
66s. 6.60 
1920 Federated Millers and Mill Employees’ Association of Australia decision 
(14 CAR 114) stated “All adults employees whose duties are not herein 
specified will receive not less than £3 12s.” (p133). Similarly the Wool and 
Basil Workers’ Federation of Australia (14 CAR 288) “… persons not 
otherwise provided for £3 12s.”(p312). In both the Tramways (14 CAR 
1114) and Australian Timber Workers (14 CAR 811) cases 11s. 10d. was 
provided – a weekly amount of 71s. was determined 
72s. 7.20 
1921 Federated Gas Employees Industrial Union (15 CAR 838) in discussion of 
the Piddington Report in this case Powers refers to the “Court’s basic 
wage of £4 6s. (p860) and in the Federated Engine Drivers’ and Firemen’s 
decision (15 CAR 269) he likewise s notes “The basic rate of £4 6s. was 
only fixed in February last” (p276). In the Clothing Trades decision (15 
CAR 434) a marginally lower minimum wage of £4.5.6 – 85½s. per week 
was set. 
86s. 8.60 
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Year Source and notes Weekly value) 
(Shillings) Dollars 
1922 The Federated Tanners and Leather Dressers Union of Australia decision 
(16 CAR 797), while in large part by agreement, contained the rate for 
tarpitmen and other labourers, as well as those not otherwise provided for 
was £4 1s.  
In October the full court agreed (16 CAR 829) a new approach to 
indexation and an additional 3s. per week to take account of 
retrospective indexation. In this decision they note that with the data on 
price changes to the September quarter 1921 that this “equated 
Harvester equivalent £4 1s. 6d.; but the rate under the new method was 
fixed at £4 5s.” (p835). (This amount is also cited in (16 CAR 4) in 
reference to Melbourne “85s. a week is a fair basic wage for an ordinary 
labourer”(p 16). 
Over this period there was much volatility in prices – in the Engineers 
case (16 CAR 231) it was noted “I propose to fix 77s. a week. This would 
be mean a reduction of 7s. at least a week in all rates fixed by 
award.”(p262)104  
 
81s. 8.10 
1923 The Manufacturing Grocers Employees Federation of Australia (17 CAR 
625) award set a basic wage of £4 0s. 6d. A slightly higher rate of £4 2s 
was set in the Carters and drivers case (17 CAR 194) although it was 
noted that this was a fall of 4s. on the previous award. 
The Manufacturing Grocers rate has been used since it coincides with the 
ABS all capitals series.  
80s. 6d. 8.05 
 
This series, along with that of Macarthy and an indicative set of rates published by Fair Work 
Australia (FWA 2011) is shown in Table 20. In seeking to understand the real value of these rates in 
the early years of the minimum wage account must also be taken of the considerable limitations of 
price indexes over the time, and that for the purposes of this analysis the data has been used on an 
annual basis.  
                                                          
104 This volatility was discussed in the Gas Employees case (16 CAR 4) “assuming the £3 6s a week allowed by the late 
President was fair for the year ending the 30th June 1919” the rates would have been “£4 9s a week for the December, 1920, 
quarter. £4 8s 6d a week for the March, 1921, quarter. £4 3s a week for the June, 1921, quarter.  £4 a week for the September, 
1921, quarter” (p 14). 
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Table 20 Comparison of estimates of the Basic Wage 1907-1922 
 Macarthy (1972) 
Average Weekly Wage of 
the lowest paid grade of 
Adult Male as prescribed 
by CCCA  
 Early minimum award rates (Fair Work 
Australia 2011) 
As used 
(Table 19) 
Dollar 
equivalent 
 Actual  Dollar 
equivalent 
  Actual Dollar 
equivalent 
 
1907    Harvester  £2.2.02 4.20 4.20 
1908       4.20 
1909 43s 8d 4.37     4.20 
1910 45s 7d 4.56     4.20 
1911 46s 0d 4.60     4.20 
1912 48s 3d 4.83     4.20 
1913 48s 3d 4.83  7 CAR at p58  £2.10.0 5.00 5.10 
1914 51s 3d 5.13  WWF v CSOA  
ATTCU vs PS Com. 
£2.11.0 
£2.13.0 
5.10 
5.30 5.10 
1915 52s 3d 5.23  ALCA vs PS Com  £3.3.6 6.35 5.30 
1916 54s 7d 5.46  FAMTCWU £3.1.6 6.15 6.00 
1917 58s 5d 5.84  FGFA £3.3.0 6.30 6.30 
1918 60s 11d 6.09  AEPU vs PMG £3.6.0 6.60 6.30 
1919 64s 6d 6.45  FTLDEU £3.15.0 7.50 6.60 
1920 
70s 1d 7.01 
  £3.17.0 
 to £4.2.0 
7.70 
to 8.20 7.20 
1921 77s 5d 7.74  15 CAR at 829 £4.5.0 8.50 8.60 
1922    16 CAR at 829 £4.10.0 9.00 8.10 
1923       8.05 
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APPENDIX B: JUNIOR MINIMUM WAGE WORKERS 
The main analysis of the minimum wage in this paper has excluded youth. There are several reasons 
for this. Firstly is the focus of the paper on the establishment of the minimum wage as a family wage 
and its evolution relative to this function. The second is the more limited data available on youth 
being paid the minimum wage. In particular, the EEH is not amenable to analysis of the incidence of 
youth minimum wages. Thirdly there is considerable complexity in analysis because of the single 
year age specific rates at which the minimum wage is paid, and the extent to which these vary 
across awards.  
While age specific minimum rates were included in the Harvester decision (at rates that ranged from 
28.6 per cent of the adult rate for those aged under 15 years to 85.7 per cent for people age 20 
years), junior rates were more frequently expressed in individual awards, as were the ages at which 
adult rates applied105. In the 2010-11 decision of Fair Work Australia a set of relativities was adopted 
for the establishment of age specific minimum wages for those not covered by awards.   
To look at the issue of Minimum Wage employment amongst youth these relativities have been 
retrospectively applied to the value of the minimum wage at the time of the 2011 HILDA survey106.  
This indicates that an estimated 30.5 per cent of employed people under the age of 21 years were 
paid rates at or below the age specific minimum wage. Very strong caution however needs to be 
exercised with this estimate. Firstly it uses relativities which were not necessarily in place at the time 
at which the data was collected. Secondly it does not take account of those who may be in receipt 
of training rates or undergoing apprenticeships. Thirdly it ignores the extent to which some youth 
may be eligible for higher minimum wages where awards and agreements provide for this. 
Notwithstanding these problems the result is sufficient to suggest that junior employees were more 
likely than older workers to be paid at or near the minimum wage. 
The estimated 317,261 young minimum wage workers (see Table 21) are on the whole children living 
at home with their parents. Such children can be divided into two groups: 169,334 dependent 
students all of whom were working part-time;107 and 117,711 non dependent children still living at 
home who may or may not also be students. Of this latter group 30.5 per cent were working part-
time. Only 2.3 per cent of all the minimum wage workers aged under 21 years were members of a 
couple and just 1.9 per cent were living alone. A further 5.1 per cent were ‘other household 
members’ a classification including people living in group houses. This family status pattern is 
however not unique to those young people working for the minimum wage. The 53.4 per cent of 
young minimum wage workers who were dependent students broadly compares with 58.6 per cent 
of people in this age group earning more than the minimum wage, as does the 37.1 per cent of 
minimum wage workers and 29.9 per cent of above minimum wage workers who were non-
dependent children. 
                                                          
105 Some 17.1 per cent of awards provide for the payment of adult rates at age 18 and 31.5 per cent either age 19 or 20. There 
is also considerable variation in the relationship between junior and adult rates. For example junior rates in awards for a 
person aged 16 years varied from 37.5 to 80 per cent of adult rates. (Australian Government 2006 p 159) 
106 Retrospectively applying these proportions may in part contribute to the apparent high rates of receipt of the minimum 
wage. By age the data suggests that the proportion in receipt of the minimum wage varies from 14.4 per cent for those aged 
15 years; 20 per cent for those age 16 years; around 30 per cent for those aged 17-18 years; 41.1 per cent for those aged 19 
years; and 35.5 per cent for those who were aged 20 years. This latter estimate is likely to be affected by the choice of the 
proportion of the adult rate, 97.7 per cent, being above the rates extant when the HILDA survey was conducted. In 2006 most 
awards provided for 20 year olds to be paid between 85 and 95 per cent of the adult rate. (Australian Government 2006 p 159) 
107 This is a consequence of the classification – in that a person who was working full-time is classified as a non-dependent 
regardless of their educational status. 
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Table 21 Persons aged 15-20 years by employment, minimum wage and 
family status, HILDA 2011 
Employment status relative to 
age specific minimum wage (a) 
Family status Total 
Member 
of a 
couple 
Depend-
ent 
student 
Non-
depend-
ent child 
Other 
HH 
member 
Lone 
person 
 
 - Persons- 
Full-time below FMW 119 0 1,436 0 0 1,555 
Part-time below FMW 476 15,498 6,092 140 920 23,126 
Full-time at FMW 4,452 0 82,696 5,429 3,576 96,511 
Part-time at FMW 2,197 153,836 27,487 10,601 1,532 196,069 
Full-time above 12,267 0 148,050 13,683 13,537 187,537 
Part-time above 12,814 424,210 68,228 21,870 7,345 535,878 
Total employees 32,325 593,544 333,989 51,723 26,910 1,040,676 
Other employed 757 18,813 5,201 4,702 975 30,448 
Not employed 27,898 696,447 90,109 58,735 12,871 896,493 
Total 60,980 1,308,804 429,299 115,160 40,756 1,967,617 
All FMW or below 7,244 169,334 117,711 16,170 6,028 317,261 
 
-%- 
Proportion of employees part-
time  47.9 100.0 30.5 63.0 36.4 72.6 
Proportion of part-time 
employees at or below FMW  17.3 28.5 33.0 32.9 25.0 29.0 
Proportion of full-time 
employees at or below FMW  27.1 - 36.2 28.4 20.9 34.3 
Proportion of total employees 
at or below FMW 22.4 28.5 35.2 31.3 22.4 30.5 
Distribution of minimum wage workers by family status (%) 
Part-time 1.2 77.3 15.3 4.9 1.1 100.0 
Full-time 4.7 0.0 85.8 5.5 3.6 100.0 
Total 2.3 53.4 37.1 5.1 1.9 100.0 
(a) Age specific rates derived using 2010-2011 FWA relativities.  These may not reflect the actual 
relativities in place at the time at which data was collected. 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
This data also suggests that young full-time employees, 34.3 per cent of whom were on the 
minimum wage, were more likely to be in minimum wage employment than those working part-time 
(29.0 per cent). This ratio varied by age group108. By gender young employed females were slightly 
more likely to be working for the minimum wage (33.0 per cent compared with 27.9 per cent of 
young males). This imbalance is present in both full-time employment where 37.4 per cent of young 
females were working on or below the minimum wage compared to 32.9 per cent of young males, 
and for part-time employment where the proportions were 32.1 per cent and 24.9 per cent 
respectively.  
Adopting the same approach that was used in Section 3 it is possible to consider the relative income 
levels of the households in which these young minimum wage workers live. This is shown in Table 22. 
                                                          
108 One possible reason for this is the likelihood that many of these full-time employees are apprentices and trainees. NCVER 
report that in 2010 there were some 440,700 apprentices and trainees ‘in-training’. While data on current age is not available 
some 36.7 per cent commence this prior to the age of 20 years and 70.6 commence as full-time employees. (NCVER 2011) In 
the HILDA data there are some 84,000 full-time and 45,000 part-time employees under the age of 21 who are undertaking 
Certificate III or Certificate IV courses – which most frequently form part of apprenticeships and traineeships. 46.9 per cent of 
these are paid at or below the minimum wage compared with 28.2 per cent of those not undertaking this type of study. 
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Table 22 Employed persons under the age of 21 years by employment and 
minimum wage status and household income quintile, HILDA 2011. 
 Equivalised annual household disposable income – all households with some 
wage and salary income (a) 
 1 
(Bottom) 
2 3 4 5 
(Top) 
No prev. 
year (b) 
Total 
 - % - 
All employed young people aged under 21 years  with identifiable earnings   
FT FMW 30.2 21.8 23.8 11.8 12.5 0.0 100.0 
PT FMW 23.0 20.8 20.8 15.6 19.1 0.8 100.0 
FT Above 15.3 20.3 18.8 24.5 19.7 1.3 100.0 
PT Above 19.5 22.1 23.2 18.8 15.7 0.8 100.0 
(a)  Previous financial year household disposable (after tax) income, equivalised using revised OECD scale 
(1.0 for first adult, 0.5 for subsequent adults and 0.3 for children aged under 15 years).   
(b)  Income quintiles are only constructed for those households with some income from earnings in the 
previous year. 
Source: Derived from HILDA Wave 11 ‘In Confidence’ data set. 
 
While young minimum wage workers are somewhat more likely to be living in households in the 
bottom quintile of the distribution of households with some income from wages and salaries, 
especially if they are employed on a full-time basis, they are relatively evenly distributed across the 
other quintiles. As with the previous analysis, this suggests that changes in the value of the minimum 
wage will not flow disproportionately to low income households. 
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APPENDIX C: ILLUSTRATIVE RATES OF LOW PAY 
This appendix provides some examples of the pay scales provided for across a range of Awards and 
Agreements for minimum wage and low paid positions. The pay rates are those that were payable in 
June 2009.  At this time the value of the Federal Minimum Wage was $543.78 per week. 
Award/Agreement Weekly pay 
Hospitality Industry (General) Award (a)  
Introductory:  Initial 3 months before assessment of capability to perform level 1, 
can be extended by a further 3 months. 543.90 
Level 1: Food and beverage attendant, guest service attendant and kitchen 
attendant grade 1. 560.50 
Level 2: Cook, clerical, door person, storeperson grade1; Food and beverage 
attendant, guest service attendant and kitchen attendant grade 2.    583.00 
  
Manufacturing and associated industries and occupations award (b)  
C14: Undertaking induction training, routine duties under direct supervision. 
(Usually of a 3 month duration.)  543.90 
C13: Assemble components, basic soldering, spot welding, repetitive packing, 
non trades cleaning (an employee who has completed up to three 
months structured training so as to enable the employee to perform 
work within the scope of this level). 560.50 
C12: Receiving/despatching products, basic keyboard, more advanced 
soldering/welding, accurate measurement, assist tradespersons. 583.00 
  
General Retail Industry (c)  
Employee level 1: Shop Assistant, Check-out operator, assembler, telephone 
order salesperson, etc. 600.00 
Employee level 2:  as per 1 with higher skills & forklift and ride on equipment 
operator. 615.00 
Employee level 3:  Senior salesperson, Deputy Department manager, cook, 
machine operator. 625.00 
  
McDonald’s Australia Enterprise Agreement 2009 (Wages as at 1 January 2010) 
(d)  
Level 1:  A trainee engaged in the preparation, the receipt of orders, cooking, sale 
, serving or delivery of meals snacks and/or hot or cold beverages. 
554.04 (Tas) – 
568.15 (NSW) 
Level 2:  An employee who has completed either a Front or Back Area 
Verification and is engaged in the preparation, the receipt of orders, 
cooking, sale , serving or delivery of meals snacks and/or hot or cold 
beverages. 
569.08 (Qld) – 
631.66 (ACT) 
Children’s Services Award (e)   
Level 1.1:  An employee who has no formal qualifications working under direct 
supervision, giving each child individual attention and comfort as 
required, Basic duties including food preparation, cleaning and 
gardening. 557.00 
Level 2.1: Assist in the implementation of the children’s program under 
supervision, Assist in the implementation of daily care routines. 
579.30 
600.20 after 1 year 
(a) Fair Work Australia   MA000009 - Hospitality Industry (General) Award 2010 
 http://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/modern_awards/30Jun10/MA000009_30Jun10.pdf  
(b)  Fair Work Australia Manufacturing and Associated Industries and Occupations Award 2010 
(Transitional)  http://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/modern_awards/30Jun10/MA000010_30Jun10.pdf  
(c) Fair Work Australia General Retail Industry Award 2010 
http://www.airc.gov.au/awardmod/awards/general_retail.pdf  
(d) Fair Work Australia, McDonald’s Australia Enterprise Agreement 2009, and Decision [2010]FWAA 4754 
http://www.fwc.gov.au/documents/agreements/fwa/AE878700.pdf  
(e) Children’s Services Award, http://www.fwc.gov.au/awardsandorders/html/PR991088.htm#P806_63753 
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